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Abstract of Thesis 
"The Concrete Expression of Abstract Ideas in Indian 
Philosophy, with special reference to Comparison as 
Means of Evidence".
The first chapter will contain a discussion of the various 
prsmSnas (means of establishing proof) and their relative 
importance* The second chapter will deal with Alamkara 
(poetics) and tte prominence and elaborate nature of figures 
of speech in this branch of literature* This will be fol-
Cu
lowed by ji detailed consideration of the simile as employed 
in the philosophical texts and as reflecting the general con­
dition of Indian society together with the physical environ­
ment* The fourth chapter will sppplement the application of 
the concrete reality by the discussion of a reality of fict­
ion in the philosophical sense for the purpose of evidence* 
Finally there will be a short summing up of the conclusions 
arrived at. The chief texts and commentaries re­
ferred to will be : Brhadaranyaka Upanishad (with commentary) , 
Vedantasara, Sankhyakarika, wi th Gaudapada* s commentary and 
SankhyatattvakaumudI , Yogasutras with Vyasa* s commentary and 
Vacaspatimisra* s gloss, Mallisena's Syadvadamanj arT , Nyayabirw 
du and commentary, Udayana* s Kusumanjali, Nyayasutras # and 
Madhavas Sarvadarsanasangraha*
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Chapter I. _Means_of Evidence In Cognition.
A glance at any list of titles of Sanskrit works cannot 
fail to reveal an astounding emphasis on 11 Illuminati on” • An 
overwhelming proportion of works on all subjects (logic, grammai 
poetics, law) boast titles ending in -adar£a (mirror), "dipa 
or ^dlplka (lamp), -praka^a (elucidation, revelation), -kaumudl, 
(moonlight), -aloka (light), and the bike (e.g. Kavyadar£a; 
Nyayasiddhantadlpa; Brhaddipika; Vi£vapraka£a (a dictionary); 
SankhyatattvakaumudI; Dhvanyaloka; and "Prabodhacandrodaya"- 
the rising of the moon of knowledge (lit. "awakening11)). The 
Buddha is the "enlightened one", but primarily one who has 
"awakened". Here not only the mental illumination is referred 
to, but the concrete image of a man awakening from the darkness 
of sleep to meet the daylight underlies this more abstract idea. 
The highest, the perfect, knowledge is known as "sambodha"- 
Complete awakening or illumination; while intuition (such as 
sometimes comes during trance) is termed "pratibha",- that which 
shines towards one.
It is through the dawning of the divine light of intelligen 
that liberation is achieved, and illumination in any sphere was 
regarded as effective. Not only the practice of devotional 
exercises, but any activity of the human mind, could bring about 
complete knowledge, and hence the cutting of earthly ties. This 
may explain in part why grammar and pofetics were included among 
the philosophical systems,- which in their turn never severed
themselves from religious aims.
Right thinking, then, was of the utmost importance; and 
each philosophical system had its own criterion or criteria 
on which its thought was based. True or correct knowledge is 
known as prama, "measure", while the instrument or means for 
acquiring prama is “pramapa"• The thing to be measured, the 
object of investigation, is "prameya", the act of acquxiring 
prama being known as pramiti, and the agent of the "measuring", 
the performer of the mental act resulting in a right cognition, 
as pramatr. The three latter are identified by the Buddhist 
Idealist (Vitfnanavadin) from an epistemological standpoint, 
and in the Vedanta doctrine too there is nothing ultimately 
save knowledge (or "conscicu sness") which reveals itself. The 
logicians, however, insist on maintaining the distinction betwe< 
cogniser, cognised and cognition.
The Sankhya definition of prama is "right knowledge, re­
sulting from the cognition by the senses of objects not previous 
ly cognised, and not obscured by doubt or error; and from the 
co-ordination of such cognitions through a function of the mind' 
vcitta-vytti) (SarikhyatattvakaumudI 4)* The Vedanta definition 
(see Vedantaparibhaga I) is similar, but it is pointed out that 
when memory is included in the definition of prama, prama is 
simply "knowledge of an object which is not contradicted (by the 
senses)". The Mlmamsaka says that right knowledge consists in 
cognising an object not cognised before (and therefore deduces
that God has no right knowledge, as he must always know).
The Naiyayika replies that this definition is non-pervasive, 
as it fails to apply to repeated knowledge; and also of too 
great extension, as it applies to erroneous judgments such as 
"this (mother-of-pearl) is silver". (Kusumanjali and Comm* 
IV,1). The test of a cognition should be "artha-kriya-karitva 
"the fact of leading to the performance of an action with a 
purpose", and a purposive action cannot take place when the kno' 
ledge is subsequently contradicted. The Buddhist, however, 
points out that an erroneous cognition does sometimes lead to 
the fulfilment of a purpose, as when the light of a jewel 
shining through a keyhole leads us to the jewel itself (See 
"Reality of Fiction").
The following is a list of the pramanas or means of 
establishing evidence:
(1) pratyaksa, direct perception, the evidence of the senses.
(2) anumana, "meaeuring along", inference (see below)
$3) £abda or aptavacana, scriptural authority, or reliable 
testimony (e.g. "Indra is the king of the gods"; x or "The 
land of the Kurus is in the North").
(4) upamana, "by-measure, measuring with, or upon; superimposin 
one thing on another", i.e. analogy (e.g. "a bison is like a 
cow"; "a pond is like the sea").
(5) arthapatti, inference from circumstances (a. drgja- (seen): 
Caitra is not at home, but he is alive (therefore he must be ou
b. £ruta- (heard) : we are told that Devadatta Is fat, although 
he does not eat by day (therefore he must eat at night).
(6). anupalabdhi or abhavapratyaksa, proof from non-existence 
(e.g. "since there are no mice (injtheir usual haunt), there 
must be cats here"). (N.B. in the Sankhyakarika, abhava and 
anupalabdhi are two distinct terms, and abhava is referred to 
as fourfold, while anupalabdhi is eightfold. See below.).
(7) sambhava, equivalence, co-existence (four kudavas = one 
prastha (measure); or 100 is included in 1000).
(8) aitihya, tradition or fallible testimony ("people say 
that there is a Yaksa in this banyan tree")
(9) cesta, gesture. T-*)
Of these, the Mlmamsa (except Prabhakara) and the normal 
Vedanta recognise (l)-(6), while the Paurapikas add (7) and 
(8), and the Tantrikas (9). Prabhakara does not admit abhava, 
and recognises (l)-(5){ while the Nyaya has (l)-(4)# and the 
Sahkhya-Yoga school (l)-(3)» One school of Jains divided the 
pramanas into a) direct (perception) and b) indirect (inference 
and "word" (£abda), while perception was further divided into 
ordinary (samvyavaharika) and supernormal (mukhya) (both of 
these having subdivisions). The Bai^egika school admits only 
pratyakga and anumana, including (3) and (4) under anumana.
The Buddhist logicians too consider the senses and intellect 
to be the sole sources of cognition, and of these, only the 
senses are ultimately to be trusted (and then only in indeter-
minate cognition) • The Carvakas or materialists go still 
further, and admit only perception, refuting inference on the 
ground that there is no means of establishing the invariable 
connection of the lihga or middle term with the lirigin or 
major term*
Let us know consider each pramapa, and try to gain some 
idea of their relative importance* The only pramana which is 
admitted by all schools without exception is that of perception 
praty-aksam, "reference back to the eye" (which represents all 
the senses)* As a general rule, the evidence of the senses is 
infallible: "The eye is Brahman*. What one hears (i*e. by hear­
say) with the ears may be false, but not what one sees with the 
eyes" (Brh* Up. and Comm. 4,1,4). Except in the case of some 
organic defect, such as timlra (an eye disease), the senses 
cannot be mistaken. Jaimini (Mlmamsa) defines perception as 
the cognition produced in the self by the intercourse of the 
sense-organs with objects. The Naiyayika contends that this 
definition includes doubtful perception and erroneous perceptioi 
and in his turn defines perception as the non-erroneous cogniti< 
resulting from intercourse of sense-organs and objects, not
U.eutf' wsQ rts*. voivxi a
associated with any name (i.e. indeterminate), but -woll-defined ,
I _ (V c*v*«JU^Ko*> (
The Vedantin points out that if the mind is consl§She^t% 
a sense-organ (which he does not admit), then the Naiyayika 
condition of perception (the contact of sense-organ and object) 
is fulfilled at all times, and pratyak§a is the only pramana.
This is an important statement, for, as we shall see presently, 
in a sense it is, possible to reduce all pramanas to pratyaksa.
Perception acquires an added authority, as it is held to 
include the supernatural knowledge of gods and yogins,- for 
almost all schools of Indian philosophers believe in supernormal 
perceptions. The Nyaya "alaukika-pratyaksa" (not-worldly per­
ception) requires a better training than the average man1s.
It has three divisions: samanya-lak^ana, jnanalaksana, and 
yoga-ja. The first, samanya-laksa^ia, signifies a knowledge of 
the genus from the perception of its particulars (cf. the Nyaya 
view of parts and whole, which we shall discuss later). The 
second, jnana-lak§ana, is really what we should call associatior 
of ideas. For instance, when a man sees a sandal tree in the 
distance, he has the sensation of its sweet smell, and says 
"I see the sweet sandal". According to the Vedantin, the know­
ledge conveyed by this sentence is direct cognition in regard 
to the sandal, but indirect in regard to the sweet smell (since 
scent is not a fit object for the sense of sight), (Vedanta- 
paribhasa I), The third form of alaukika-pratyaksa, yoga-ja, 
is the Yogin!s intuitive vision of the whole of truth, even 
down to the normally imperceptible atoms, (For the intuitive 
knowledge known as pratibha,- a vi&ion of the truth after hear­
ing an expert’s description, see Sankhyakarika Comm. A).
It is evident that the perception even of illusory objects 
can be explained as earn jnana-1 alts ana- we see rlalaukika!l silver
in a piece of mother-of-pearl (See "Reality of Fiction"),
_ _ _ jw
The Prabhakara Mlmamsaka, his part, subseribes to the
doctrine og "svataJ^-pramanya", the self-evidence of truth 
(see e.g. Strauss, pp, 175-6), He maintains the truth of every 
cognition as such, owing to the fact that even a false cognitio 
(as of water in a mirage) produces the same reactions in the 
percipient as a true cognition, Kumarila agrees, and points out 
that what is corrected is not the cognition, but what is cog­
nised, Sarvam-eva jnanam samicinam- "All knowledge is right 
knowledge1*.
Inference (anumana) may be classified in various ways. 
There may be a threefold division, as follows:
a, purvavat. Fire is Inferred from smoke (since the two have 
formerly been seen together). Or (Sankhya view) there may be
a deduction from cause to effect: The cloud is swollen, therefo] 
it will rain.
b, £egavat. This signifies (1) Inference from part to whole,
as when one tastes salt in one part of a pool, the inference is 
that the rest of the pool is also aaltyj or when one grain of 
rice in a pot is cooked, the rest must be;
or (2) proof by elimination, e.g. clay and pot (in the Sankhya 
view) are one, since neither the relation of union nor that of 
separation exists between them (see Keith, p. 90); 
or (3) inference from effect to cause, as when we infer that it 
has rained, on seeing a swollen river.
c. samanyato-drsta, which is applied to things and circumstance; 
beyond our normal experience, e.g. 1) the sun, moon and stars 
move, because they are seen in different places, like Caitra; 
or, having observed mangoes in flower in one place, one infers 
that they are flowering elsefthere as well; and 2) from seeing 
that the activity of farmers etc, has a result, we infer that 
that of monks and hermits has, too, though it does not come 
within our experience, (See Nyayasutras 1,5; Sankhyak. Comm, 5)
Sometimes anumana is divided into drsta-liriga (inference 
of eneke fire from smoke- an argument from one combination of 
circumstances to another of the same sort), and adrsta-linga 
(corresponding to samanyato-drsta), e.g. the inference of the 
existence of wind as substratum of hot and cold touch; and the 
inference of the relation of prakrti and Purusa (in the Sankhya) 
Yet another classification (Sankhyak. Comm, 5) is a) from linga 
(characteristic) to lingin (characterised), as when the existenc 
of a pilgrim is inferred from the sight of his staff; and b) 
from lingin to linga, as when, having seen a pilgrim, one con­
cludes "this is his staff1'• £ propos of this relation of linga
and lingin, Dr. Beimann (p. 87, "Indian and Western Philosophy") 
has pointed out that India never leaves the ground of empirical 
reality, even ill its syllogism,- for "smoke, the visible object, 
is the property, and the unseen fire is its bearer".
We have seen that the Carvaka does not admit the validity 
of inference. He says: "The step (which the mind takes) from
the knowledge of smoke to the knowledge of fire can be accounted 
for by its being based on a former perception (or by its being 
an error) (Sarv. I, p. 4; and cf. Kusum. Comm. Introduction, 
111,6-7)* But, says the Buddhist, one who says "anumana is no 
pramana" is contradicted by his own words, for if he seeks to 
prove, i.e. to infer, that it is none, it will be like asserting 
his own mother to be barren (Sarv. II, p. 6; and cf. Nyayabindu- 
tlka III, pp. 63-4).
It is, however, expressly stated in the Nyayasutras (1,5) 
that inference is dependent upon perception (tat-purvakam); 
but on the other hand we cannot dispense with inference, for 
it is inference which corrects errors due to faulty perception 
(as e.g. the perception of a fiery circle, which is really a 
rapidly rotating fire-brand). But again, when we infer that 
such things do not really exist, such an Inference is nothing 
more hor less than the memory of a past perception (cf. Nyaya- 
bindutlka III, p. 52, where smaranam is a synonym for anumana; 
also ibid. I, p. 8, where anumana is defined as "measuring, 
after the remembrance of the connection of the invariable mark" 
(linga)); and dependence on memory can be shown to exist in all 
perceptions. It may even be suggested that a perception is 
itself nothing but inference, for when we say "I see a tree", 
it is only a part of the tree that is seen, and the whole infern 
from the part. The Naiyayika cannot admit such a suggestion, 
for according to him, we see the whole when looking at a part,- 
and our perception is verified by our ability to hold the k tree
etc. (also, one can walk around the tree and see it from all 
angles} (See below, Cahapter
The schools which acknowledge the pramanata of aptavacana 
or £abda, assert that inference cannot stand when it contradict 
the authority of revelation (e.g. Sarv. V, p. 59). (The Sankhya 
school is independent of the the authority of scripture, but 
credits the words of the expert). According to Dignaga, howeve 
£abda is either inference, if we infer that the credible person 
words agree with reality; or perception, if we learn by (subseq 
experience that the speaker’s statement is avisamvadin, i.e. 
not disagreeing (with the a true facts). (See Randle, Ch. V). 
But surely we should rather say that it is perception, not by 
oneself, but by another person? The raising of aptavacana, not 
in the sense of revelation, but in that of "credible testimony" 
to the status of a pramana, is yet another proof of the belief 
in the infallibility of the senses,- not only one’s own senses, 
but also those of others. The pramanata of £ru±t as revelation 
on the other hand, is bound up with the eternity of the "holy 
word", which can still be heard as it was heard by the first 
"seeds" (for the Mlmamsa doctrine of the eternity of sound, see 
Chap. VIII below); accordingly in this sense also "£abda" is 
practically synonymous with "pratyaksa".
It is a significant fact that "revelation" should have 
remained one of the most important pramapas in the majority of 
the systems. Indian philosophy has not been able to develop
independently of religion. And, in India especially, religion 
in its turn is dependent on, or expressive of, biological and 
physical conditions, (cf. my R.A.S. essay). A primitive culture 
has developed to its limits without Interference from outside, 
and this fact largely explains the unique and specifically Indian 
character of logic, ethics, metaphysics and other fields of 
learning. "So ergibt sich ftir das indlsche G-eistesleben das 
Paradoxon: Primitiv in der G-rundlage, in der Behandlungsweise 
Hochstkultur". (Betty Heimann, Zur Struktur des indischen 
Denkens). The presence of a caste devoted to the pursuit of 
knowledge (i.e. the Brahmans), attached to the schools of the 
different Vedas, and frequently engaged in friendly argument and 
rivalry (as we see from the Upanisads, e.g. Brh. Up., where 
Yajnavalkya is put to the test by his fellow Brahmans) led to 
the development of an extraordinary variety of theories about the 
origin of the world, the nature of the Divine, man’s ultimate 
purpose, and the like; and these discussions later led on to 
the Samvada custom of polemical dispute between the philosophical 
schools, whether these were "orthodox" or not. A cursory glance 
at the Nyaya system of logic reveals that it was built up on 
the foundations of argument, and is no mere abstract theoretical 
structure. In no country have so many creeds,- theistic, pan­
theistic, and frankly atheistic,- been able to flourish side by 
side without danger of suppression; the vast size of India, and 
her isolation, are to be thanked for the survival of an infinite
variety of religious beliefs and social customs, which no 
ruler, even had he so desired, would dare to suppress, and 
which have often mingled one with another. (Cf. also the number 
of rulers who became monks, such as A^oka, Kanigka, etc.).
But there is another side to the question. The same 
conditions which allowed of an intellectual development unres­
tricted by out/$^de influences, also fiostered a remarkable con­
servatism of ideas. Untouched by the stimulating leaven which 
is so often a consequence of foreign invasion and the mingling 
of stocks, old mythology and new philosophy did not, as might 
have been expected, cancel one another out. In every department 
of thought we repeatedly see an extraordinary unwillingness to 
discard any of the old beliefs, even though they sire at variance 
with new ideas. The Vedic gods, and their successor?, are 
incorporated into philosophical systems with which they are 
incompatible; in the same way that Indra, for example, is 
allowed to retain his place (though a much altered one) in 
Buddhist literature.
The Indian love for combining seemingly incompatible 
factors is well illustrated by the application of the fourth 
pramapa, analogy or upama. The stock illustration of upama is 
as follows: A man who is about to go into the forest is told 
by a forester that he is likely to meet an animal called a 
gavaya (bison); further, he is informed that the gavaya looks 
like a cow. Going into the forest, he meets an animal answering
to this description, and realises that it must be a gavaya.
The advocates of upama as a separate pramapa are not all agreed 
as to what the fruit of upama is. The Naiyayika says that the 
discriminative knowledge (pariccheda) of the connection of a 
name with the thing named is the fruit of comparison. The 
Vedantin asks, "WhJ; should not likeness be simply a common 
property (samanadharma), and comparison be that proof which 
produces the cognition thereof?” /Then it is suggested that 
upamana is simply perception, the Mlmamsaka points out that 
after the cognition that the gavaya is like a cow, we may also 
have the cognition that the cow is like a gavaya, even though 
the cow is not then present to the senses (i.e. there is a
The Sankhya, refusing to recognise upamana as a fresh 
pramana, says: "The knowledge resulting from hearing the sen­
tence ’yatha gaus tatha gavayaha' is nothing but aptavacana.
The knowledge that the word gavaya means something similar to 
a cow is an inference. And the knowledge of similarity to a 
cow which is confirmed when the gavyaya is actually seen, is 
nothing but perception,- likewise the remembrance of the cow's 
likeness to the gavaya." The Naiyayika is particularly 
anxious to point out that upama cannot be included under infer­
ence : there is no inference of the appearance of the unseen 
gavaya from the seen cow (as in the ease of seen smoke and 
unseen fire), but a recognition of the seen gavaya as such, 
through information previously acquired. (See Nyayasutras 11,42
definite^judgment in upamana). (See Kusum. 111,8-12, Comm.)
(also vrtti and Bhasya)•
We conclude, then,that upama Is a coordination of different 
pratyaksas; like aptavacana, it enlists the aid of other 
people's experience (see for example Randle, p. 315*- a person 
is told of the mdeAe medicinal properties of a certain plant 
resembling a bean, and thereupon, when he actually finds such 
a plant*, he knows and makes use of its properties). Though 
from one point of view it may be argued that it can be included 
under perception, or inference, or credible testimony, as the 
case may be, yet on the other hand upama has a definite value 
of its own, not merely logically, but also psychologically.
Its chief use is in the elucidation of (otherwise) abstract 
ideas; in the establishing of specific resemblances between 
different objects. In poetics, upama is the highest pramana, 
as we shall see in chapter II. The structure of the Indian 
syllogism, which is in essence inference from examples, shows 
us agAin how important was the concrete illustration, the 
"udaharana", the "upama". Not only positive,* but also negativ 
examples, were adduced to ± clarify the nature of the probandum 
and it was an established rule that an example (udaharana) 
eh must be an object or circumstance regarding which there was 
a concurrence of opinion among both laymen^ and philosophers 
(see Nyayasutras 1,25).
arthapatti is described as a process that "consists in 
finding a supposition which reconciles a prima facie contra-
diction11 (Randle). The examples for drs£a- and £ruta-arthapatti 
have been given above. The Sankhya view is expressed as follows 
"Arthapatti is an inference not from examples, but from circum­
stances. If anything which is not all-pervading is not in one 
place, then it must be in another. We see that Caitra is not 
at home; and we are told (aptavacana) that he is alive; therefor 
we infer that he has gone outM(See SankhyatattvakaumudI 5).
The Nyaya-Vai£esika view is similar. The upholder of arfchapatt 
however,(Vedantln) says that if we try to reduce instances of 
arthapatti to inference, we shall have for a major premise not 
a proposition expressing a direct relation of invariable con­
comitance between the middle and the major term (anvaya-vyapti), 
but between the oqx absence of the major term and the absence of 
the middle term (vyatireka-vyapti)j and this cannot lead to an 
inference. (Vedantaparibhasa). The Naiyayika points out that 
if there were no affirmative pervasion (anvaya-vyapti), there 
would be no realisation of absurdity or inconsistency: therefore 
arthapatti is included in inference, (see Kusum. Comm. 111,19). 
We may note also that the element of analogy enters into it: 
we observe that (example b, above, p.7 ) people must eat in orde 
to grow fat, and accordingly when we see a fat man we assume tha 
he eats sometiiiie,- if not in the daytime, then at night.
The admission of abhava, "proof from non-existence", among 
the pramanas is an evidence of the polaric aspect ("the polarity 
of being and non-being") which is peculiar to Indian philosophy.
, its* dj. fL*. ^c ru x u ^U  Tvvjcb*<x^ t-v <^ f- /
There are four varieties of abhava:
(1) prxag-abhava (something that does not yet exist), e.g. 
Devadatta as a boy and as a youth, etc,
(2) anyonya-abhava or itaretara-abhava, mutual non-existence, 
e.g. the non-existence of "Jar" in "cloth".
(3) atyanta-abhava, (absolute non-existence, i.e. an impossible 
e.g. an ass's horns, the son of a barren woman, or a flower in 
the sky; or (Sarv. X, p. 91) the non-existence of colour (or 
forms(rupa) in the air.
(4) sarvabhava (complete non-existence, i.e. non-existence of 
something which has previously existed, in consequence of 
destruction), e.g. like a cloth that has been burnt; or (througi 
Inference) as through the sight of dried-up corn, the non­
existence of rain is inferred. (See Sankhyakarika Comm. 4).
The term abhava, then, refers to a specific condition of 
non-existence, a condition which does not depend on a the cog­
nising powers of any particular subject. Anupalabdhi, ton the 
other hand, as its etymology indicates, is "non-grasping", i.e. 
failure to apprehend something which is potentially cognisable, 
owing to some defect or impediment affecting the senses. There 
are eight divisions of anupalabdhi:
a. atidurat- (owing to too great distance), e.g. Caitra, I.iaitraj 
in another district^ or a tree on a mountain peak, 
b* samlpyat- (owing to too close proximity), e.g. collyrium on 
the eyes.
c. indriya-abhighatat (owing to injury to the sense-organs), 
e.g. there is no perception of colour or sound on the
part of one who is blind or deaf.
d. mano1navasthanat- (owing to instability of the mind; absent- 
mindedness), e.g. one does not hear even a distinctly spoken 
discourse when one's mind is elsewhere; or one does not see
a jar in broad daylight when preoccupied by passion etc.
—  . s vvyOVV^^
e. sauksmyat- (owing to subtility), e.g. the /perception of
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minute atoms of smoke, water, snow, etc. in the sky.
f« vyavadhanat- (owing to obstruction), e.g. the non-perception
of things behind a wall (STK ad loc: the king's wives are hidden 
by a wall).
g. abhibhavat- (owing to overpowering), e.g. the non-perception 
of the light of stars and planets in the daytime, when the sun 
is shining.
h. samana-abhiharat- (owing to intermixture of like things), e.g. 
the pon-perception of a pigeon among a flock of pigeons, or of 
beans, lotus or myrobalan flowers in heaps of the same; or of 
milk and water separately in a mixture of the two. (Sankhya- 
karika Comm. 7; and cf. Sarv. V., pp. 51-2).
In a different class from non-perception is erroneous per­
ception, due to faulty vision, digestive disorders, swift move­
ment, jaundice, and the like. Such erroneous cognitions will be 
discussed in Chap. IX ("Reality of Fiction"). Doubt (sam£aya) 
e.g. as to whether a distant object is a post or a man, may almos
be classed under "anupalabdhi owing to too great distance11,- 
but see "Reality of Fiction”•
The logical application of the abhava-pratyak^a, the proof 
from non-existence, is restricted to cases where an object is 
missing from its accustomed place, and would be seen by a person 
with senses intact, were it present to sight. The Vedantins 
and Mimaiiisakas, who admit abhava as a separate proof, insist 
that the non-perception of an object is as positive as the per­
ception of it; but the other schools assert that our cognition 
of an absent object cannot logically be rfche cognition of that
A
object, but only of the place which it formerly occupied. This 
involves an inferential process, in which we proceed from non­
perception of an object as present to realisation of its absence 
But one cannot help feeling that there .is a positive perception 
of a thing’s absence, even before one is conscious of its site;
OL* <X
and though the schools which do not admit abhava/generally inclu
/\
it under inference, there is certainly a greater element of 
perception than of inference in the process. (See for instance 
Nyayabhasya 11,74-5: When a person is sent to fetch a non-blue 
cloth, he recognises it through the absence in it of blue colour 
We shall have occasion to discuss the question more fully in 
Chapter III, a propos of the jar (ghata).
The pramapa of abhava, then, is chiefly interesting in its 
capacity as corollary to pratyaksa; and as illustration of the 
polarity of Indian philosophical thought. We find the same
polarity (or perhaps in this case rather "permutations and com­
binations") in the Jain doctrine of Syadvada, which claims that 
a thing majjfnot only exist, or not exist, but may exist in a cer­
tain way, and at the same time not exist in a certain way, and 
in relation to other things. T^at is to say, there are potential­
ities in all things, and it is wrong to assume that they have 
a static existence or non-existence. This is only one of many 
illustrations of the Indian tendency to consider a subject from 
all angles. As Dr. Heimann has aptly said, "To the Indian mind 
an object’s sphere is a combination of innumerable sectors of 
circles to which innumerable other things also belong" (Indian 
and Western Philosophy, p. 91).
The remaining pramapas,- sambhava, aitihya, and ce§£a, may 
quickly be disposed of. Sambhava, inclusion, may easily be 
reduced to inference. Thus if a we hear that a man has three 
sons, we naturally infer that he has (at least) two; or else 
the knowledge that small measures, e.g. a Drona, A$haka, or 
Prastha, are included in a larger measure, e.g. a Khari, is 
explained by the Sankhya as resulting from an inferential procesi 
(STK 5). This may seem to us a totally unnecessary and childish 
process; but we must remember the interminable Brahmanic dis­
cussions about ritual, and the like, e.g. "If a man having two 
sons is mentioned, will a father of three sons be debarred?".
Here again the inferential process is evidently based on a formei 
perception (or on a present perception, if we actually have the
man and his sons, or the smaller and larger measures, before 
us).
Aitihya, tradition, can also be reduced to inference, with 
the proviso that it is only valid when substantiated by fact 
See STK 5; Nyayasutras (vrtti) 11,67)* But here we are walking 
on thin ice. The Carvakas (see above, p. 0 provided us with 
one argument in favour of regarding pratyaksa as the sole ulti­
mate pramana) this seems to be another. If a self-respecting 
school of philosophers could solemnly maintain that their an­
cestors had discovered the presence of a goblin in a banyan- 
tree, and that therefore they inferred that it must still be 
there, what credence are we to attach to their view of anumana? 
Surely this is simply pratyaksa carried ad abdurdum, in that 
not merely "credible" testimony, but also unreliable tradition, 
is accepted as a means of evidence?
Cesja, gesture, may also be reduced to inference, on the 
ground that it is not the actual gesture (e.g. a nodding of the 
head to indicate consent) which produces knowledge, but our 
understanding of what the person means by It. But we might Just 
as well say that when someone assents by saying "Yes", this is 
not a perception,(hot a^cognltion through the organ of hearing) 
but an Inference, as we have had first to learn the meaning of 
the word "yes". Here there is a confusion between inference 
and instinct, such as is clearly exhibited in the passage of 
Byh. Up. Comm. (4f3»6) in which it is said that when we see
other people eat, we Infer that we should eat too, as we shall 
be kept alive by eatingI
As Randle rightly points out ("Indian Logic", p. 311» and 
in other places), there is a constantly recurring confusion 
between logical grounds of knowledge and psychological causes 
of knowledge. None of the pramanas, with the exception of praty­
aksa and anumana, can be said to give a logical ground of know­
ledge; though some, such as upamana, may serve a special and 
useful purpose.
Having established the dependence of all pramanas on praty­
aksa and anumana, can we now dispose of anumana, and admit only 
pratyaksa? If we restrict pratyaksa to the present, and to the 
actual person collecting evidence, the answer is no. If we admit 
the perceptions of people in the past, who may not even be known 
to the subject, as well as the subject's own past perceptions, 
then the answer is yes. To be more explicit: anumana can be 
reduced to pratyaksa, with the proviso that it is a kind of 
cumulative perception, the fruit of all past perceptions which 
have been proved correct, or rather, the fruit of all past ob­
servation!^ the relation of cause and effect. The objection 
to this statement will no doubt be that, as soon as a judgment 
is made, as soon as the element of weighing or balancing possi­
bilities enters into the process, it ceases to be a pure per­
ception, and becomes an inference. But for that matter there is
no such thing as a pure perception. As soon as we have seen a
given thing more than once, a mental element enters into our 
perception; and if that mental element were not there, the
perception would not he acceptable as a proof, for the person
concerned would not be capable of passing judgment. One would
hardly accept a baby*s perception as a pramaija. It must be
admitted that perceptions may be reduced to inference just
as well as inference may be reduced to perception,- and in
the West the former alternative would probably hold. But because
of the avowed predominance & in India of pratyaksa, and the
firm belief in the infallibility of the senses, there the
contrary process is, one feels, the right one.
The belief in the efficacy of perception must have been 
fostered by the conviction that there existed some material 
link or communion between the senses and the objects of sense. 
And, curiously, the normal belief is that it is not the senses 
themselves, but the sense-objects, which are active, and which 
throw out rays, or rather invisible yet cogent emanations, 
connecting them with the eye, the ear, and other senses. It is 
significant that these sense-objects are termed atlgrahas, "over 
graspers", whereas the senses are just grahas, "graspers"; and 
in the Kg-J,ha Up. (3,10) it is explicitly stated that the sense- 
ob jects are higher than the organs of sense. The organs, however 
are not completely passive recipients of the suhtle emanations,- 
they*. 4©©*. emit a like substance, and the resultant material 
link between organ and object ensures the accuracy of the per-
peption. It is only when the link is destroyed by defects such 
as defective vision, that the senses are not to be trusted.
We must remember, however, that this was not the only 
theory of perception in ancient India. The lack of exact science 
at that period naturally meant that diverse speculations could 
flourish without fear of contradiction. For example, the orthodo: 
Nyaya view was that, in visual perception, an invisible light- 
ray travel±^& out to the object (see Nyayasutras III, 28-45); 
while in hearing, waves of sound are transmitted to the oar.
On the other hand, the Vedanta view, as expressed in Vedanta- 
paribhasa I, was that the organs of smell, taste and touch 
produce their perceptions while remaining in their own sites, 
while the organs of sight and hearing go out towards their ewja 
objects (the internal organ being modified in the form of those 
objects,- see below, Chap. III). The organ of hearing can 
move out to its objects, because it consists of the all-pervading 
ether, limited by the ether in the auditory passage. (For 
further details, of other schools, see Sinha, Indian Psychology; 
Perception, Chap. I).
No matter which theory a philosopher subscribed to, he 
always believed in a material contact between organ and object, 
and one can gain some idea of the stress laid on this contact, 
by noting that Caraka and his followers 3d held that w there was 
only one sense-organ, that of touch, (see Nyayasutras 111,47 
et seq.). Further, in the Nyaya-Val£esika view, each sense-organ
vwo
is composted of its own particular element: smell, of earth;
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taste, of water, etc, (See Nyayasutras 111,55).
The various theories of sense-perception lead us on to 
the consideration of the problem of matter and spirit, which 
figures prominently in Indian philosophy. The solution of this 
problem depends upon the standpoint taken, according as the 
one or the other is regarded as the meat predominant*
For example: (a) In Jainism, karma,(the* effects of past
actions) is supposed to have a material influence, in the shape 
of subtle material substances (good or evil), which pass into 
the soul* Further, the soul itself is supposed to a #vary in size 
with the size of the body.
(b) In the Vai^esika system, the atoms are not merely material 
facts, but they constitute metaphysical, problems: atoms and 
elements are only the first emanations of the primaeval spirit; 
while on the other hand soul is a substance (one of the nine 
dravyani)•
(c) In the Sankhya, matter and spirit (prakyti and purusa) are 
equally important and equally eternal; but spirit is totally 
inactive, and the operations of thinking, willing, etc. sire 
purely mechanical processes carried on by the internal organ,- 
an emanation of matter.
(d) The Upanisads and Bhagavadglta provide us with many examples 
of a material conception of the sacrifice ntt only of concrete 
things, but also of knowledge, hearing, breathing, and the like.
1*
(see e.g. Kaus. Up. 2,5; BhG IV,33).
These examples will suffice to show that even in their 
ghighest flights of fancy, the Indians never quite severed 
themselves from the earth. In the early days, when the gods 
were held in awe, that awe never led the worshipper to regard 
them as eternal or omnipotent,- they were too concrete for that, 
and heavenly beings were (on a higher plane) as fallible as 
men (see e.g. Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 126 et seq. 
(Coomaraswamy): there was rebirth also among the gods).
Later, however, when polytheism and kathenotheism
had yielded place to monotheism or monism, they Indians evolved 
a kind of “transcendental materialism" (Betty Heimann) which, 
paradoxical as it may seem, led them to heights of mysticism 
unequalled elsewhere. Religion, as its name implies, should 
provide a link between God and man. As soon as rites have lost 
their imagery, and the Deity has become a mere abstraction, 
the value of the worship is gone. It is then (as happened in 
Upanisadic days) that rites give place to practices such as that 
of Yoga, with its restrictions (control of the breath, etc.) 
aiming, through complete mastery over the material body, at the 
attainment of spiritual absorption (in which there is still a 
sense of material contact- cf. the illustration at Brhl Up. 4,3,23 
et seq.: "As a man fully embraced by his beloved wife knows 
nothing of what goes on in the world outside, likewise the Self 
when embraced by the Supreme Self (in susupti)’.1
It may be argued that the mental and physical condition 
which precedes and governs a trance must be the same whether in 
East or West. But the attitude towards the process of spiritual 
absorption is different. In the West, the subject realises that 
there must be a cessation t of body-consciousness before the 
spiritual forces can have full play,- i.e. the material factor 
must be eliminated as far as possible. In the East, the idea 
persists that-41 io the-body which- is the medium of the absorpti-ow 
-ire-, that there is some material contact between the body, or 
the soul in the body, and the Absolute whose attainment is striven 
after: and it is with this idea that all sorts of postures and 
schooling of limbs and senses are practised. Moreover, the Yogin 
is advised to concentrate upon material objects, becoming pro­
gressively subtler and subtler, until x finally, in the highest 
stage of all (which most devotees never reach), no object remains, 
and the trances is nirbija, "seedless". The Yogin was a recog­
nised demonstrator of the power of mind over matter, and could 
materialise thought-forms at will (in thaumaturgy). It should be
4'VOt' ^vsaiLuJ
noted, further, that in the West the mystic is born, q-f it wer^f 
while in India there have are schools of mysticism,- for only 
with x the aid of a teacher can one attain liberation (moksa).
The standardisation of Yoga has had far-reaching results.
The second-sight of the Yogin is perhaps regarded as in­
fallible, mainly because tof the belief in material contact of 
soul and soul, which is the counterpart, on a higher level, of
*9
the subtle link between sense-organ and sense-object. Thus it 
is that the greatdst possible abstraction,- Nirvana,- is actually 
more concrete than our notions of heaven and hell, which after 
all are gigments of the imagination, comparable to fairj tales; 
for Nirvana means simply absorption into, and identification with 
eternal or primaeval matter,- a merging into the ocean of being. 
And thus it is that this seeming abstraction is only to be 
grasped (i.e. made concrete) by an J-ndian mind, which sees no fcx 
hard-and-fast line drawn between the material and the spiritual.
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Chapter II, The Role_of Alamkira__in Philosophy,.
That poetics are allowed to be included in philosophy is 
a proof of the concrete and all-embracing nature of the Indian 
outlook. The art of poetics is regarded as a science, the 
pursuit of which has the four conventional aims of mankind,- 
dharraa, artha, kama, moksa,- in view. That is to feay, true 
poetry can have practical as well as aesthetic value: it not 
only gives pleasure to the reader or hearer, but, rightly used, 
it constitutes one of the paths to liberation. Sarasvatl, 
goddess of wisdom, is also called Vac, Word personified. The 
'’“light of speech11 is often referred to, e.g.
"idam andhana tamah krtsnam Jay eta bhuvanatrayam 
yadi £abdahvayam Jyotir a samsarana na dlpyate.” (Kavyad. 1,4). 
f,These three worlds would relapse into blind darkness, if the 
light called speech did not shine till the end of time.11 It is 
not only with reference to poetry that the illuminatory powers 
of speech are mentioned; we shall also find such references when 
considering the various figures current in the philosophical 
systems proper.
What is the test of good poetry? It is not necessary for 
the poem to be in verse; not is all verse regarded as poetry: for 
there are many prose poems (e.g. Ds^akumaracarita), while count­
less lawbooks and abstract treatises are couched in verse, as an 
aid to memory. It is significant that the Sanskrit equivalent
for "Ars loetica is i*lamkara5astra, the”teaching of the or­
naments' (i.e. poetical embellishments or figures, literal 
meaning '*state of sufficiency, balance, rounding off, making 
perfect"). j?or tne art of poetics has been developed to such 
an extent, ana the poet’s work circumscribed by so many rules 
regarding metre ana rhetorical figures, that it is often im­
possible to see the wooa for the trees. Poetry should deal 
with one or more of the so-callea rasas or tafetes, sentiments, 
viz. vlra heroism, ^ n g a r a  love, karupa pity, blbhatsa disgust, 
rauara anger or fury, bhayanaka fear, hasya mirth, adbhuta 
wonder, ana vthough this last is not accepted by all schools, 
ana is of later development than the others) £anta contentment, 
tranquillity. TJie term £anta, in the religious sense, is applied 
to the man who has conquered all desire ana is ripe for lioer- 
ation; it is thus a requisite of the fourth aim, mokga.
But it stands to reason that poetry must in any case deal 
with emotions such as these, and it is not tne rasas as such, 
but the alaipkaras themselves which aetermlne the aesthetic 
value of a poem, iheir importance may be measured by the fact 
that there are no fewer than varieties of siile (to mention
A
only one figure of speech) prescribed in the KavyadarSa. ^ost 
of the similes must perforce be concerned witn the task of con­
necting man with his surroundings, the animals, plants, and 
planets. For instance, there are 2o different ways in which a
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girl1s face may be compared to a lotus* The only restrictions 
to the resultant concrete expressions are those dicxtated by 
decency or a sense of fitness, e.g. one should not compare a 
x faithful servant to a dog* On the other hand, the poet may 
use metaphorically terms which he could not apply in the accepted 
sense. For example s£hlv, and other words meaning "expectorate“ 
may with propriety be applied to phenomena of nature, such as 
the sky, or flowers; or (just as in English) a cloud may be 
described as "pregnant", whereas one should not refer to a woman 
in that condition*
Here it may be well to note the amazing metaphorical poten­
tialities ofthe Sanskrit language, which are #ell illustrated by 
the innumerable £le$as or puns (lixterally "intertwining, connect­
ing") which abound throughout the literature. Even the simplest 
word may have twenty different meanings, all of which are employed 
to the full by the ambitious poet. Thus "go", an ox or cow, may 
also mean "anything coming from or appertaining to an ox or cow", 
e.g. milk, flesh, skin, hide, leather, strap, bow-string, sinew; 
while it has in addition such divergent meanings as "the herds 
of the sky" (the stars), rays of light, the sun, the moon, water, 
an organ of sense, the eye, a billion, the sky, a thunderbolt, 
the hairs of the body, a region of the sky, the earth las the 
milch-cow of kings), a mother, speech, Sarasvatl, (goddess of 
speech); and it may also apply in a figurative derogatory sense 
to a stupid person, "an ox".
a
The Kvyadar^a (11.57 sq.) gives a significant list of the
A
synonyms for “like11 . First we have comparative particles, such 
as iva, vad, yatha which have no secondary metaphorical sense. 
Not quite in their class is sama, level, even (and hence equal). 
Then we have a group of terms having reference to weights and 
measures : eammna, sammita, upama, upamita, tulya, tulita ; 
then words meaning image or illumination, such as nibha, san- 
nibha, sagika£a, nika£a, praka£a, pratibimba, abha, praticchanda. 
Next, a group of terms referring to various common attributes, 
e.g. likeness of form (sarupa, pratirupaka); of appearance 
(sadyS, sadykga), and colour (savarpa) ; shading through less 
personal, more social aspects, denoting equality of birth (sa- 
jatlya) and country (de£ya, de^Iya) to still more intangible 
and logical characteristics, e.g. saipvadin and anuvSdin, in 
agreement with (from logic or perhaps music ?), prakhya one who 
may be addressed in the same way, and salakgana having the same 
(logical) mark. Lastly, we have a group which once again illu­
strates the polafcity of Indian thought : on the one hand sapakga
on the other
(friend, on the same side), pratinidhi representative, andAvi- 
rodhin out of harmony with, pratipakga a match for, pratidvand- 
vin adversary, and pratyanlka vying with (bringing an army 
against).
So much for adverbial particles and adjectives (or 
nouns, - for nouns and adjectives arepractic ally interchangeable
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in Sanskrit), Of verbs expressive of likeness, the following 
are mentioned: spardhate rival; jayati conquer, dvesti hate, 
druhyatl threaten, and pratigarjati vie with (lit, roar against),- 
all metaphors from the battle-field. In a narrower sense, i,e, 
in the home, we have *ikro5ati scold, avajanati despise, nindati 
blame, hasati laugh at, Ir^yati and asuyati envy, nisedhati forbid 
Then there are two denominatives, kadarthayati consider as a 
useless thing (lit, for what purpose?), and vi^ambayati make an 
image of, mock. The only verb which has an agreeable sense is 
sandhatte harmonise (=joln), be reconciled. It will be noticed 
that many of these terms imply not merely equality but superiority 
particularly those meaning despide, laugh at, regard as worthless. 
Why is there less variety in the ideas expressed by the verbs 
enumerated above than in those expressed by their corresponding 
nouns? The answer may lie in the fact that a verb is naturally 
more dynamic than the (more pliable) noun. When dealing with 
verbs, we can no linger look at all the aspects of likeness such 
as we saw exhibited by the nouns, for most of those aspects are 
more or less static; the only dynamic idea in the entire list 
is that of rivalry, which is utilised to the full by the verbs, 
and which with the addition o^lhe emotions of envy, mockery 
and eententp contempt, and of the friendly action of combining,
forms the sphere of the expression of likeness in this group.
The implicit assumption of likeness in Bahuvrlhi compounds 
is too frequent a phenomenon to require much illustration ; 
examples are 5a£anka-vadana having a moonlike face; bahulata 
arm-creeper; padamboja lotus-foot. From compounds we pass on 
to phrases, e,g, tasya mugpati saubhagyam (she) steals its 
charm; tasya kantim vilumpati (she) plunders its beauty; tena 
sardham vigyhpati he contends with it; tulam tenadhirohati he 
mounts the balance with it (or him); tatpadavyam padaip dhatte 
he places his foot in his footsteps; tasya kakgam vigahate he 
plunges into its orbit or sphere; tamanveti he follows him; 
anubadhnati tacchllam he binds himself to (i,e, follows close­
ly) his behaviour; tannisedhate he suppresses (surpasses) him; 
and tasyanukaroti he imitates him.
Even a cursory glance at the above list will give some idea 
of the ornate and elaborate character of Sanskrit poetry ; and 
a consideration of the Alamkaras, or 11 ornamentations11 only ser­
ves to deepen this impression. It has already been mentioned 
that, according to Dandin (Kavyadar^a), there are 32 different 
kinds of upama or simile. Thus for example we have the vastupama 
a comparison in which the common quality is omitted, e.g. HThy 
face is (beautiful) like a lotus’1; vikriyopama a simile in which 
the object of comparison is regarded as produced from thaft to 
which it is compared, e,g. f,Thy face, 0 fair one, seems to be
cut out from the disc of the moon, or from the eentre of a 
lotus"; hetupama a simile accompanied by reasons, e.g* "You,
0 King, imitate the moon by reason of your lovableness, the 
sun by your spJondour, the ocean by your steadfastness" ; tul- 
yayogopama, combination of equal qualities (of unequal objects), 
as when a king is compared to Indra, by reasons of his fighting 
prowess. By way of variation we have the viparyasopama, Inverted 
comparison, in which the relation between upamama and upameya, 
object and subject of comparison, is reversed ; e,g, "The lotus 
is like your face" ; the k k b asambhavitopama, simile implying 
an impossibility, as "a harsh word from that mouth would be 
like poison from the moon's disc (instead of nectar) or fire 
from sandal" ; abhutopama, something that has not happened, as 
"your face gleams as if the essence of all the glory of lotuses 
had been collected together" ; pratisedhopama, a comparison ex­
pressed in the form of a prohibition : "The moon cannot compete 
with your face, for it is tainted (with spots) and cold (or 
sjupid)". The virodhopama, or cmmparison founded on opposition, 
is illustrated as follows : "The lotus, the autumn moon, and 
your face, - this triad is mutually opposed". Then we have the 
pra^amsopama, or laudatory comparison : "Brahma was born from 
a lotus and the moon adorns Siva’s forehead; yet your face is 
equal to these". The opposite of this is the nindopama, a 
simile involving reproof : "The lotus has much pollen (or the
quality of rajas, passion) ; the moon is subject to consumption 
(waning) ; therefore your face, though equal to them (as regards 
other qualities) is really superior". Ty,e simile implying a 
doubt, saiji£ayopama, is as follows :"ls this a lotus with a bee 
moving inside it, or is it your face, with its wavering glance?" 
It will be seen that doubt, to become a poetical figure, must 
not be the doubt which arises from circumstances, such as the 
common example "Is this a post or a man?" It must be "a doubt 
raised by the imagination (pratibha) of the poet" (Keith). The 
ati£ayopama, hyperbole, is a favourite figure : "Your face is 
a part of you, and the moon is in the sky - there is no other* 
difference between the two." Then we have the complementary 
pair of similes, niyamopama and aniyamopama, restricted and 
unrestricted comparisons : "Your face is equal to the lotus 
and to nothing else"; and "Your face imitates the lotus, and 
it may imitate anything else, if (a worthy object of imitation) 
exists." The mutual (anyonya) upama, as a final example, brings 
out the good qualities of both upama and upameya : "Your face 
is like the lotus, and the lotus is like your face."
This does not exhaust the list of upamas, but it is fairly 
Representative, and once more shows the polarity, love of Juxta­
position, confusion of reality and fiction, and mixture of log­
ical and psychological arguments which we saw from the consid- 
eratidn of the pramanas. When a girl's face is to be compared
with a beautiful object such as a lotus or the moon, the
Indian poet is by no means satisfied with saying "your face
is beautiful like the moon (or lotus)"or even "your face is*
as it were*of the very substance of the moon"* No: the
various known or imagined, actual or mythological, at tributes
of the moon are gathered together,and pressed into use: not
only its waxing and waning,Its shining, and its coldness;
buts also its spots,-regerded as taints, or as the mark of
the hare or deer,-and the fact that it is supposed to have
been worn on Siva’s forehead, and to consist of nectar which
Is drunk by the gods* These qualities, some of which may be
regarded as faults* give endless scope for comparisons*some
of which emphasise the lofty nature, and others the defects
of the upamana*- but sill of which are designed to flattdr the
upameya, the subject of the comparison*
The rupaka, or metaphor, is described as an upama with
the particle iva or vat omitted. It has almost as many
varieties as the upama, and some of them correspond* e.g. the
heturupaka, or metaphor accompanied by reasons* as when a
king is a mountain because of his dignity (or heaviness);
the sea because of his depth (profondity of character); and
the wishing-tree because he grants desires to people. Here*
as so often* we see the important role played by tflejas or
puns, without which no poem worthy of the name would be comp­
lete*
and for which the Sanskrit language gives such scope.
We have already seen how many meanings one word can have 
let us now glance at a selection of synonyms for common 
phenomena. The moon, for example, is known as candra, candrama, 
candramasa (from cand, shine, be bright); indu (originally 
"drop8,“bright drop1,!’spark-” this was applied only to the moon 
in the Brahma^a§, but later to Soma juice, and hence the 
confusion of the two ideas later); Svetarcis, SiSiramSu, 
cold-rayed (in contrast to the sun); 5a£in, £a£anka,5a£a- 
lanchana, and mjgankita,"hare- or deer-marked”, alluding 
to the spots, our "man in the moon”. This by no means 
exhausts the list of synonyms, but it gives some idea of 
their possibilities.
There is an even greater variety of terms for ‘’lotus”; 
though we must remember that a number of these terms are 
simply names for the different varieties of flower, and have 
no particular metaphorical significance. For example: utpala 
and pugkara, (lotus in general); kamala, pink lotus (from 
kam, to love,- there is no doubt a symbolic reason for 
applying this term to a pink or red lotus); padma, white 
lotus; tamarasa and kairava, day and night lotuses (for 
the former, cf. tamra, copper. The night lotus is white.
I t is noteworthy that these two distinct varieties of 
flower should correspond in colour to the sun and moon 
respectively, and thus foster the belief in the mythical
«*•
friendship between day-lotus and sun, and night-lotus 
and moon); indlvara, blue lotus (also: nllotpala, asltot- 
pala), Then we have a group of terms which refer to the 
especial characteristics of the lotus: rajlva, streaked 
or striped; nalinl (from nala, reed, because of its hollow 
stalk); £atapatra, the hundred-leaved; aravinda (from ara, 
spoke, alluding to its wheel-shape); bisinl, having filaments 
Further, bakasamavasin, living in the same place as the 
crane; and kumuda, "exciting what joy?’1,- a reference to 
its aesthetic value. A number of words refer to its place 
of origin, eg. ambhoja, ambhoruha, pankaja, saroja, vanaja, 
ambuja, amburuha, ab&a, nlraja (water-born, water-grown, 
k lake-born, wood-born, etc.).
The synonyms for "bee” are interesting. First we have 
bhrnga and bhramara, "wanderer” (though perhaps bhrnga 
is also onomatopoetic, referring to the buzzing); and, 
from bhramara, the curious term dvirepha, the creature 
with two r ’s in its name. Other aspects of the insect are 
expressed by all, "the creature with a sting”; madhukara, 
”honey-maker”, madhupa, "honey-drinker”, and madhuvrata, 
"devoted to honey"; and §a£pada, "having six feet”.
The sun cannot be said to have captured the Indian 
imagination to the same extent as the moon. Apart from 
one or two names of deities identified with it, such as
Surya, Savity, Pugan, iditya, its light and heat are 
practically the only qualities referred to. For example: 
tapana, bhasvant, bhaskara, bhanu, bhasaip nidhi, (abode 
of light or lustres), caydakara and ugyagi^u (hot-rayed: 
the antithesis of £i£irani5u, the moon), and simply aip^umat, 
having rays. The sun’s function as bringer of day is 
indicated by the terms divakara, dinakara, dinapati and 
divaseSvara (lord of day); dyumayi, jewel of day. More 
obscure terms are arka (arc, meaning praise, adorn, shine), 
ravi (possibly from ru, roar?), mihira (=Avestam Mithra?), 
and lna, strong, mighty. With arka, cf. raja, king, and 
tejas, splendour. That which ^Lnes is praiseworthy and 
powerful. (For etymolfc^s of "sun” synonyms, cf. Chand.
Up. 1,2; 1,4, VI,8, etc.; Maitrl Up. VI,7).
Synonyms for ’’cloud” abound, and refer almost exclusively 
to its two functions, namely obstructing (ghana, abhra), and 
(most important) the giving of water: w megha, ambhoda, 
dharadhara, jalada, jalamuc, payoda, pathodhara, payodhara, 
jaladhara (allending in derivatives of verbs expressing the 
ideas ’’hold”, “give”, or "release"). Then we have parjanya, 
rain-cloud, of doubtful etymology,- possibly connected with 
pyc, give lavishly, or pyj, and perhaps ultimately from py, 
to fill (or "speckled?); and jlmuta, also meaning a rain- 
cloud.
The words for "sea" to some extent correspond to those 
for "cloud", since both are holders of water. Thus we have 
ambudhi, udadhi, varidhi, abdhi, samudra ("gathering together 
of waters"), jaladhi, varagi nidhi ("abode of waters"), 
Jalanidhi, toyadhi, payodhi, ambhonidhi, pathodhi, vardhi, 
udanvat, sindhu (flowing). Further, jalara^i and arabura5i, 
"heap of water"f aryava (having waves? Probably from r, go). 
More metaphysical expressions are akupara (unbounded), 
and ratnakara, home of gems. The ocean is also known as 
Sagara, after Sagara (sa-gara, "with poison",- this may have 
some reference to the mythical churning of the ocean); and is 
frequently referred to as the lord of rivers- srotahpati, 
nadI5a, payasaip natha.
As a final example let us take the eart£,- so very im­
portant in an agricultural community. It Is "the broad one"- 
pythvl, pythivl, urvl; or "great"-majil. Or it is "the bearer, 
supporter",-dhara, dharanjr, or "abode, dwelling",-kgiti;
"the patient one" ,-kgama, or kgma, because it submits to till­
ing; "immovable, solid"-kgoni, kyauni. Then we have references 
to its fertility, and the giving of treasure, whether as food 
or as precious stones: medinl (having fatness or fertility), 
vasudha, vasuiyatl, vasmpdhara.Lastly, bhu and bhumi, bhuvana, 
from bhu, to become,(since earth is ever changing).
From these examples it will be evident that Sanskrit was
a language peculiarly suited to poetic development, and 
paricularly rich in fancies. It was no accident that Word was 
deified; and that the art of poetry was incorporated into the 
study of philosophy. And when we find terms which in any 
other language would he restricted topofctry, e.g. mahldhara 
(mountain = "bearer of the earth"), or mygankita (moon = 
"deer-marked") appearing in dull logical treatises, we are 
bound to admit that words in India are real bearers of 
meanings,- they are live things, concrete, dynamic.
It is well-known that primitive people cannot grasp 
the conception of genus. They may have terms for red cow, 
black cow, etc., but no term for cow in general. In the 
same way one may be tempted to call the highly developed 
Indian tendency to specialise,- to dwell on one aspect of 
a thing at a time,- a survival of the primitive. And, 
to the extent that Indian culture has developed from a 
primitive to an advanced stage with little or no interference 
from outside, and has therefore exhibited a marked conservatism 
of ideas, and an unwillingness to discard beliefs and turns 
of phrase, (See above, Ch. I, p . ) this is no doubt true. 
Mythological and metaphorical expressions for natural 
phenomena, etc., which were invented in the Rigvedic age, 
were still in current use among poets three thousand years 
later, even though these poets had devised new terms of their
own as well. But to accuse the Indian people of inability
to classify would be ludicrous. Classification with them
became a passion, and was extended to all fields of
learning: philosophy (cf. the names of the systems, e.g.
Sankhya, "enumeration"; Vaijlegika, the system relating
to differences or distinctions); cosmogony (3 or 7 worlds);
grammar, which like poetics was regarded as a branch of
philosophy. The Sanskrit alphabet alone is evidence of
an instij&t for orderly arrangement which we at our advanced
stage have not yet reached. We may note, further, that
the Indians had a method of classification according to
«
principles strange to us. They frequently classified not 
according to species, but according to other distinctive 
characteristics, e.g. colour, shape, motion or the lack 
of it. And even a proper name can be replaced at will by 
a synonym (e.g. Kanada, Kayabhuj, Kanabhaksa). (See Betty 
Heimann, Zur Indischen Namenkunde, Studia Indo-Iranica, 
Ehrengabe fUr Wilh. Geiger, 1931).
We are therefore Justified in concluding that the wealth 
of synonyms which may be observed on any page of Indian 
poetry is a natural consequence of a distinctive tendency 
to look at an object from all possible angles, to gather up 
all its separate parts, and fit them together to form a 
complete whole,—  a whole which is the more complete because
it is the more concrete, i.e, because each of its parts 
has been separately examined and grasped before it Joins 
the rest to form the finished picture. It is significant 
that in logic (Nyaya philosophy) a thing consisting of 
sixteen parts is regarded as in reality consisting og 
seventeen (sixteen parts and the whole)•
In India, then, words give more rational associations 
than their more abstract counterparts in the West, and 
therefore they survive more. Instead of being liable to 
be supplanted by a mor^popular synonym, a Sanskrit word 
has an unlimited span of life; and the Mlmarasa idea of 
the eternity of sound was based not so* much on a knowledge 
of the character of the ether, as on an appreciation of 
the sanctity of Word, It is common knowledge that oral 
tradition has had a greater r3le in India than perhaps 
in any other country: the necessity for preserving the 
Vedic texts syllable for syllable, without committing 
them to writing, sharpened the memory, and at the same 
time instilled into the listener an awe at the wonder of 
words, (for the ”spho£aH theory, see e.g. Sarv. XII,XIII; 
and cf. Chap. VIII below).
The theory of dhvani, ,ftone, sound” as applied to 
poetics, lays stress on a more subtle function of words 
and sounds. This theory in its full development belongs
to a fairly late stage (about 820 A.D.), and was expounded 
by inandfcavardhana. The gist of it is that the unexpressed 
meaning of a poem is of more importance than the expressed 
meaning. This applies to metaphors, and also to words 
which have a double sense, and can accordingly be employed 
in £le§as (e,g, kara, which means ray (of the sun), or hand, 
or tax). This is the rational sense of dhvani; in the 
irrational or instinctive sense it applies to the use of 
metres and sounds which fit the subject-matter, and by 
satisfying the critical ear, help to mould the poem into a 
perfect whole. A threefold division of poetry is laid down.
V|%
First, true poetry, which the implied meaning is of greater
A
prominence than that which is expressed; second, medium 
poetry, in which the implied meaning m is of secondary 
importance, and only serves to fill out and embellish that 
which is expressed; and third, the least valuable poetry, 
which relies on fine language and various embellishments 
alone. This doctrine is of interest in that it crystallises 
the marked fondness for Slegas or puns which has already 
been observed, and which is yet another example (as its 
very name shows) of the co-ordinating tendency which refuses 
to look upon any phenomenon as single and separate, and which 
seeks to knit together heaven and earth, and all that therein 
is, into one whole.
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Let us consider one or two instances of £lesas. Kavyad.
2,87 demonstrates the £lista-rupakam, or punning metaphor:
9
rajahamsopabhogarham bhramaraprarthyasaurabham 
sakhi vaktrambujam idam tava.
This means (1) Your lotus-face is fit to be enjoyed by excel&ent 
kings, and its £aa?g fragrance is desirable to young men. (2) Your 
lotus-face (the stress this time being on lotus) is fit to be 
eaten by the king-swans, and its perfume is desired by the bees.
A pure 5le§a, without an obvious metaphor, is, for example: 
aty acchenaviruddhe na suvy11e nat ic aru$ j.
antarbhinnena samprapta^knaukt ikenapi bandhanam. (Bohtlingk,
' Sprtiche 1,165)#
This means (1) Even a transparent, unimpeded, well-rounded,lovely 
pearl becomes bound (upon a string) when it is pierced. (2) Even 
one who is striving after emancipation, who is very pure, not at 
strife with anyone, of good conduct and well-esteemed, is bound 
(by earthly ties) when he is divided in himself.
Finally, a £le§a which depends for its effect on a different 
dividing up of words and syllables, and accordingly almost tres­
passes on the ground of £abdalamkaras, figures of sound, as 
opposed to arthalanxkaras, figures of sense: 
akgajnalapavyttijna ku^asanaparigraha
brahmlva daurjanl samsad vandanlya samekhala (same khala).
(Bohjlingk, Spruche 1,52).
"An assembly of rogues should be greeted respectfully, as well as 
an assembly of Brahmans, for it knows when the rosary is at an end
(or : it knows how to live by envious talk), takes a seat of 
Kusa gaass (or assimilates bad teachings), ahd wears the girdle 
(of a Brahman) (or : is malicious towards a good person).
This leads us on to glance at the gabdalaipkara proper, whose 
chief representative is the yamaka (literally : twin), paronoma­
sia, or the repetition in the same stanza of words or syllables 
similar in sound but different in meaning. For example : 
varapo va ra$odaamo hayo va smara durdharah 
na yato nayato 'ntani nastadaho vikramastava (Kavyad. 3*9)
"We are astonished, 0 god of love, at your bravery, in that you 
lead us to death, although you possess neither an elephant which 
is eager for battle, nor an unrestrainable horse." This is only 
a very simple and elementary example of the figure which is some­
times carried to unbelievable lengths.
Wherever we look, we are driven to the same conclusion; we are 
always confronted with different aspects of the ever-present love 
of coordination and combination, and the tendency to look on words 
as live and concrete objects which may be juggled with at will. 
Indeed, the right use of words is a means of reaching heaven with 
distinction as indicated in Sarv.XIII, p. 113 : "Those who use 
words rightly go to hemben in well-yoked chariots of harnessed 
speech. Those who speak haltingly must go on foot."
y?
Chapter III.
Two ^ standard symbols : Jar and Cloth.
Having given a general account of the pramanas and their 
sigificance and having considered the rSle of figures of speech 
in poetics, let us now turn to the philosophical texts proper 
and examine upama as pramama. It is difficult to separate texta 
and commentaries, as the latter are necessarily dependent onjjthd 
former, but although it would Involve too much repetition to 
make a hard and fast division between them, yet we must realise 
the distinct character of the two styles. The texts themselves 
are, in varying degrees, original compositions, succinct and un­
elaborated, and often somewhat obscure. It is the task of the 
commentaries to elucidate and enlarge upon the texts; according­
ly it is here that we may expect to find the greatest number of 
comparisons which bring the philosophical speculations into line 
with daily life. A commentary, since its function is to explain 
and clarify, is necessarily concrete in its approach (though we 
must not ignore the paradox that some commentaries are so invol­
ved and abstruse that they in their turn require a comnjg&tary 
before they can]t>ie understood ! ), and the commentary habit is 
in a great measure responsible for the number of illustrations 
from daily life which abbund in Sanskrit philosophical literat­
ure.
But this is not all. T^e commentaries follow the texts and 
introduce examples to elucidate the texts, it is true; but unless 
the texts themselves had set the example by introducing concrete
illustrations, this practice would probably not have developed 
to any extent. And once the ball had been set rolling it could 
not stop but was given an impetus by writer after writer, and 
commentator after commentator, each of them eager to stress some 
fresh aspect of an example or to use it to worst an opponent. 
Here we can see wheels moving within wheels : not only are the 
controversial speculations themselves subjects of discussion 
among the different schools, but also the concrete examples.
In the main there was a tendency to transfer the attention from 
the original object to the stock example which had been chosen 
to represent it. This tendency had its advantages and its^ dis­
advantages. On the one hand, it helped to popularise philosophy 
and to inculcate truths which would otherwise have remained re­
stricted ; but on the other hand, it often tended to obscure 
the issue by encouraging people to dwell on one aspect of a 
thing at the expense of the others. For it stands to reason 
that a metaphor or simile is necessarily limited in its applic­
ation. For instance, there is the favourite formula :"The earth 
must have had a maker, for it has the nature $ of an effect, lii
a jar." We can see at once where this example is defective : it
takes no account of the fact that the earth is a live, evolving
thing, while the jar is inanimate and static.
Let us now examine the examples that occur in the texts, 
starting with those which occur most frequently and may be said
to be the common property of all the systems.
The article which more than all others has, not captured 
the imagination perhaps, but attracted the attention of the 
logicians, has already been mentioned, the jar. Tlie philoso­
phers af all the schools constantly take the jar as an example, 
almost regardless of what it is that they wish to illustrate.
The general and obvious qualities which are dwelt on are its
material nature, its perceptibility, the fact that it is a pro­
limited
duct or effect (clay being the cause) and, as such,^both in 
space and in duration, and that, being produced from the un­
conscious, inanimate clay, it is itself unconscious and inanim­
ate (Sankhyakarika Comm. 11 : as vyaktam is insensible, like­
wise pradhanam). These are the jar's common, objective qualities 
about which most schools are agreed.
Let us now see how the various schools use this example 
to illustrate their particular theories and aspects of outlook. 
Tfte most engrossing point of view is the ontological one, - the 
relation of cause and effect. The Sankhy a school is particular­
ly explicit on this subject. From one standpoint the effect 
(i.e. the Jar) does not differ from the cause (i.e. the clay), 
cp. Brh. Up. 1,6,1. For the material is the same in both cases, 
and one could not exist without the other. B#t it J is also em- 
pasized that the jar, as effect, has a different function from 
the clay, as cause. The jar arises from the clay, not the clay
from the jar, and a lump of clay cannot hold liquid (curds, 
honey, water), as a jar can (Sanxhyakar. Comm* 15; cp* N*S*
II. 35* holding and pulling)* This apparently contradicts the 
assertion of the superiority of avyakta over vyakta, but is an 
example of the usefulness of the concrete manifested object, 
as opposed to the unmanifested, shapeless basic material.
W&en two things are different from one another, they do not 
stand in the relation of material cause and material product, - 
e.g. a jar and a cloth which are negations of one another. 
Things which are inseparably connected with certain special 
characteristics have as material cause something avyakta (un­
unfolded, undifferentiated) which has these characteristics 
latent in it. Thus e.g. clay contains the characteristics ne­
cessary to a jar, and unbeaten gold contains those which will 
be manifested in a diadem or earrings.
Here we have a striking illustration. Just as the limbs 
of a tortoise appear and disappear as the tortoise expends or 
contracts them, but fche limbs are not different from the body 
and are not destroyed when they are withdrawn from our sight, * 
so it is with the jafc, the diadem, and all other special forms 
(vikaras) of clay or gold (and likewise with the successive 
evolutions of prakrti). When they come"out, i.e. are manifest­
ed, we say “they arise11, when they go in, i.e. vanish from 
our ken, we say "they are destroyed". But in reality there
can be no manifestation of unreal objects, nor destruction 
of real ones:
"nasato vidyate bhavo nabhavo vidyate satah" (BhG- II,16; 
cf. ibid 11,58; and Kgurika Up. III). And as the tortoise 
is not different from its contracting and expanding limbs, 
so the jar, diadem, etc., are not different from the clay 
or the gold. (Sankhy at at tvakaumudl 9; and see ibid 15).
This question, "Does the existent arise from the 
existent, or from the non-existent?" or "Does the effect 
exist prior to its manifestation, or not?" was one of the 
basic problems which occupied all philosophical schools.
The jar is, by common consent, the object which is taken as 
a cosmogonic symbol to illustrate the rival theories of 
sat-karya and asat-karya.
The Nihilist asserts that a Jar does not exist before 
its manifestation, and deduces that there was nothing before 
the origin of the world. If existence were the true nature 
of a jar, says he, then the activity of the potter would 
be superfluous. The same would apply if non-existence were 
its nature. And "hoth existence and non-existence" and 
"neither existence nor non-existence" may be rejected as 
mutually contradictory. Therefore everything is void (£unya). 
(Sarv. II, p. 11).
The Naiyayika admits that, although the effect (Jar) 
is not manifest, yet the cause (clay) is not non-existent;
but he maintains that the jar is not produced without 
destroying the lump of clay. The follower of the Vedanta 
and Sankhya schools replies that it is only the form 
that is changed, not the material; the effect must exist 
before its manifestation, for nothing can come out of 
nothing. A further proof (sic!) of the pre-existence 
of an effect is the fact that the knowledge of gods and 
yogins regarding a future jar is infallible: i.e. as a 
superior being can visualise a jar as existing in the 
future, that same jar cannot be entirely non-existent 
in the present. F^om a more realistic point of view, most 
schools say that when we see a jar in process of being 
made, we can safely assume its future existence (e.g. 
vrtti on NS 11,80; VS VII,2,17), for the internal organ 
functions in all three times,- in contrast to the senses 
of a normal person, which only function in the present 
(Sankhyakarika Comm. 33). The Buddhist ksajiikavadin, 
however, does not admit a judgment regarding a future Jar.
Clay is not the only material which is necessary for 
the making of a jar; and smother Sankhy a proof for the 
pre-existence of an effect is "the possibility of a skilled 
person*s producing things". For instance, a potter, by 
using clay, wheel, stick, iron filings, rope, water, etc., 
is able to produce a jar out of a lump of clay (Sankhya- 
karika Comm. 9); and these materials cannot manifest the
Jar without the intervention of the independent potter. 
Similarly, according to the Yoga system, it is not the 
Puruoafo ai«-j purusa-artha^/ihat sets the creative causes 
in motion, but I^vara (Vacaspati's gloss on Yogasutras IV, 
But, in the Indian view, there are exceptions to the 
rule that to make a jar one must have materials. In 
Chapter VIII of Sarv. ("recognitive" system) it is stated 
that Siva can create the world by his will alone; and 
further, that the jar produced by yoglns, without clay or 
other materials, serves the same purpose as the jar which 
comes from clay. Accordingly the clay, etc., cannot be 
regarded as the efficient cause of the jar, for it is not 
indispensable to its production. On the contrary, it is 
the will of the producer that is the chief factor. And 
it should not be objected that the yogin actually sets 
atoms in motion when he exercises his volition,- for even 
then we should lack the other materials, potter*s wheel 
and stick, etc. (Sarv. VIII, pp. 77-8). The point is 
noteworthy, for it is an outstanding example of emphasis 
on the concrete, when even what we should term "figments 
of the imagination11,- the products of the volition of a 
supernormal person,- can serve their purpose as tangible 
objects in every-day life. (Cf. the Vedantin's views on 
dream-consciousness, especially propos of chariots etc., 
below, Chapter IV).
Turning to a specific theory of the Sankhya school, 
we find that the three gunas (qualities) which together, 
in their state of equipoise, constitute prakyti, give 
rise to each other, as the clay gives rise to the jar 
(Sankhyakarika 12); and as the jar is a vikara (modification) 
of clay, so the different elements, etc., are vikaras of 
prakrti. The five gross elements and the eleven senses 
(jnana-indriyani, karma-indriyani, and manas) are only 
modifications, not basis forms. And a jar, a cow, a tree, 
etc., in their turn are modifications of the element earth, 
and do not constitute a separate principle from that of earth, 
any more than their own vikaras, milk, seed, etc., and 
further vikaras, curds, shoot, etc., differ materially 
from the original (Sankhyatattvakauraudl 3). For, as far 
as their bodies are concerned, cow, jar, etc., although 
distinct, have the common qualities of being material and 
perceptible to the senses, and are therefore grouped 
together, in contrast to puruga, soul, which is not a 
vikara.
With the Nyaya-VaiSesika school, the jar is the 
stock example in connection with the atom theory. Each 
object is made up, according to its own nature, of different 
collections of atoms, which are not perceptible individually, 
but which assume perceptibility when massed into a complete 
whole, e.g. a jar (Nyayasutras 11,34 (vrtti). This whole,
according to the Naiyayika, is an entity which has its 
own special nature, apart from the characteristics of 
its parts. The Sanskrit term for whole is significant, 
for it epitomises the Indian outlook: "avayavin", "having 
limbs or parts" (See above, Chap. II). When a jar is 
fired, the Naiyayikas maintain that there is simply a 
change of colour, i.e. the red jar becomes a black jar; 
but the Vai£egika view is that there is a change in each 
separate atom during the baking process (See e.g. vytti 
on Nyayasutras 11,40-1; also 111,115-6; 138; IV,5; IV,63.
In the latter passage, the change of colour is an analogy 
for the throwing off of the bonds of kleSa, which need not 
be permanent).
An example of emphasis on the concrete is the contro­
versy between the different schools on the subject of the 
jar's development. In the first place, it is evident that 
there is a distinct succession of evolution in the various 
stages between the appearance of the lump of clay and the 
manifestation of the completed jar. It is evident also 
that there is an inverse process of evolution when the Jar 
is broken, the complete succession being as follows: 
powdered clay>lump of clay >~j&r >-potsherd. Here each 
change is independent of the preceding one, and is perceptible 
to the senses. But what of the life of a Jar between its 
manifestation and its destruction?
The Sankhy a and Yoga schools hold that a jar begins to 
grow old as sson as it leaves the potter1s hands. Theirs
is the doctrine of paripama or constant change; and the
9.
Jains, from* their relativity standpoint, are substantially 
in agreement with this idea of permanence-in-change•
The Buddhists go further, and use the Jar as an example 
for their theory of kgapikatva, "momentariness11. According 
to them, a jar at one moment is completely distinct from 
the jar of the next moment, which is simply its successor; 
and origination is the sole cause of destruction, for from 
the moment of its manifestation the jar travels steadily 
on the road to decomposition. The Naiyayikas strive to 
overthrow this contention by saying "There can be no doubt 
as to constancy (of objects), nor as to perception... and 
the same proof which establishes the oneness of the object 
during a moment also establishes it during a longer period." 
This is in reply to the Buddhist refutation of the plea of 
recognition ("This is the Jar I saw yesterday") on the 
ground that there is a doubt as to its being the same jar. 
The Naiyayika from the logical point of view says that 
if this kjaijikatva involves a jump from moment to moment, 
but a static condition during each moment, then the jar 
may just as well remain static in composition for a longer 
period. He adds: "A jar, e.g., is one and the same, not
different, even when it exists in different moments,- 
just as there is no restriction on the association of one 
cognition (jnana) with different objects,- for it is 
associated with different times through dependence on the 
succession of different causes.11 (Kusumanjali 1,17, Comm, 
cf. also NBT p. 49 etc.)
Turning to metaphysics, we find that the Naiyayika 
uses the jar as a proof for the existence of a soul. He 
says: Since we see that the Jar is always found where the 
clay or the two halves are, and is never found in the 
absence of the material, we learn that an effect must have 
a (material) cause. Hence by rejecting earth and other 
elements as the material cause of qualities such as knowledge, 
desire, and the like, we establish that they must have 
a cause other than the gross elements,- i.e. soul (Xtman). 
Alternatively, we can employ the argument from negative 
instances: "that Which is not a half-jar, or a lump of clay, 
has no jar connected with it by intimate relation; and 
similarly, that which is not soul (atman) has no knowledge, 
etc., connected with it." (Kusumanjali Comm. 1,19)*
The Vedantin exponent of non-duality says that as 
clay is the essence of various sorts of jar, so all beings 
are modifications of the indivisible Brahman; any supposed 
differences in the Universal Self belong only to"name and 
form", and in reality a jar, a cloth, a cow, a tree, are
but different names of the Supreme Spirit which dwells in 
all (cf. Ch. Up. 6,1,4: 11 As by one lump of clay all that is 
made of clay is known,- every distinction (vikara) being 
a^modificatiorv of speech (vacarambhanam), a name,- and the 
clay being the only reality...11 (likewise the Self is in 
all). This doctrine was later carried to its logical 
extreme, when the entire empirical world was regarded as 
unreal, when contrasted with the sole transcendental 
reality, Brahman. For example, in Vedantaparibhasa I:
The rejection of jars etc. as unreal follows upon realisation 
of Brahman, i.e. for the purpose of everyday activity, 
we must accept material objects as virtually real; but when 
enlightenment is attained, it is realised that nothing has 
a real existence apart from brahman.
One of the chief objections to the deduction that 
the earth (or the seas, mountains, etc.) must have had an 
intelligent creator, since it has the nature of an effect, 
like a jar (see above, p . v 8) is that if the analogy is 
carried further, and the maker is assumed to have a body, 
like the potter, then he cannot be supposed to be omnipotent 
or omniscient. This argument is debated at great length 
among the Nyaya and other schools (see e.g. Kusumanjali V,l; 
Syadv. St. VI, pp. 21-4; Sarv. VII, pp. 67-8). One way out 
of the difficulty is that propounded in the Kusumanjali, 1,4,
where the existence of a God who supervises the working 
of merit and demerit is sought to be established* "But," 
says an objector, Hif the cause of a jar, etc*, were eternal, 
there would be the (undesired) result that the jar etc* would 
also be eternal; therefore we must assume the jar's cause 
to be itself only occasional (kadacitkin), and this would 
involve an uninterrupted succession of occasional causes 
(each dependent on its previous cause)." To meet this 
objection of a regressus in infinitum, the Naiyayika adduces 
the example of the seed and the shoot, i.e* the eternity 
of succession of cause and effect (an allowable regressus 
in inf.- see below, Chapter VII).
In the Vedanta view, the jar is an object of the pro­
jection of mind* That is to say, the mind, through a mode 
or vrtti, projects itself through the eye and assumes the 
form of the jar (See Vedantaparibhasa I*, -e«p-. 178-9;).
This action is further compared to the function of a lamp, 
which manifests the jar, and at the same time dispels the 
darkness enveloping it. In the same way the intellect and 
its underlying consciousness both come into contact with the 
Jar: the intellect destroys the ignorance regarding it, while 
the discriminative consciousness (viveka) manifests it 
(Paficada£I 7,91)* (With this, contrast the Buddhist Vijnana- 
vadin's view that everything is consciousness alone, and
that there are no external objects* See below, p.iV ).
The Bha£Ja Mlmamsakas hold that after the cognition
of a jar has taken'place, a quality called “cognisedness1
(jnatata) is produced in the jar. They apply the rule
that an action must produce some effect on its object,
and therefore deduce that the action of cognition must
do likewise. The Naiyayika overthrows this contention, mainly
on the ground that there is no visible effect produced
on the jar by its contact with the sense-organs; and
further, action implies motion (spandana), and cognition
is not a motion. The Nyaya view is that it is the cognition 
alone which distinguished the particular knowledge of the
jar, and not any surmised qualities such as “jnatata11 
(Kusum. Comm. IV*3-4)* The Mlmamsaka theory is noteworthy,
however, as evidence of the concrete connection between 
sense-organ and sense-object.
Because the jar is gross and easily perceptible, it 
is conversely used to illustrate non-perception, i.e. when 
all the conditions of perceptibility are present, and the 
jar is still not perceived, it must be absent. This is 
with reference to abhava, as distinct from anupalabdhi 
(non-perception owing to defects of sense etc.), for which 
see Chap. I above. We first imagine the jar as present in 
a certain spot, and then realise that it is absent; accordingly
our negative judgment is preceded and conditioned by a 
positive one (See e.g. NBT II, pp. 32-4; III, p# 58, p. 87, 
etc.). The schools which do not recognise abhava as a 
separate proof (pramapa), e.g. the Sankhya and Nyaya 
schools, seek to include it under perception or inference.
The Sankhya takes the cognition of a jar's absence to 
equal the cognition of the bare patch of ground on which 
it formerly stood. The argument is as follows: "Abhava 
is simply pratyaksa. The "non-existence" of a jar on a 
patch of ground is nothing but the particular modification 
of the ground which can be called its "being alone"; for 
everything, except purusa, is subject to modification 
every moment." This modification of the ground can be 
grasped by the senses, hence there is no need for a separate 
pramana. The Naiyayika works from the angle of the Jar, 
not of the patch of ground. In replying to the Carvaka's 
statement ("Just as we conclude that a jar is not existent 
when it is absent from a given pattfh of ground, so we conclude 
that God is not existence, because we cannot see him" (Kusum. 
111,1, introduction)), he says "Non-perception cannot pre­
clude the existence of God; moreover it is not a distinct 
proof at all. He argues that the cognition of the jar's 
absence is preceded by a non-perception of which we are 
ourselves unconscious,- and therefore it is a case of per­
ception. If, on the other hand, the cognition were preceded
by a conscious non-perception, it would be a case of 
inference. We cannot say that the senses are occupied 
in the perception of the patch of ground, for just as 
the ear can detect the cessation of sound in the ether, 
without a perception of its substratum, the ether, so the 
eye can detecth the absence of form, without a separate 
cognition of its substratum (Kusum. Comm. 111,20).
The Naiyayika does not, however, deny that the patch 
of ground has its part to play in the cognition; he merely 
emphasises that the senses are the true cause of the 
cognition. The perception of the substratum is inseparable 
from the function (vyapara) of the senses- otherwise the 
eye, etc. would be superfluous. He further postulates a 
certain intimate relation between the jar's absence and 
its substratum, and establishes his contention that abhava 
is simply perception, by stating that the relation between 
the eye and its object, which is necessary in every act of 
perception, is here^fulfilled by this svarupa relation 
between the spot of ground and the absence (of the jar) 
(Kusum. Comm. Ill, 212-2).
Those schools which admit abhava as a separate pramajia 
(Vedanta and Bhatja Mlmamaa) hold that the evidence which 
causes the apprehension of non-existence in the ground is 
non-perception, not perception*, for we cannot see that which 
is absent (sc. the jar)> nor can the perception of the patch
of ground be said to lead to the inference of the jar's 
absence. We are aware that we do not perceive the Jar, 
before we cognise the ground as possessing the jar's 
absence* (See e.g. Kusum. Comm. 111,22, Introduction)*
From whichever angle we regard the cognition of non­
existence, it is evident that a good deal depends on the 
Imagination, which is carried to the extreme by the Buddhist 
logician when he says: "When we wish to deny the identity 
of a visible object, such as a jar, with another object, 
it does not matter whether the latter is perceptible or 
not. For example, if we wish to arrive at the judgment, "This 
is a jar, it is not a demon (pi£aca), we must first imagine 
the demon as visible, and then deny its identity with the 
perceptible jar." (See NBT II, p. 38).
With regard to the jar's relation to other things, it is 
often mentioned in connection with a lamp, particularly in 
metaphysical examples. Thus when the soul has freed itself 
of its impediments (wrong notions), and has realised its 
identity with the Supreme, it is comparable to the light of 
a lamp which shines forth unhindered when the enclosing jar 
is broken. The simile of the range of a lamp's light within 
a jar or within a mansion illustrates varying degrees of 
spiritual illumination, or else (J4in theory) the expansion 
or contraction of a soul to accommodate itself to the body
it inhabits.
A jar which is placed in the sun shines; similarly 
this "aggregate of body and organs", though itself 
material and therefore unconscious, performs its functions, 
such as resting and working, as if it were conscious, because 
it is illuminated by the light of the Self (Brh. Up. Comm. 
4,3*7). In this connection, cf. Vai6. Sutras 11,1,7:
"(The body or senses are not the seat of perception), 
because it is nbt known (that any degree of consciousness 
exists in a jar, etc.). This is explained by the Upaskara 
on 111,1,6: "if consciousness did exist in the ultimate 
atoms of the body, it would also exist in a jar, etc. (since 
both are vikaras of earth)" By contrast, the Buddhist 
Vijnanavadin asserts that there is nothing apart from 
consciousness, which assumes its own form as well as those 
of objects.
The Sankhya observes that a jar, although itself 
inanimate, becomes hot or cold through contact with the 
atmosphere, or with hot or cold water. In the same way, 
the principle of buddhi (mahat), and other modifications 
of pradhana, becomes possessed of consciousness, as it were, 
through their association with the conscious puru§a (Sankhyak. 
20).
One of the less obvious functions of a jar is to act 
as the container of ether. This does not imply any real
distinction in the indivisible ether, for the ether 
particularised by a jar in a house is not distinct from 
the ether that pervades the house (although jar and 
house are two different upadhis or limiting conditions 
of ether) (Vedantaparibhaga I. But see below, Chap. VIII, 
for the Jain view of ether as permanent and impermanent).
It may be noted that the illustration goes to show that 
a jar is dull and heavy, and impedes knowledge and 
illumination. This follows from the fact of^.ts having 
limits, and being material and gross. And it is only a 
limited thing which is checked by another thing with which 
it is in relation, as a jar is checked by a post or a 
wall. - *k
Only the Sankhya system has noted a person's psychological 
reactions to a jar. One may feel sattva, contentment, towards 
a jar if one possesses it; rajas, desire, if one wishes to 
possess it; and tamas, indifference, if one is not interested 
in it. (Sarv. XIV, p. 122).
In our perception of a given object, e.g. a jar, the 
general notion (ghatatva) must come first, and then we 
become aware of the object's special characteristics.
The sequence is as follows: first, "thing" in general; 
second, "jar" in general; third, "jar" in particular (yellow 
jar, black jar, etc.). In the Sankhya philosophy, this
illustration shows the function of mind as distinct from 
the other senses; mind has the special faculty of "dis­
crimination", which sets it apart both from senses and 
sense-objects, such as jars etc.
A puzzling problem was "which comes first, the 
particular or the general (gha£a or gha^atva)?" This was 
supplemented by such questions as, Is the universal proper 
to a species immanent in all existent objects of that 
species, or is it something external? Is It a substance in 
itself, or is it something intangible? The Vai^egika 
seeks to solve the problem by postulating an intimate relation 
(samavaya) between the universal and its particulars. He 
asserts further that this samavaya is one, indivisible, and 
eternal. The Jain argues in reply: If the samavaya relation 
is one and eternal, etc., then the qualities of jar could 
reside in cloth; and when a jar perished, the samavaya would 
perish with it (Syadv. p. 32, St. VII). The Buddhist, in 
his turn, says: "if the universal is not a substance, it cannot 
be in intimate relation with the jar; while if it is a sub­
stance, it must be of limited dimensions, and cannot attach 
itself ad lib. to each fresh jar." Accordingly he concludes 
that specific individuals alone exist, and that the universal 
has no reality. The Jain does not go quite so far. He says 
that the likeness between different individuals belonging to
the same class is the real universal, and that there is 
no need to assume a universal class-essence. Here again 
we find an emphasis on the concrete, such as is expressed 
by Betty Heimann in her review of S^nart's Bjhadarapyaka 
Up. trsl. (JRAS 1937): "S^nart hints that the Indian basis 
of thought is not merely formal logic when he translates 
arkatvam not as the abstract idea of arka but as "the name 
arka", i.e. name as the concrete and magical essence of the 
thing expressed."
As a kind of supplement to the idea of gha^atva, we 
may mention the Buddhist theory of kurvadrupatva. From the 
biological point of view, the Buddhists hold that the 
occasional quality of kurvadrupatva ("efficient form") 
resides in each object when that object is actively engaged 
In producing its effect, as a jar in holding water, or rice 
in producing a shoot. The Naiyayikas retort, from the merely 
logical and not biological standpoint, that this would 
result in a confusion (saipkara): i.e. the admission of this 
quality would involve a division or distinction between, e.g. 
rice that is gar owing, and rice in a granary,- but a non- 
distinction between barley and rice (when both are growing). 
In their turn they urge that a species should be subdivided 
according to material, e.g. silver, earthenware, etc., jars. 
But the real species, gha^atva, depends on the static form, 
not on material or function. The general appellation "jar11
arises from our viewing all jars as possessed of a common 
attribute, viz* the being composed of parts which (though 
of different composition) share a particular kind of 
arrangement (i.e. shape) (Kusum. Comm. 1,16).
Another inanimate object which, like the jar, is in 
great favour as an illustration of the relation of cause 
and effect, is the cloth (pa£a). It is stated several times 
in the Sankhyakarika Comm* (e.g. 11,14,61) that the cloth 
does not differ from the threads which compose it: when 
black threads are used, the cloth will be black, and when 
white threads are used, it will be white. The effect does 
not differ from its material cause, and just as the cloth 
arises from the threads, so the visible world, pervaded by 
the three gunas, arises from the undifferentiated avyakta, 
which is likewise composed of the three gupas. In another 
passage (Sankhyak. 16) this is expressed rather differently:
11 Just as the three streams of the Ganges fell on Siva's head 
and formed a single stream, so the "trigupam avyaktam" 
evolved into the single "vyaktam"; or just as the combined 
threads give rise to the single cloth, so avyakta gives rise 
to w e  successive qualitioa, mahat, etc., owing to the 
collaboration of the three gupas. And just as the cloth 
contains the qualities of the threads, so also the products 
of avyakta,- mahat, etc.- which are distinguished by the 
three gunas, have inherited these qualities from their cause,
the basic avyakta. In spite of the differences between the 
undifferentiated basic material, avyakta, and the evolved 
product, vyakta, they are fundamentally one, as the latter 
is contained in the former. It is definitely stated (Sankhyak 
14) that whoever sees the manifest world, sees the unmanifest 
original matter also: uyo vyaktap pa^yati, sa pradhanam api 
pa^yati, tad-viparyay a-abhavat. "
The fullest defeane of the Identity of material cause 
and material product is found at SankhyatattvakaumudI 9.
Four reasons are given for the identity of cloth and threads, 
and thence of product and material: (1) the cloth and the 
threads have the same particular quality (dharma), unlike 
a cow and a horse, which differ from each other in this 
respect. (2) Cloth and threads stand in the relation of 
material cause and material product (upadana and upadeya), 
unlike a jar and a cloth, or a horse and a cow (Sarv. XIV), 
which differ materially from one another. (3) Cloth and 
threads cannot come together anc^e separated, as different 
things such as a dish and the fruit which is placed in it 
can; or be forever separate, like the Himalaya and Vindhya 
mountains. (4) Cloth and threads have the same weight on 
the scale, unlike e.g. a golden ornament of two pal as( weight 
and a golden ornament of one pala. On all these grounds, 
it is established that the cloth is nothing but a particular 
modification of the threads, and is not materially different
from them.
But the Nalyayika here interposes four reasons for the 
difference between cause and product (in support of his 
belief that the whole is something separate from the parts 
which compose it): (1) kriyabuddhi, the understanding of 
the production (of the cloth) (i.e. if the cloth and the 
threads were really identical, it should not be necessary 
to produce the one from the other); (2) nirodhabuddhi, the 
understanding of the destruction (of the cause, before the 
effect is manifested); (3) vya^de^abheda, the difference in
A
terminology; and (4) arthakriyabheda, the difference in 
practical use.
The first two arguments are met by the illustration 
of the tortoise and its limbs (see above, p.57?); i.e. the 
qualities in cloth and threads which respectively appear 
and disappear are mutual, and the manifestation or destruction 
of one or the other is only apparent. The difference in 
terminology presents no difficulty for the Sankhya, for the 
expression "the cloth is (contained in) the threads" is ana­
logous to the expression "the Tilaka trees are in this wood" 
(where the wood and the trees are co-extensive) (N.B. this 
example is contrary: it should be "the wood is contained in 
the Tilaka trees"). Nor is the difference in practical use 
difficult £o account for: even one object may have several 
different uses, as for instance a fire burns, gives light,
and may be used for cooking. And as a single servant (vig£i) 
can only be employed on a journey to point out the way, 
but many such servants are able to bear the palanquin, so 
the separate threads are not able to cover (the body), but 
en masse they can perform that function. (Cf. Sarv. XIV, pp. 
1212-2: "..the office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads 
manifesting the nature of cloth when they are placed in a 
particular arrangement").
Here the Naiyayika steps in with a quibbling argument:
"is the manifestation of the cloth, before its material cause 
is at work, existent or non-existent? If non-existent, then 
our theory of the production of the existent from the non­
existent must be granted. If (it is already) existent, 
what is the use of the activity of the cause? If the product 
is already there, what is the use of the material? And if 
we had to assume another manifestation (of a former product) 
before that manifestation, there would be a regressus in 
infiniturn."
The Sahkhya reply turns the tables on the Naiyayika:
"What is the production of a previously non-existent object?
Is it real (=exlstent) or unreal? If it is real, then what 
is the use of the material? If it is unreal, then we should 
have to assume another (previous) production, and you would 
in your turn be faced with a regressus in infinitum. But if 
you say that existence is the nature of the cloth, then you could
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substitute the word “existence11 for “cloth", and it would 
be tautological to say “the cloth exists". And you could 
not say that the cloth was destroyed, as existence and 
destruction cannot be present in a thing at one and the same 
time. Therefore this manifestation of the cloth is impossible, 
whether you regard it as inherent in the functionary cause of 
the cloth, or as inherent in the fact of the existence of 
the cloth (cf. NS IV, 90,92. The Naiyayika holds that the cloth 
inheres in the threads, and is dependent on them, and this 
accounts for the fact that it is not grasped separately, 
though, as a whole, it is something complete in itself).
On the contrary, continues the Sankhya, our theory is established, 
and the existent arises from the existent. The material cause 
(in this case the threads) is set in motion by some efficient 
cause (in this case the weaver). And you Naiyayikas cannot 
say, further, that the production of the cloth is due to a 
combination of the material cause with the colour of the 
cloth; for the colour has no activity, and the material cause, 
when operating for the production of an article, must always 
be in relation with activity,- otherwise it would not have the 
nature of a cause."
Jacob (Popular Maxims, Vol. II, pp. 122-3), under sutra- 
£a£ikanyaya (the thread about to be woven into a garment, and 
already regarded as the garment) discusses this question of 
the pre-existence of the effect, and quotes Ballantyne's
translation of the Nyayasutras II, 126; and IV,1,50:
“from the design" (tadarthya): “He makes a mat“ (ka$a)
Implies his aiming after a mat* inasmuch as it is a thing 
nonexistent (until made) can have (at the time when one 
is spoken of as making it) no maker". Further: “The 
weaver sets himself to work, having considered “In these 
threads (i.e. constituted by these threads) there will 
be a cloth", but not with the understanding that “there 
is a cloth “, (for in the latter case the weaver*s labour 
would be superfluous) .
The general qualities of a cloth, apart from its 
relation to tne tnreaas composing it, are comparatively 
seldom referred to. We have evidence of the importance 
of the art of weaving, in the common expression "paratantra*’ 
meaning 1!dependent on others', but literally ’'interwoven 
with another ' (tantra- loom, or warp of a cloth). This 
expression occurs e.g. in Sankhyakarika commentary, 10: "All 
the derivatives of avyakta are interwoven one with another.
Of. also isrh.Up.3,6,1 - water is woven through (ota and 
prota) with air, air with the sky,etc.etc. Mund. Up. 2,2,5.- 
reference to the one Atman, on whom heaven, earth, sky, mind 
and all the pranas are woven; Maitri Up. 6,3: "the sun is Om, 
consisting of three matras - "and by these all things are 
woven and interwoven (otam, protam)1
Being a product, like a jar, the cloth is subject to 
destruction, and to parinama or constant change fgnfkhynknr1lta)
Even a new cloth, as soon as it enters upon the succession 
of moments, begins to grow old; but conversely, It does not 
grow old all at once, but must first pass through the ageing 
process of parinama.
The dyeing of a cloth is used as an illustration for 
the assimilating by the mind of certain impressions. As a 
cloth becomes a deep yellow when dyed with turmeric, so the 
mind receives pleasant impressions when in the presence of 
objects of enjoyment; and a man In such circumstances is said 
to be attached’, as the cloth is said to be dyed. (Brh. Comm.
2 *3*6. ) • ^  CaTUwu (A fba,
An opponent of the Naiyayika says that there is no such 
thing as a "whole4, for one sees that a cloth may be ot reddened 
with safflower (maharanjana) in one part, and not in another,- 
and a composite whole should not have contradictory parts.
But the Naiyayika holds that theJ.wo colours produce one 
“citrarupa" (variegated form), and the latter belongs to the 
(whole) cloth, while the colours themselves belong to the 
parts. The Jain, from his relativity standpoint, says: 
red and blue are in the same cloth, though in different parts 
of it. a s two colours are predicable of one and the same 
thing, likewise “being11 and “non-being" (i.e. any given 
object is neither entirely existent, nor entirely non-existent). 
(Syadv. p. 149, St. XXIV).
The eight conditions of attitudes (bhava) of Sankhya,
viz. dharma, adharma, jnana, ajnana, vairagya, avairagya,
aiSvarya and anai£varya, pervade or perfume the intellect
(buddhi); and as the subtle body (sukgma£arira) is associated
with the intellect, it too is perfumed by the bhavas,-
Just as a cloth or garment, through contact with sweet-smelling
Campaka flowers, is pervaded by their perfume (bankhyatattva-
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kaumudl 40).(But this smell is not natural to the cloth,- 
cf. vai£. butras 2,2,1).
The karma which ripens into a period of life (ayur- 
vipakam karma) is either speedy or delayed (sa-upakrama or 
nir-upakrama: as for example a wet piece of cloth, when well 
spread out, dries in a short time, but when the same cloth Is 
rolled up, it takes a long while to dry (Vyasa on Yogasutras 
111,22). A wet garment (vastra) collects the dust brought 
to it from all sides by the wind; in the same way the soul, 
wet with the water of impurities (kagaya, sins) collects., 
the actions brought to it by loga (= a natural attraction?) 
(Sarv. Ill, p. 30).
The modifications (vrtti) of the afflictions (kle£a) 
are destroyed by meditation (Comm, on xogasutras 11,11).
When the seed-power of the kle£as has been burnt up, they 
disappear (when the Yoginfs mind is absorbed into its 
primal cause); but when they still retain their seed-power, 
their fresh modifications or functions can be checked by 
the power of meditation. As the heavy (sthula) dirt on
clothes is shaken off first, and then the fine dirt is 
washed off by effort and appliance, so the gross modifications 
of the kleifas are easily destroyed, but the subtle or potential 
ones are powerful antagonists. vacaspatlmi^ra questions 
the propriety of this illustration, saying that it is impossible 
to remove the potential afflictions by meditation; they 
disappear with the disappearance of the mind, xhe portion 
of the comparison which is valid is the reference to grosser 
ana finer dirt, as of course the potential khe£as are more 
inaccessible than those which are already present; but the 
"removability by effort" does not apply in the case of the 
potential kle£as.
The moulding of jars and the weaving of cloths are 
regarded as fine arts, originally Imparted to man by the 
Creator: "The traditional arts now current, as that of making 
cloth,etc., must have been originated by an independent being, 
from the very fact that they are traditional usages like the 
tradition of modern modes of writing " (alluding to the 
supposed divine origin of the Devanagari script) (Kusum.
Comm. V,l). Further on (11,2) we find the following passage: 
"Just as a magician having made a wooden doll pulled by 
strings, tells it to bring a jar, and thus causes the jar to 
be brought, and thereby furthers the education of a child, 
likewise Tlvara, having assumed two bodies in the mutual
connection of master and disciple, and thus initiated the 
tradition (of words), and taught their meanings to the men then 
newly created. In the same manner having himseir originated 
the tradition of (making) jars etc., he instructed them 
therein." (cf. ibid. i, 3, and v,S 5, Comm.).
Like the jar, the cloth is frequently cited in arguments 
about the destructibillty of matter, e.g. Kusum. Comm. v,l:
"the universe is destructible by an effort, like cloth which 
can be torn apart". Or JBhagavadglta ±1,22: "The embodied 
person (dehin; casts off bodies and assumes new ones, just 
as a man discards old, worn garments and puts on fresn ones." 
There is a complicated argument at oarv. a ± I ,  pp. 107-8:
"If you object that non-existence (abhava) cannot be a cause, 
(says the mlmarnsaka), then it must be asked whether non­
existence is an effect or not,* ±f it is not, then the eternity 
of (e.g.; a cloth must oe admitted, since there is no proof 
of its destruction. If it is an effect, then v/hat fault is 
there in its being a causer (This is a 'rope which binds at 
both ends- ubhayatahpa£a rajju- a dilemma).
any ony a-abhava or itaretara-abhava, mutual exclusion, 
is exemplified by the relation oi a jar to a cloth; while 
sarva-abhava, complete non-existence, or destruction, is 
seen in a cloth which is burnt up (oankhyakarika 4)# The 
burnt cloth is also referred to in the vedantaBara (172): 
"(When the mental state or absolute oneness is attained;
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this modification of consciousness, accompanied by the 
reflection of pure thought v=£>ranman;, makes the (hitherto; 
unknown supreme ^rahman (from which the individual ooul 
does not differ; its object and destroys the ignorance 
regarding it, xhem, just as a cloth is burnt when the threads 
composing it are hurnt, so all the effects or ignorance 
are destroyed when their cause, l,e, ignorance, is destroyed,
And accordingly the mental state ^cittavrtti; or oneness 
or absorption (lit, Mindivisibilityakhap^a) which has 
caused the destruction of the effects of ignorance, is 
itself destroyed11 (and the individual soul is merged in 
Brahman),
With regard to anyonyabhava, it should be noted that 
according to the Vedantin, the cloth , although it is the 
negation of a jar, is a positive entity, not a nonentity.
The Jainsview, however, is rather different. Propounding 
the doctrine of Syadvada, he says that absolute existence 
or absolute non-existence cannot be predicated of any 
object, A jar, say, exiBts"in a certain way1',- and in relation 
to other things. It exists in its own nature, but not as 
regards a cloth, for example. As far as the cloth is concerned, 
the jar is non-existent; accordingly each object is negative 
as well as positive. (Cf. the Buddhist theory of apoha (negation 
conveyed by word): ghaja * ghaja-itara-abhavavyav^tti).
On the other hand, the Nyayabindu^Ika III, p. 76, dis­
cussing a syllogism relating to omniscience, observes:
“if there were altogether no incompatibility (virodha) 
between omniscience and the faculty of speech) they could 
have been observed as coexistent, just as a jar and a cloth,"
This is Stcherbatsky1s rendering - it should be noted that it 
is also possible that the "virodha11 may be construed withxgk*|i 
ghatapajayjr, i.e.if there were no incompatibility or contra­
diction as between a jar and a cloth. Here is yet another inst­
ance of the polaric outlook : the very example which by common 
consent represents mutual exclusion, is here taken to illustrate 
co-existence.
All that has been said about the species jar (ghatatva) 
may of course equally apply to the species cloth (pajatva). It 
is only necessary in this connection to mention the following 
discussion in the Nyaya chapter of the Sarvadar5anasangraha. The 
Naiyayika, anxious to establish a proof for the existence of a 
Supreme Being, produces his usual argument : "The mountains, 
seas, etc. must have had a maker from their possessing the nat­
ure of effects just like a jar." He adds: "Our middle term can­
not be rejected as asiddha, since it can be established by the 
fact of the subject's possessing parts." H^s opponent objects : 
"What are we to understand by 'possessing parts?1 ( savayavatva), 
Does it mean 'Existing in contact with parts', or 'in intimate 
relation (samavayitva) with parts'? It cannot be the first, since
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this would equally apply to (eternal things) such as ether 
(gagana), nor can it be the second, since this would prove too 
much, as applying to such cases as the species thread (tantutva), 
(which exists in intimate relation with the individual threads)1*. 
The Naiyayika replies by suggesting that ‘possessing parts'* 
may be explained by “belonging to the class of substances which 
exist in intimate relation (samaveta-dravyatva)" ("substances" 
excludes tantutva, and "in intimate relation" excludes ether, 
etc.). Accordingly it is implied here that the species or 
universal is not a substance (Sarv. XI, p. 97)*
We have treated these two stock examples separately 
because of their unlimited application. Various aspects of 
Indian civilisation (in the sense of Latin 'cives*) will next 
be dealt with in their dsmployment as upamas.
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Chapter IV* The immanent story of ancient Indian culture, 
as reflected in the Upama.
(a) _Arts and Crafts_.
It is difficult to make any hard and fast division between 
‘‘arts and crafts” as such, and their application in social 
life* *'or instance, weapons such as arrows and swords belong 
both to the work of the smith and to the purauit of soldiery* 
Where weapons and instruments of various kinds are specifically 
mentioned in the analogies, without a definite reference 
to the person wielding them, it will be simpler to treat 
them under the head of “arts and crafts”, even though the 
social sphere might be more appropriate.
We begin with metals and their modifications. The most 
frequently mentioned metals are gold, iron, brass, copper, 
and silver, the two former being the most popular. We have 
already had occasion to refer to gold when dealing with the 
jar and the cloth {above, pp.5Z> and ), where it is pointed 
out that the golden ornament is a modification of unbeaten 
gold; and that a golden ornament of the weight of two palas 
differs from one which weighs one pala. (Cf* also Kusum. Comm. 
V',1). j^lsewhere (Sarv. XIII, p. 118) it is said: “That which 
remains as the true (satya) during the process of modification, 
as the gold remains under the form of the earring,- that wherein 
change comes and goes,-they call the supreme Mature Cprakrti).”
And again: "Whatever is possessed or certain attributes must 
have had a cause possessed, of the same,- thus a ring has 
gold for its material cause, because it has the attributes 
of gold" tin reference to the three gunas) (Sarv. Alv, p. 12*;.
According to the followers of the Sankhya and Yoga schools, 
a substance ^dharmin; undergoes paripama or modification 
of three kinds: (1) dharma, “property'1; (2) lakgajia, character­
istic; ^3) avastha, condition* The first change occurs when 
the gold is made into a bracelet, or diadem; the second is 
a change of the ornaments themselves, from one shape to another; 
while the third change refers to relative newness or oldness, 
owing to lapse of time (See e.g. Syadv. p. 16, St* V).
In Sarv, XIV, pp* 130-1, these three changes are applied to 
the function of the understanding (citta)* When citta per­
ceives, e.g., the colour "blue", there is a change of dharma, 
as when gold becomes a bracelet, diadem, or armlet (i.e. the 
understanding is coloured by the object, and^previous im­
pressions are obliterated). When the perception recedes into 
the past, there is a change of lakgapa, and when there is an 
alternate manifestation and non-manifestation of blue, etc., 
this is a change of avastha. Elsewhere (Vyasa on Yogasutras 
111,13) it is stated that it is only the condition that 
changes states in the past, present, and future; the substance 
is not changed. Thus when a vessel of gold is broken to out 
be made into something else, it is only the condition that
, changes, not the gold* VacaspatimliSra adds that when vessels 
or ornaments of gold are termed e.g. a rucaka or a svastika, 
they differ only in appellation, not in substance. The (efficient) 
cause of the differentiation is the goldsmith. The goldsmith 
who makes bracelets, may make them from gold which is not 
materially different from the gold of the earrings; but he is 
responsible for the difference in form. Similarly, the cause 
of change or modification of the mind is a sense-object other 
than that which is occupying the mind at the tlifce (See also 
Vyasa on Yogasfitras 11,28),
The Buddhist, on the contrary, holds that there is no such 
thing as an unchangeable substance (e.g. gold), and says that it 
is only the characteristic which exists (i.e. the ornaments, 
as successors of.the unbeaten gold) (See e.g. Vacaspati on 
Yogasutras III,13).
The example of the relation of gold and necklace is often 
quoted side by side with that of clay and Jar to illustrate 
the relation of cause and effect. But gold has one distinctive 
characteristic which is not shared by clay, viz. that even 
after it has been modified in the shape of an ornament, that 
ornament can be melted down again, and transformed into another. 
^Moreover, even when there has been the destruction of a mans, 
e.g. of gold, 3ft** through the destruction of the union of its 
parts by the blows of a hammer, an earring can still be made 
therefrom; while a Jar, or the like, originates without the
& v
destruction of the nature of the bowl-shaped halves (kapala) 
etc# (which are put together to form the jar).'1 (Nyayasutras 
II, 109 et seq., and vytti). This puts the matter from a 
slightly different angle, but goes to show the same thing, 
namely that gold is more flexible than clay# Later, it is 
stated that things which have undergone a change do not again 
return to their original form (ibid. 11,111). Someone objects 
that this is not right, for gold, having abandoned the 
condition of a bracelet (kataKa), and having assumed that of 
a ring, (kun<Jala), can again assume the condition of a bracelet# 
The re$>ly is that these modifications do not relinquish the 
nature of gold, their original basis,- it is different in 
the case of e#g# milk and curds, which have the fixed relation 
of material and modification, which cannot be reversed (11,118, 
vftti). (The subject under discussion is the letter i, and 
whether it is actually changed to y in sandhi, or merely 
substituted by y)#
An ingenious way of surmounting the difficulty of how an 
"eternal’1 substance can submit to change, or a modified article 
rest on an eternal basis, is afforded by the Jain Syadvadin who 
explains that objects are nitya4- anitya() permanent and imperman­
ent); and modifications of a ’’characterised object” (dharmin) 
are both distinct from it and identical with it. In their charac­
ter as distinct from it, they are susceptible to change, and 
therefore impermanent; but as identical (in substance) with it, 
they are eternal. It is a question of relativity. (Syadv.st.5)
Gold is, of course, regarded as a precious metal, and the 
process of freeing it from dross is eagerly seized upon by the 
moralist as an analogy. 11 Just as a goldsmith (pe^askarl, alter­
native trsl. embroiderer) takes apart a little quantity of gold 
and fashions another - a newer and better- form, so does the 
self throw this body away, and make (assume?) a newer and better 
form, suited to the Pitys or the Gandharvas, or the gods, or 
Viraj, or H ir any agar bha". (Brhad.Up. 4,4,4) ,fThe mind (citta) 
becomes established in its true nature when the impunity of Rajas 
is removed”(Yogasutras 1.2) Purified of the dross of Rajas and 
Tamas, through heating with the re-agents of practice and freedom 
from desire, the gold of Sattva becomes established in its own 
nature. The three tests of real gold are kaga, cheda, and tapa; 
now each of these words has a secondary meaning as applied to 
the ascetic : he is to purify his mind through the doctrines of 
the Jina, to cut himself off from evil influences, and to under­
go severe penance (tapa). The teachers of the other schools of 
thought teahh doctrines which cannot stand such a test (and 
which are, therefore, not gold but base metal). (Syadv. st.
XXXI, p. 177)* "As one would mend gold with salt, silvef with 
gold, tin with silver, leather with tin, iron (loha) with lead, 
wood with iron, and leather with wood; in the same way one mends 
the wounds of the sacrifice through the power of these/yttyjifl 
worlds, of the deities and of the threefold knowledge”. (Ch.Up. 
4,17,7). ”Just as those not knowing the district (akgetrajna)
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might walk about above a hidden gold treasure, and yet not 
find it; similarly all these living creatures (praja), thougi 
going day after day (in deep sleep) to the world of Brahman, 
yet do not discover it. (Ch. Up. 8,3,2)
In seeking to refute the Vedanta doctrine of advaita 
(non-duality), the Sankhya says that to attribute the nature 
of the unintelligent Creation to the pure Brahman would be 
like mistaking gold for silver (kaladhauta) (Sarv. XIV, p.
122). Silver evidently ranked quite low in the scale of 
metalSj/Tfrf» alsoSaSJEyakarika Comm. 9: f,The existent must
A
be the cause, for things cannot arise interchangeably; as 
for instance there is a non-existence of gold in silver, 
grass, dust, sand, etc.).
Gold has always had a high mystical value (cp. alchemy in 
the Middle Ages); it is the colour observed in the Sun, the moon 
and in fire, and this adds weight to the conception of its purity 
e.g. golden vessel = sun IiSa Up. 15; ,fgolden person in the heart11 
passim In Upahisads (often jLuentified with the sun,, e.g.
MaitrT up. 6,1.; gold and silver shell (earth and heaven) Ch.
Up. p.l9*l. f,The genus of fire is that universal (samanya) 
which is found with intimate relation (samaveta) in fire, being 
also found with intimate relation in the moon and gold 1 (Sarv.
X, p.87). Coppare also Upaskara on VaiS.S. 11.1,3; IV.1,7; IV.*
2,11. Gold, as well as a jewel, is "taijasa11, compounded of light 
But gold and jewels (e.g. pearls) are not visible without exter­
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nal light, whereas a lamp, or the moon, etc. are self-luminous
(Syadv. st* V, p.14). Through its name (suvarna) gold is linked
with the mysteries of speech : ,fHe who knows the correct sound
of fchis Saman (vital force) obtains gold".(su-varpa means both
a good tone and gold) (Brhad Up.1,3,26). Finally, though the
illustration is not taken from a philosophical text, we may
note the curious idea found in the Pancatantra (II.2) that a 
may
mouse jump to any height through the magic potency of a bag 
of gold buried beneath the floor.
Next to gold comes iron. Like gold, iron is heated; but 
in this case the effect is not wholly beneficial. In fact the 
most frequent allusion to the heating of iron is the simile of 
"the red-hot iron ball1 which deludes a man into thinking that 
it is gold :nFor the truth is that arty attempt to establish 
happiness (as the sum:;um bonum) since it is inevitably accomp­
anied by various causes of pain, is only like the man (viz. 
his action) who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron 
under the delusion that it was gold (tapanlya)" (Sarv. XI,p.96). 
Or :f,This Pure Consciousness which is known as "turlya”, when 
not discriminated, like a red-hot iron ball, from ignorance 
and the Consciousness with which it is associated, becomes the 
direct meaning of the sacred utterance, mahavakya (tat tvam asi) 
and when discriminated, it gives us its implied meaning”. (Ved- 
antasara 50) That is to say, the direct way of expression, vacya 
does not discriminate between the iron and the fire latent in
it; while the indirect way, lakgya, refers to the fire, 
though the word ‘'iron1 is used (e,g* "the (red-hot) 
iron scorches,11 The same simile is applied to the primary 
an<ijimplied meanings of the word "tat* and lv tv am" respect­
ively, according as collective ignorance and individual 
ignorance is being considered (Vedantasara 144# 146),
Gf, also Vedantaparibhaga I: "Through superimposition 
(adhyasa) of the nature of fire, which is the seat of 
the power of burning, we commonly say "The iron burns". 
Similarly in everyday life we say "I am happy" or "I am 
miserable", through superimposition (on the Self) of the 
complete internal organ, which is modified into the form 
of pleasure, etc,"
In a discussion on sleep and dreams (Bfh, Up? Comm* 
2,1,19) the intellect in the waking state is supposed 
to extend along the network of arteries (na$I) in the body* 
When sleep is ended, the intellect comes back along those art­
eries, and the individual self too comes back and remains 
in the body, uniformly pervading it, as fire pervades a 
heated lump of iron.
The Jains, discussing the nature of asrava, "flowing", 
the action of the senses in attracting the soul to objects, 
say: "as when water is thrown on to a heated lump of iron, 
the iron absorbs the water from all sides, so the jlva 
(soul), heated by previous sins, receives from every side
the actions which are led to it by yoga11 (Sarv, III, p.
30. See also above, p. 70*
Iron is the symbol of things that are heavy, dense, 
strong, or unimaginative. For eatample: HIron-souled are 
they in whose heart Thou canst find no resting-place, 
thxough their hearts are thus washed by many floods of 
£rutl {scriptural texts) and nlti (rules of conduct).H
(Kusum. V,17). In Syadv. St. XI, pp. 62~3, the Mlmamsaka
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is represented as arguing that hiqisa is sometimes Justifi­
able. A piece of iron is heavy and therefore liable to 
sink; but by certain processes it can be made to float on 
water when used in ship-bdilding (just as a deadly poison 
may sometimes be used as a matedlclne, and fire lose its 
burning power, when treated with Vedic rites and spells). 
Analogously, hiipsa, though bad in Itself, is sometimes 
meritorious (in sacrifices, etc.). The Jain replies that the 
simile of the iron is out of place. The pieces of iron 
are used as parts of a ship and are therefore capable of 
floating; but the Vedic mantras do not cause the sacrificed 
animals to cease suffering, nor is there evidence that they 
attain a better condition in the hereafter, through having 
been sacrificed.
The magnet and its effect on iron or iron filings is 
a useful simile. We have already referred (above, Chap. I, 
p.ll) to the supposed etheric connection between sense-
objects and sense-organs* T^is connection is also likened 
to that between a magnet and the iron it attracts. The 
understanding (citta) resembles the iron, and is drawn by 
the influence of the object, acting as magnet or loadstone, 
through the medium of the senses* When this influence is 
not at work, no new knowledge is produced (Sarv. XV, p. 130; 
and see Vyasa on Xogasutras IV, 17* But at ibid. 1,4# 
citta is itself likened to a magnet). Similarly, the 
sense of hearing acts like iron, being drawn by the sounds 
coming from the mouth of the speaker, which act as a load­
stone. The sounds are then transformed by the hearing into 
its own modifications (svavjtti-paramparaya), and thus 
sensed (alocayati) (Vacaspat^s gloss on Yogasutras 111,41)* 
Vacaspati adds, significantly: 11 It is for this reason 
that for every living creature the perception of sound in 
external space is, in the absence of defects, never void of 
authority. H
The same illustration, with a different application, 
is found in Syadv. p. 51# St* IX, where the Vai£e§ika claims 
that there are manifold all-pervasive souls, which, until 
released, are in contact with particles of matter, forming 
the bodies in which the souls abide. If the souls were not 
all-pervafcive, they could not exercise an influence on the 
particles of matter, and thus would be eternally liberated 
(mukta). No, says the Jain, we have the analogy of the
magnet, which can attract a piece of iron without being 
in contact with it. (Cf. also Syadv. St. VI, p. 27)*
The instinctive movements of a baby (to its mother's breast) 
are compared to the movement of iron towards a magnet 
(Nyaya Sutras 111,21-2). But, says the Naiyayika, this is 
no analogy, for it does not apply in other cases (i.e. a 
lump of clay does not move towards a magnet). He deduces 
that the movements of the infant must have an underlying 
cause, scil. the remembrance of former lives.
A telling comparison occurs In Sarv. XIV (p. 123): 11 Just 
as a movement takes place in the iron in the proximity of 
the unmoved magnet, so a movement takes place in Nature 
(Prakfti) in the proximity of the unmoved Soul (Puruga).."
The other metals are rarely specifically referred to. 
Brass is usually mentioned in the form of brazen vessels 
(e.g. Maitri Up. 6,22, where the sound of a brazen vessel 
(kamsya) is one of the similes for the sound-Brahman within 
the heart); and silver, either in contrast to gold, or in 
connection with the stock illustration of an illusion,- the 
mistaking of mother-of-pearl for silver (See below, "Reality 
of Fiction").
There is a reference to copper in Sarv. VII, p. 73, 
where "mala" (taint, natural impurity) is compared to the 
husk in rice (tujatapdula), or the rust on copper (tamra).
As molten copper, when poured into a mould, assumes its
shape, so the mind (citta), reaching objects (through the 
sense-organs, assumes their shape (UpadetfasahasrI XIV,3)*
And (Ch. Up. 6,1,5-6) from one copper ornament, everything 
made of copyer is known.. Likewise from one pair of nail- 
scissors everything that is made of iron.. (See above with 
reference to clay, Ch. Ill, pS i ) .  Further, with regard 
to metal in general: "As the dross of metals (dhatu), when 
they are melted, is consumed, so the serpents of the senses 
are consumed by regulation of the bfeath." (Sarv. KV, p. 141) 
Before going on to a consideration of the various 
articles fashioned from metal, let us deal with previous 
stones, which form a most important part of "arts and crafts" 
The highest praise that one can bestow on a philosophical 
system or on the founder of a system is the title "crest-gem" 
referring either to the imaginary crest-gem of the serpent 
Takgaka, or to the Kaustubha jewel of Vigyu. For example, 
at the end of Sarv. XV, the system of Sankara is called 
the crest-gem of all the systems; and at the beginning of 
Sarv. I it is said that the synopsis of all the systems has 
been made by Madhava, "the Kaustubha jewel of the milk- 
ocean of Sri Sankara". The well-known "three Jewels" of 
Jainism are Jnana, darifana, and caritra, knowledge, vision, 
and good conduct; while the Buddhist triad is Buddha, dharma, 
sangha. Another group of jewels deserving mention is the 
Cakravartin*s collection of seven, consisting of his chief
*ueen, his prime minister, treasurer, elephant, horse, 
wheel of power, and sceptre (mani).
It is not always easy to detect the true nature of 
a jewel at the first glance,- a glittering object may be 
a precious stone, and it may a&se only be a piece of 
quartz* Thus it happens that the Jewel is a favourite 
example for illusion (See below, "Reality of Fiction").
The invisible power of a word, called sphoja, is revealed 
gradually, as each successive letter is pronounced,- just 
as the real nature of a Jewel is not clearly seen at the 
first glance, but is finally revealed (Sarv. XIII, p. 116)* 
In the realm of metaphysics, the inflsuence of the 
Self on the intellect, etc*, is compared to that of an 
emerald or other gem, which imparts Its lustre to the milk 
into which it is dropped for testing* Similarly the Self, 
being self-luminous, imparts its lustre to the body and 
organs, including the intellect,- although it actxually 
abides within the Intellect (Bjh. Up. Comm., 4,3,7)*
Another Vedanta simile is that of the ornament on the neck*
A man looks for his ornament (or Jewel), while all the time 
it is hanging around his neck. Similarly, although we are 
already free, and Brahman, we do not realise this until
A-
instructed by a competent teacher (itmatattvaviveka p* 130).
There is a Sutra (a play on the word, whose primary 
meaning is string, thread) by which this life and the next,
and all beings, from Viraj down to a clump of grass, 
are strung together, like a necklace on a thread. This 
Sutra is Vayu, wind (represented in living beings by 
prapa, the vital force). When the thread is gone, gems 
that are strung on it are scattered; and if Vayu is the 
Sutra, and the limbs of man are strung upon it, it follows 
that when Vayu is gone, they will be loosened (i.e. at 
time of death) (Byh. Up, and Comm,, 3,7#1-2). (Cf, Bhagavad- 
glta VII,7: "Evdrything is strung on me (=Kygjta) like gems 
on a thread”; and SySdv, p, 173-4# St, XXV: The Syadvada 
is a synthesis of the systems (naya), like a necklace of 
pearls strung on a single thread,).
The Buddhist exponent of momentariness says that 
everything, including Stman, consists of a plurality of 
separate momentary ideas; for him there is no thread 
running through the gems and connecting them. If he admits 
any connecting link, any "Sutra”, it is vasana, the subtle 
impressions left by experiences in a former life (See 
Syadv. p. 127, St. XIX).
The followers of ^iva, more materially minded, believe 
that when the nature of the Supreme Being (Siva) is attained,
all joys are acquired at the same time, just as if a man
'R
obtained possession of Mount Rohana, he would acquire all 
the treasures it contained (Sarv. VIII, p. 75).
Returning to metallic objects, we find that another 
sort of chain,- the chain of bondage,- has a wide symbolic 
application* The desire for liberation which characterises 
all the Indian religio-phllosophic systems, is naturally 
accompanied by an intense revolt against the "chains1 and 
"fetters" of existence* The chains of matter are numerous: 
e*g* the kle5as,mala, desire (tyg^a), karma, sense-organs a 
and objects (grahas and atigrahas), Each of these in turn 
is mentioned as responsible for continued existence, and it 
is only when their cheiins are realised and broken that 
liberation of the soul can take place* Life itself is also
compared to a chain (VJrasa on Yogasfitral 16), but this is
/
with reference to the continuity of existences rather than
to its binding power; however, the chain of life is made up
of past karma, which have strengthened it and postponed
liberation* There is some difficulty as to whether the Xtman
can ever be regarded as bound, for the Supreme Self, in the
Yedantic view, is the only entity that exists, and is eternally
liberated* This is argued in the Brhad* Up* Comm* 4*4*6.: "Nor
can liberation be a mere negative something- the cessation
of bondage, like the breaking of fetters, for the Supreme
Self is supposed to be the only entity that exists* And there
Is no other entity that is bound, whose freedom from bondag® 
would be liberation* Therefore, the cessation of ignorance
alone Is commonly called liberation*"
Akin to chains, though not of metal, are snares, 
nets and ropes, which likewise provide symbols for sin; 
the bonds of karma; and attachment to the pleasures of 
sense* References of this sort are too numerous to deal 
with in any detail, but we may Just mention the connection 
between "net” (Jala) and so-called "illusion" (cf* Indra- 
Jala): see for example gvet. Up* 3,1; 5*3* Here the mayin 
(Brahman) is also called "possessor of the net" (Jalavan).
From the physiological point of view, the structure 
of arteries meeting in the heart is likened to a net 
(e*g* Byh. Up* 4,2 2,3)* These arteries are known as "Hita", 
and it is said that they branch off everywhere like the 
filaments of a Kadamba flower; and that the subtle body 
is nourished by the food which passes along them, and is 
held fast as by a cord (ibid*, flomm*). When liberation is 
attained, the "heart’s knot" is cut (e.g* Mup^ l* Up. 2,2,8). 
The intellect, whose abode is ir#the heart, is pictured 
as extending along the aiev arteries which are interwoven 
like a fish-net, and which cover the whole body like the 
veins of an A^vattha leaf; and when the Self has been absent 
during sleep, it comes back along those arteries,- for it 
follows the nature of its limiting adjunct, the intellect* 
(Byh* Up. and Comm., 2,1,19)*
The rope will be dealt with later in another connection 
("Reality of Fiction"). We have mentioned (above, Chap. Ill,
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p. 7 7) the rope that hinds at both ends". The Indian school­
man is particularly fond of posing such dilemmas, this being 
the easiest way of refuting an opponent.
Ww now come to weights and measures, and coins. Measures 
give us a standard by which to judge things, and we have already 
met with them in their metaphorical function as pramanas, or 
means of right knowledge s " The thing which is to be measured 
is ascertained by the pramana, just as rice is measured by the 
prastha, and sandal etc. by the balance (tula) (Sankhy akarika 
4)* And " the fact of being an object of right knowledge (does 
npt destroy the character of a proof), as the Judicial character 
of a balance (is not disproved by the fact that you can weigh 
the balance itself in another pair of acales) 11 (Nyayasutras 
II, 16 - Ballantyne's translation). Just as the balance is 
a cause of knowledge when gold, etc., is weighed on it, but 
an object of knowledge when it is itself weighed, so the senses, 
etc., can likewise be both causes and objects of knowledge, 
(vrtti, loc. cit.)
The scales have a prominent part to play in the ordeal by 
weighing. The Bhatta Mlmiujsakas held that a certain capacity 
was produced in the scales by the ceremony of the ordeal, and 
that this caused the defendant to rise or sink in the balance 
(Kusum. Comm. 1.13)• The Naiyayika maintains that it is the 
innocence or guilt of the defendant which determines whether 
the scales are to rise or fall, not a “capacity'* (£akti) in
the scales themselves.
With regard to coins, we have the maxim of "the un­
witting employment of base money",(kn|akSrgSpaga), which 
is used by Kumarila in Tantrav£rtika,l,3*3, quoted by I 
Jacob (III,p.23). Xi^n argument of the relative value of 
4rutl and Smgitl, Kumarila maintains that any Smpti teaching 
which Is incompatible with Sruti teaching should be given up, 
just as a man who finds that he has been using counterfeit 
coins unknowingly should at once stop doing so. In Tantra- 
vartika 1,3,8, Kumarila compares words to coins which can be 
tested by Intelligent people. A man who has lost a small 
coin does not spend a large one looking for It. (See 
Reality of Fiction).
One of the chief tasks of the workers in metal was 
the making of weapons and sharp Instruments of all kinds,- 
swords, lances, arrow-tlps, axes, razors, knives, etc.
The sword typifies a shining weapon, whose brightness Is 
revealed when it is drawn from its sheath: it illustrates t 
the light of the Self in dreams, when freed from the 
restrictions of the waking state.(cf#"sword of knowledge 
for cutting of doubt" BhagavadgIta.IW.42.). Elsewhere In 
the Brhad. Up.(l,4,2,) the existence of the Self in a body 
is compared to that of a razor in its case: "This Self has 
entered into these bodies up to the tip of the nails, as 
a razor may be put in its ease", (also Kauf". Up. 4,19).
In describing where the performers of the horse sacrifice
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go, the space at the Juncture of the two halves of the 
cosmic shell Is likened to the edge of a razor, i.e. It 
is very fine (Byh. Up# 3»3*2). (Cf# also Kajha Up# 3#14; 
and Svet? Up# 5*8# In the latter passage, the individual 
soul is said to be Mof the measure of the point of an 
awl (aragra)"#
Actions that have begun to bear fruit are stronger 
than knowledge, and must continue to have an effect, even 
though revelation has been attained,•* as an arrow that 
has been let fly continues its course for some time*
(Cf# the potter*s wheel, and its continued revolving)#
The flight of an arrow towards its target provides a 
favourite figure in the Upanigads. For instance: HTaking 
the great weapon of the Upanlgads as A a bow, one should 
fix to It an arrow sharpened by meditation## and pierce 
(or: know (viddhi)) the Imperishable (akgaram) as the 
target. The syllable Om is called the bow, the individual 
self the arrow, and Brahman the target." (Mup$# Up. II, 
2,3-4)* Cf# also Maitri Up# 6,24: "the body is the bow,
Om the arrow, its point the mind. Darkness is the target# 
One should pierce through the darkness (and proceed to 
the light)?
There is a graphic illustration of the feeling of 
doubt (e#g. taking a post for a man) in the Sarikhyatattva- 
kaumudl 30. A man sees an Indistinct object in the half-
lire
light, and his imagination runs away with him: he sees
a robber with drawn bow, and arrow tfeady to shoot, and
decides to flee* The sense here seems to be that the
working of the various functions of mind andorgans is
not simultaneous, in a situation where the eyes, etc*,
are not directly to be trusted; it is the mind which
draws the conclusion, only partly aided by the imperfect
visual knowledge* A contrast to this situation is the
case in which'a tiger is revealed by the light of a flash
of lightning: here perception, conclusion, and action
\
(=running away) are practically simultaneous* (aloeana, 
sajjkalpa, abhimana, adhyavasaya) •
There is one class of instrument, which for convenience1 
sake we shall call axe, though there must have been several 
varieties (paraSu, kujhara, etc*), that was used almost 
exclusively for cutting down trees, or chopping wood. For 
example, the practice of the branches of Yoga is the cause 
of the separation of impurity (from the Self), as the axe 
separates a piece of wood from a tree (Vyasa on Yogasutras 
11,28). When the axe (or knife- vasl) is operating on a 
piece of wood, we can cognise it as a special representative 
of the genus Minstrument11; but when, e.g., the eye is 
engaged in acting as instrument for the cognition of colour, 
we cannot cognise it as special representative of the 
genus "sense”. Such a cognition may be possible for Yogins
and gods, but not for mortals* (The eye is sometimes defined 
as that which cannot see itself). (SankhyatattvakaumudI 5).
An Illustration of the complete distinctness or independence 
of two objects is "When the axe is aimed at the Khadlra tree, 
it is not the PalaSa tree that is cut." This occurs, e.g. 
in Vacaspati's gloss on Yogasutras 1,6-7, as an objection 
to the statement "The result is the knowledge by the Puru§a 
of the modifications (or functions: vytti) of the mind".
The objector asks, "How can knowledge on the part of the 
Puruga be a result of a modification of the mind?" The reply 
is that the knowledge may be compared to a reflection,- 
consciousness reflected in buddhi, which takes the form of 
the object of perception. Puruga*s cognition seems independent 
but is not really so.
A problem which puzzled the philosophers was "Is there 
an invariable connection between a word and the object it 
signifies?" The answer in Nyayasutras 11,51 is "No. For if 
a word were inseparably connected with its meaning, then when 
the words "food", "fire" and "axe" (vasl) were mentioned, 
the mouth should water, burn, and split (pa^ana) respectively. 
At Syadv. p. 42-3, St. VIII, there is a lengthy Imaginary 
argument between the Jain and the Vai£e§ika, on the subject 
of the relation between knowledge (jnana) and soul (atma).
In the course of it, the Vai^egika upholds a samavaya connec­
tion between the two, urging that a distinction between Jnana
icy.
and atma is required owing to their being related as agent 
and instrument (karty and karapa), like the carpenter and 
his adze (vasl). But, says the Jain, the position is different: 
jnana is an internal karapa, while the adze is an external 
one* Moreover, the example does not prove what it sets out 
to prove, for it does not pbint to an absolute distinction 
between the carpenter (karty) and his tool (karana). The 
carpenter has to resolve (a process of atman) to use the 
tool, and has to make the tool one with himself (paripata) 
before he can cut wood with it. In the same way, atman resolves 
to know a particular object by means of jnana, undergoes 
paripama and assimilates the jnana with itself, and then the 
two in conjunction produce the effect, viz. cognition or 
knowledge of an object (sapvitti).
The axe (kujhara) features again in a later chapter of 
Syadv., when the Jain is engaged in refuting the arguments 
of the Buddhist Nihilist. The Buddhist says that the existence 
of atman cannot be proved by inference, since there is no 
characteristic (linga) on which the inference can be based.
The Jain produces a number of arguments in reply to this, the 
first being as follows: MThe perception of form etc. (=the 
objective world) requires an agent, because it is an action, 
like cutting. This agent, or percipient, is the atman. Could 
the senses (sight, etc.) be the agents? No, for they are 
instruments, dependent on someone who uses them, just as the
axe is dependent on the carpenter or woodcutter* They are 
instruments, because they are made up of matter, and there­
fore are inanimate in the absence of a conscious (spiritual) 
stimulus* (Cf. a similar comparison applied to the act of 
hearing, Vacaspati’s gloss on Yogasutras 111,41; and see 
Nyayasutras 111,104: M0ne cannot consider that the body is 
intelligent, for we see movement etc. even in axes (when an 
intelligent person operates them”).
The Sankhya explanation of the "Creation11 is that the 
primaeval matter, pradhana, gradually evolved*, and undertook 
to work for the good of the Puruga, only vanishing when 
that object should be accomplished. The idea of a personal 
Creator is superfluous, for it is only matter that is active: 
"an x inactive carpenter does not employ his adze and other 
instruments" (and therefore iSvara cannot be the creator) 
(SankhyatattvakaumudI 56)*
The hammer (mudgara), according to the Buddhist, does 
not produce a new nature in a jar when it destroys it; for 
both * hammer and Jar are momentary, and began to perish 
as soon as they came into existence (Syadv. p. 104, St. XVI.
Cf. also NBT II, p. 38).
There is a reference to a smaller, less deadly instrument, 
in Vacaspati's gloss on Yogasutras 111,41: "if there were no 
ether (akafia), shapes and forms would be so closely packed 
together that the space between them could not be pierced
104
even by a needle-point* Everything would be obstructed by 
everything else.
A semi-metallic object like a mirror may be dealt with here.
We have already referred to the reflection of consciousness in 
the mirror of buddhi, by which the Puruga appears to be
affected, by a sort of deflex action (Vacaspati on Yogasutras 
1,4; I»6 ; 11,20). The process is further explained at Sarv.XV, 
p. 125, lines 10-1 4: the cit^akti or bhoktr-£akti is reflected 
in buddhi and appears to partake of buddhi*s nature (lit. "mod­
ifications” = vrtti), while Puruga looks on at the ideas of buddhi 
and in his turn appears to be identified with (= reflected in) 
buddhi, though in reality quite detached. Cp. also Yogasutras III. 
35 : “The reflection of Puruga in buddhi depends upon Puruga, as 
the reflection of a face in a mirror depehds upon the face;i.
(Citta or ”mind-stuff” assimilated the objects which actively im­
press themselves upon it, and then passes on the impressions to 
buddhi, the thinking principle, which consciously coordinates 
them. Citta is thus the passive recipient of impressions, while 
Purusa is completely detached and only appears to be identified 
with buddhi. It is only buddhi and the sense-objects themselves 
vto ich are active).
T^e same figure is employed by hhe Jains, the Vedantins, 
and other schools. Seeking to expose the fallacy of the Sankhya- 
Yoga epistemology, the Jain says :”A man may be reflected in 
a mirror, but that does not mean that even Indra can make the 
mirror alive”. Accordingly buddhi mufet not be taken to be 
active, just because the conscious Puruga appears to partake
I O'*
of its nature* Moreover, it is not correct to assume that 
an incorporeal being like Puruga can be reflected at all* 
(Syadv* pp. 97-9, St. XV). This view is reiaterated in a 
slightly different form in Barv* III, p. 22: "in perception, 
consciousness in the shape of knowledge of a Jar, etc., 
is experienced with a definite reference to each man*s person­
ality (ahamahamika), even without taking the form of the 
sense-object, and is not merely the passive recipient of 
a reflection like a mirror.'1
Certain MaheSvaras, followers of Siva, introducing the 
Supreme Lord into their epistemology, say that He manifests, 
in the mirror of each man's soul, all objects as if they 
were images reflected in it (Sarv* VIII, p. 74). Following 
a description of the state of samadhi, absorption, in the 
Vedantasara, 173» it is said that on the destruction of this 
state of absolute oneness, there remains only the Supreme 
Brahman, identical with the individual self, Just as the image 
of a face in a mirror is resolved into the face itself when 
the mirror is removed. With this, cf. Kajha Up. VI,5: "one 
perceives the Atman within one's self as in a mirror.."; and 
Svet. Up. 2,14: "Just as a mirror (bimba) smeared with dirt 
shines forth in splendour when cleaned, so the embodied one, 
on seeing correctly the essence of the Atman, has his end 
attained, and is freed from grief."
With regard to the theory of speech and language, it
ioC
is said in Vacaspatifs gloss on Yogasutras 111,17 that words 
are single and without parts: it is only the single letters 
composigg them which change places in relation to each other. 
"This happens in the same way as a face of constant colour 
and features shows varying reflections when placed at different 
angles in regard to a mirror, a dagger, and a Jewel. The 
difference is only apparent, not real.H(Cf. l^skara on Vai$. 
Sutras 2,2,37)* It is stated that the letters are not actually 
parts of a word, but that by means of differences in their 
order, the word itself assumes different forms. This is no 
doubt because when we are familiar with words, both spoken 
and read, we think in words, not in letters.
Before leaving metallic objects, we may deal with mudical
instruments. The moving from side to side of the tongue of
a bell (ghap^alala) is an illustration for indecision or
fluctuation (Syadv. p. 31, St. VI). The Mlmamsaka tenet of%
the eternity of sound is refuted by the Naiyayika on the ground 
that when a bell (ghap£a) or gong (kamsya) is being rung, 
and the hand or the like is brought into contact with it, 
there is a cessation of sound. An opponent (Sankhya, not 
Mlmamsaka this time, according to Ruben*s note 160) urges that 
since the contact of the hand with the bell stops the sound, 
therefore the sound must really reside in the bell, and not 
in the ether. This objection will not hold, for the ether, 
which must be the substratum of sound, is intangible. Contact
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with fire (which is tangible, like a bell) does not produce 
sound: therefore the cause of sound must be intangible. A 
peculiarity of sou©d is that it can have various divisions, 
even in a single subject such as a conch-she11. This is 
another argument for the presence of an intangible substratum, 
which causes alterations without altering the shape of the 
instrument. (See Nyayasutras 11,102 et seq.)* Cf* also 
Upaskara on Vai£. Sutra 11,2,28: sound is non-eternal, because 
it is produced by a cause, such as the conjunction of drum 
and drum-stick. From an aesthetic, mystical point
of view, the sound of a bell is one of the seven similes for 
the sound-Brahman within the heart (Maitri Up. 6,22).
The drum (dundubhi), the conch-shell (£ankha) and the 
lute (vlna) are employed as metaphysical similes in the Byh.
Up. When each of these instruments ia being played, the 
listener cannot distinguish between the various different 
notes, but a general impression of sound or tune is produced,- 
and through grasping, e.g. the drum and the drummer, the 
sound too is grasped. Similarly nothing in particular is 
perceived in the waking and dream states apart from Pure 
Intelligence* This is a telling example: it illustrates how 
all individuals have their particular note, all notes being
unified in the Supreme Harmony of Brahman, which Includes all 
varieties of genus within itself (Bjh* Up. 2,4,7-9; 4,5,8-10).
An imaginary illustration of the manner of departure 
of a man1 s soul appears at Byhad. Up. 5,10,1: "When a man 
departs from this world, he reaches the air, which makes 
an opening (kha) for him there like the hole of a chariot- 
wheel. He goes upwards through that and reaches the sun, 
which makes an opening for him like the hole of a tabor. He 
goes upwards through that and reaches the moon, which makes 
an opening for him like the hole of a drum . ’1 Evidently 
the respective siaes of these things were well known.
There is a valuable illustration of the prior existence 
of pramaja, at Nyayasutras 11,15. The Buddhist Madhyamika 
denies the validity of all proof, on the ground that it cannot 
be established for any of the three times (=past, present, 
and future). Says the Naiyayika: "This fact is not to be 
denied as regards all the three times, because (the validity 
of pramana) is proved, as the (previous existence of) a drum 
is proved by the sound.1 (The drum, or other musical instrument, 
exists even before the sound which proves its existence is 
produced; the postcedent illumination of objects is inferred 
from the (prior) existence of the sun; while the existence of 
fire is inferred from the smoke which is synchronous with it.). 
And from the prama, "right knowledge"(which always follows 
the pramapa, or means of establishing right knowledge) the
prior existence of the pramapa (pratyakga, anumana, etc.) 
is demonstrated.
The "building1 metaphor was a favourite one in connection 
with ontological and metaphysical problems. In the course 
of his proofs b for the existence of a soul, the Jain says:
"The powers o^growth and healing or repair clearly indicate 
the presence of a soul which dwells in the body. For we 
observe that a house does not grow of its own accord or repair 
itself without the agency of a maHon or carpenter. In case 
anyone quotes the example of a tree to illustrate spontaneous 
growth and repair, I would point out that the tree (like a 
human being) is a living organism possessing a single sense
it _
(that of touch), and an indwelling soul. (Syadv. p. 119-120,
St. XVII).
As mentioned above, the usual syllogism to establish 
the existence of a Creator is "The earth must have had a maker, 
because it has the nature of an effect, like a jar." A further 
assumption is that there can only be one Creator, otherwise 
there would be a conflict of wills, and the harmony of the 
universe would be non-existent. The Jaink denies the necessity 
of this corollary, and quotes the examples of a palace made 
by many artisans, an anthill (£akra-murdhan) made by many ants 
(kl^Jka), and a beehive (madhucchatra) made by many bees 
(saragha),- all working harmoniously. Moreover if all the 
world were produced by one maker, all other mrtisanA would be 
superfluous (Syadv. p. 25, St. VI; cf. also Sarv. III,p#25).
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We find another building simile for the Creation in 
the Comm, on Aitareya Up. I (Ananda^rama ed. p. 29)•
The Sankhya-Yoga school lays stress on the fact that everything 
constructed exists not for its own sake, but for the sake of 
another. For instance, citta is diversified by countless im­
pressions, and exists for the enjoyment of another (scil. Pu­
rusa) because it is a composite substance, like a house (Vyasa 
on Yogasutras IV,24) (Cf. also Ait.Up.Comm. 1,3; Anand.p. 46).
A favourite simile with the Sahkhy^Yoga schools is 
that ibf beds and chairs. An inanimate, unconscious bed or 
couch (paryanka), composed of framework, pillow, headpiese, 
bedclothes, etc., does not exist for the sake or use of itself, 
nor do its separate parts exist for the use of each other. On 
the contrary, the bed is meant to be enjoyed by the man who 
lies on it. In the same way the body, as conglomeration of the 
five gross elements, is inferred to exist for the sake of an­
other, viz. Purusa (Sankhyakarika 17)# In the Sankhyatattva- 
kaumudl on the same passage, "beds, seats, and toilet powders# 
are referred to, while in Vacaspati's gloss on Yogasutras II. 
20, this simile is applied to the function of buddhi, working 
for the benefit of Puruga.
The Buddhist logician is scathing about the Sankhya 
proof from beds and chairs. It is posited by the Sank&ya 
that the senses etc, being composite, exist for the sake of
a simple substance, viz. puruga. But, says the Buddhist, 
why should the composite exist for the sake of the simple?
As a matter of fact, the opposite is proved by this pro­
position {for the man who uses the beds and chairs is himself 
composite'i. Even if As it is admitted that the senses exist 
for the benefit of someone else, it by no means follows that 
that someone or something is Puruga, Soul (See NBT III,pp.61-2 
77-8).
With regard to other objects making up the house and its 
contents, we may note that the vital force (prapa) is compared 
to the post of a house, for it is the internal supporter of 
the body (Byh. Up. Comm (Introduction) 2,1,1). The post 
will feature later in the "Reality of Fiction” chapter, as 
an illustration of "doubt" (mistaking a post for a man), and 
also as the result of bodily derangement ("flaming post").
The wall, a common instance of an obstructing agency, has 
already been mentioned in Chapter I, and also in passing, in 
connection with the Jar (Chap. II, p.45").
The ascent of a ladder or staircase (sopanaroha$a) is 
a simile for the gradual acquiring of knowledge (e.g. Bhamatl 
1#3|8. And in regard to the power of words, Sarv. XIII, p. 119 
"This is the first foot-round of the ladder of final bliss"). 
References to doors and gates, of obvious metaphorical value, 
(e.g. the moon as the door of the heavenly world, etc., etc.) 
occur passim, and it will not be necessary to enumerate them.
See for instance the fully worked out allegory of the "slaying 
of the doorkeeper on the road to (the hall of) Brahman" (i.e. 
ahaipkara, egotism, which is a hindrance to the realisation 
of the Self),- Maitrl Up. 6,28. In the Sankhya theory
of perception, the outer sense-organs are called doors, and 
the threefold "internal organ" (karapa = antapkarapa) Is 
the door-keeper, using discrimination as to admitting objects 
which seek to pass through the doors (Sahkhyakarlka 35)#
A favourite context for gates is the "city with nine 
(or eleven) gates" (=the body, with nine or eleven orifices): 
e.g. Svet. Up. 3,18, and Kajha Up. V,l; therein dwells the 
itman of the size of a thumb, seated in the citadel (=the 
heart) like a king (Kajha Up. Comm. V,4). (See also MupjL. Up. 
2,2,7: brahmapura; and SankhyatattvakaumudI 41: purl £ete).
A wood suggestive of building is matra, "that which is 
used for measuring out; material". As Dr. Heimann has pointed 
out, the stock translation of -matra (e.g. cin-matra) as "only" 
overlooks the literal meaning , which is "having (cit) as its 
material". The fact that it has only cit and nothing else as 
its material is of secondary importance.
We return to the objects found within a house. In the 
course of a discussion on the relation between letters and 
the word they form, Vacaspatimi^ra says:i& "It may be in one 
of two ways that the literal sounds may produce the mental 
impression of the object, when each is pronounced as a part
of the complete word. Either they may each have the capacity 
of signifying the object, like pegs (naga-dantaka, "elephant’s 
tusk*.1 They were originally of ivory, but the word was later 
applied to any peg) which give support to a hammock hung from 
them; or they ®ay give support to the meaning as several 
stones placed together give support to a stool (pijhara).
Both theories are forthwith refuted. In the first case, if 
the pronouncing of one letter conveyed the notion of the object 
to the mind, the pronouncing of the other letters would be 
pointless. In the second case, what is possible for the stones 
is not possible for the letters, for they are not uttered 
simultaneouksly (whereas the stones are arranged at the fcame 
time and in the same place). The final conclusion is that 
the letters are like separate rods of iron, and cannot in­
dividually be said to partake of the nature of the word. 
(Yogasutras III, 17).
At Syadv. p. 119, St. XVII, the bellows (bhasra) blown 
by an intelligent person is cited as an argument for the 
existence of a soul (which inflates the body).
The chariot or cart was a particular favourite as a 
symbol from pre-Upanigadic days on. Being composed of numerous 
parts set in a particular arrangement, it comes under the 
"building" category; and this aspeat is uppermost in Bjh. Up. 
4,3,10. In the previous verse (4,3,9) it is stated that when 
a man dreams, he takes away some of the impressions of the
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waking world, discards his body, and himself builds (nlrmaya) 
a dream body.*, and himself becomes the light.1 Further,
(4,3,10) in the dream world there are no chariots, nor animals 
to be yoked to them, nor roads to travel. It is the Self which 
creates the chariots, animals and roads. No materials are 
required for this creation, and there is no direct activity; 
but 1 in the waking state., the body and organs, illumined by 
the light of the Self, perform work that (later on) produc es 
the modifications of the mind representing the impressions 
of the chariot etc." (ibid., Comm.). We meet an elaboration 
of the theme in Vedantaparibhasa I, where it is said that 
the appearance of chariots etc. arises through the indidental 
defects of sleep. Self-luminous consciousness forms the sub­
stratum of the chariot, the road beneath it, etc. The per­
ception of the chariot, it should be noted, is only apparent, 
for the sense-organs cease to function in dreams. And when 
chariot, etc., vanishes, its destruction is due either to the 
rise of a second contradictory modification of the mind (vjtti), 
or to the destruction of the defects of sleep.
Yajnavalkya says to Janaka: "As one wishing to go for 
a long Journey would secure a chariot or a boat, so you have 
fully equipped yourself with many Upanigads (for your journey 
after you leave this body)" (Byh. Up. 4,2,1). Above (Chap. II, 
p . % ) we have met the grammarians' fancy of *#wll-yoked chariots 
of harnessed speech",- which lead one to the heavenly world.
There is a long and detailed passage in the Brhad. Up. 
(and Comm.), in which the embodied Self is compared to a. 
heavily loaded cart. Just as a cart, packed up with household 
utensils, mortar andy* pestle, winnowing fan and cooking 
vessels, goes on its way creaking under its load, so the 
Self, when breathing becomes difficult at the time of death, 
makes noises, as it seeks an outlet from the body. If It 
be asked, "Why should the Self, about to be united with the 
Supreme Soul, make noises?11, the answer is that the Self, 
through the subtle body (lingaSarlra) and the vital force, 
which act as its limiting adjuncts, is afflicted by the con­
sciousness of the body*s afflictions. (Byh. Up. 4,3,35).
At Maitri Up. 2,3 it is likewise said that the body is 
like an unintelligent cart (Sakata). Further on (2,6) the 
itman is designated its driver, the organs of sense its reins, 
the organs of action the horses, the mind the charioteer, and 
character (prakyti) the whip. In the better-known passage 
of Ka^ha Up. (3,3, et seq.) buddhi is the charioteer, and 
manas the reins; the senses are the horses, and the objects 
of sense the road traversed. (See also below, Ch. VI). And 
"higher than the senses are the objects of sense" (cf. graha 
and atigraha).
The simile of chariot and charioteer is also favoured 
by the Sankhya school, as typifying the relation between 
Prakyti and Puruga. For instance: "Everything that has the xx
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nature of the three gupas must be ruled and guided by smother, 
as the chariot Is by the reins (of the charioteer)1’ (Sankhya- 
tattvakaumudl 17). The Jain expresses himself similarly: 
tfThe body is ruled over by a definite agent, (i.e. the Soul) 
because it is the seat of a definite activity (like a chariot)” 
(Syadv. St. XIX, p. 119).
Among the most famous ’’chariot” similes is the one in 
the Buddhist Milindapariho (Trenckner's edition, pp. 27-8).
In an argument with King Milinda, Nagasena, the Buddhist 
monk, establishes that a chariot cannot be identified with 
any one of its component parts,- pole, axle, wheel, frame­
work, flagstaff, yoke, reins, or goad. Nor yet can it be 
regarded simply as the aggregate of all these parts (cf. the 
Nyaya idea of the whole as separate from the parts). No: 
it in dependence on (pajicca) each of the parts that
there arises the ordinary designation ’’chariot”. In the same 
way, argues Nagasena, it is not necessary to assume the 
existence of a soul, for the name of a person is given on 
account of the various parts of the body (including conscious­
ness etc.).
A badly performed sacrifice brings harm to the sacrlficer, 
as a one-legged man walking, or a chariot with one wheel, comes 
to grief. Properly performed, the sacrifice is like a two- 
legged man walking, or a chariot with both wheels intact.
(Ch. Up. 4.16,3-5).
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This leads us on to a symbol that is vast in its applic­
ation,- the wheel. To mention only a few of its metaphorical 
uses, the wheel (originally a sun-symbol) is the sign of the 
universal monarch (Cakravartin), and also of him who liberates 
from worldly ties: Buddha, On the one hand it symbolises the 
cycle of birth, death and liberation (sajpsara and mukti), 
while on the other the union of its parts represents the 
inseparability of all beings and all worlds, which are fixed 
in the Supreme Self, and have no existence apart from it.
Mrs. Rhys Davids ("Zur Geschichte des Rad-Symbols", 
Sonderdruck Eranos-Jahrbuch 1934) has traced the gradual 
evolution and degeneration of the wheel-symbol, which began 
by being associated with progress, the forward motion of the 
chariot along the road; and ended by being forcibly divorced 
from its medium, and left to roll around aimlessly, making 
no progress, and- worse still- catching up the beings who 
had travelled happily along with it, and forcing them into 
an endless cycle of misery.
It is not always the chariot wheel that is referred to. 
Often the wheel in question is that of the potter, or else 
the wheel by which the buckets in a well are raised and 
lowered.
From the psychological point of view, the wheel of 
"tendencies’1 or mental attitudes is frequently referred to. 
Thus e.g. in the Yoga system we meet the "six-spoked wheel
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of the world11, consisting of virtue and vice; pleasure and 
pain; attachment and aversion;- all of which in their turn 
generate a fresh cycle of tendencies. Thus the exercise of 
virtue brings pleasure, and pleasure gives rise to attach­
ment; while on the other hand vice begets pain, and pain 
aversion, and then attachment and aversion respectively pro­
duce a new virtue and vice (in another life, or in another 
person)* Here, as ever, there is a positive and a negative 
aspect to be considered, but the sum-total of both good and 
bad tendencies is evil, for the "driver of the wheel" is 
ignorance, leading to rebirth.
The cycle of saipsara is described at Byh. Up. (and Comm.) 
6,2,15. The souls of ritualists, set on the Pityyana (for 
which see x below, Chap. VIII), go to the moon, and then 
come down to earth as rain* enter into the plants, and thence 
become food for man, and are reborn,- thus rotating constantly, 
like a water-wheel, until such time as they attain knowledge 
of Brahman, and enter upon the Devayana, or else attain 
immediate liberation. "When they know the meditation of the 
five fires they are freed from this rotation and reach the 
flame" (= illumination). (Cf. Bhagavadglta 111,14-6, for 
the wheel of existence and karma: from karma results yajna 
(sacrifice), from yajna, rain; from rain, food; from food, 
beings (bhutani). And see also Sarv. XI, p. 94).
A very similar illustration is that of the actual buckets
attached to the water-wheel of a well (kupayantragha^ika).
The man who Is ignorant of Brahman is likened to such 
buckets, which alternately rise and fall in the water of 
a well, and have no stable existence (See Jacob III, pp. 68-9)• 
Or else, from a more worldly standpoint, fortune is never 
constant, and the full become empty, and the empty full, 
like the buckets on the water-wheel ("The last shall be 
first") (Mycchaka^ika X,60).
The vital airs remain for two and a half ghajikas 
in each artery (na<jl) from sunrise onwards, like the revolving 
buckets on a water-wheel (Sarv. XV, p. 140).
In the Sankhya philosophy, a favourite illustration is 
the cakra-bhrama$a-nyaya, the simile of the (continued) re­
volving of the potter1s wheel. This is used to explain 
the continued bodily existence of the Yogin who has acquired 
the saving knowledge which should liberate him. Just as the 
potter's wheel continues to revolve even after the potter 
has withdrawn his hands and staff, and only stops when the 
effect of the impetus has subsided, so the Yogin's previous 
deeds continue to exert an influence even after he has 
attained samyag-jnana, "-right- knowledge". (Sankhyakarika 67; 
cf. also Brahmasutrabhagya 4*1,15* for the same simile from 
the Vedanta standpoint). Such a man, however, is not affected 
by good or bad deeds, for he is jlvan-mukta, "liberated while 
(still) living". A slightly different application occurs
in the Jain chapter of SarvadarSanasangraha, where it is 
stated that the previous meditations of the embodied soul 
for the attainment of mokga exert their influence even after 
theji have ceased, and help to bear the soul upward,- just as
the potter's wheel continues to revolve after hands and
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stick are withdrawn (Sarv. Ill, p. 33).(Of. Maitrt 2,7;3»3).
So much for the wheel as a whole. Its different parts,- 
nave, felloe and spokes,- are often mentioned without any 
reference to the idea of motion. Here are a few examples. 
"Everything is fixed in Praga, as the spokes in the nave 
of a wheel" (Chand. Up. 7,14,1; Pra£na Up. 11,6). At Pra£na 
Up. VI,6, the same figure is applied to the kalas or parts 
of a person, as centred in Puruga. "Just as all spokes 
are fitted into the nave and felloe of a chariot-wheel, so 
all beings, all gods, all worlds, all organs, and all 
individual selves are fixed in the Universal Self, and 
cannot be separated from it, without damage to the whole." 
(Brh. Up. 2,5,15$. Kaug. Up. 3,9: "Ju3t as the felloe 
of a chariot is fixed on the spokes, and the spokes on the 
hub, so the gross elements (bhuta-matra) are fixed on the 
organs of sense (prajna-matra), and these in their turn 
on the vital force (praga)". See also MugujU Up. 2,2,6 ;
3vet. Up. 1,6; 5,8; 6,1 ; and (a mystic simile) 1 ,4 . X A 
similar illustration occurred even in the Rigyeda (X,82,6 ):
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"There was the One, inserted into the everlasting; nave, 
in which all living beings are fixed." t,aee oakravartin, 
Philosophy of the Upani^ads, p. 169).
An alternative application of the simile is when a 
man’s body is likened to the nave of a wheel, andjiis external 
trappings, wealth etc., are built around it, like spokes 
and felloe. Accordingly if a man loses all his worldly 
possessions, but saves his life, he is regarded as having 
lost his external trappings, like a wheel losing its spokes 
and felloe, which may again be added if the nave is intact. 
(B^h. Up., 1,5,15 and Comm.)
Finally, we have an imaginary "wheel", the "alata-cakra", 
which illustrates the fallibility of perception (pratyaksa). 
Here a rapidly rotating point of light (usually represented 
by a firebrand) may appear to be a fiery circle or wheel; 
and in such a case we must make use of anumana (inference), 
and infer that our senses are being deluded (See NBT I, p. 12; 
Yogasutras 1,6-7 (Vacaspatl); 11,5 (ditto). Also under 
"Reality of Fiction"). At Nyayasutras 111,125, it is said 
that different perceptions follow one another with lightning 
rapidity, so that it seems as if they occur simultaneously, 
as illustrated by the whirling firebrand.
But^the reference at Maitri Up. 6,24 "Having pierced 
through darkness, one sees the Brahman who sparkles lle& a 
wheel of fire (alatacakra)", the alatacakra does not seem
to have the implication of illusion,-merely of brightness*
Most of the other references to daily life can best be 
dealt with in the next chapter ("Structure of Society")*
But as a transition between "arts and crafts" and "social 
gradesM we may take cooking and medicine*
In the Yoga system, different objects are represented 
as changing the functions or modifications (vytti) of the 
mind, as fire changes the rice when it is cooked (raw and 
cooked rice (tapdula and pulaka) are two different aspects 
of the same substance (Vacaspatl on Yogasutras 11,28). And 
any action is seen in relation to the subject, the instru­
ment and the object. As cooking is seen in relation to Caitra, 
fire and rice, so also illumination (i.e. neither fire nor 
the mind can be regarded as self-luminous). (Vacaspatl on 
Yogasutras IV,19).
According to the Sahkhya, Just as food -flourod with the 
six flavours (sweet, acid, etc.) is prepared (for someone to 
enjoy), so this body must exist for the use of somebody, 
viz. the soul. (Sankhyak. Comm. 17). And just as a person 
desiring cooked rice sets to work and cooks it, but stops as 
soon as the rice is ready, so Prakpti works for the benefit 
of Purusa, but does not continue its work after the soul is 
released (SankhyatattvakaumudI 56).
The Carvaka, from his purely material standpoint, urges 
men to grasp visible pleasures. He says, "Men do not refrain
from sowing rice because there are wild beasts (who may 
devour it); nor do they abstain from putting cooking-pots 
on the fire, because there are beggars (who may want a 
share of the contents), must take the good with the bad,- 
the fish with its bones, and the rice with its husk."
(Sarv. I, p. 2). (For "imaginary sweets", see "Reality of 
Fiction").
Charms, elixirs and drugs are often classed together, 
as producing supernatural results, similar to those obtainable 
through samadhi (profound meditation).(See for example 
Yogasutras IV,1 and Comm.). When the Carvaka rejects the 
authority of inference, he observes that its occasional 
justification is accidental, Just like the coincidence of 
effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, drugs, 
etc. (For the counteracting of the effects ofp poison by 
mantras (spells) see e.g. Upaskara on Val£. Sutras V,l,3).
But the properties of medicine are also discussed semi- 
scientifically. The three "jewels" of Jainism, when united,
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bring about liberation,-^tfnich they are unable to achieve 
separately,- Just as, in the case of a medicine, it is the 
knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues, and its 
actual employment, which produce the desired effect. (Sarv. 
Ill, p. 27). The Naiyayika, in denying the existence of 
the "capacity" (£akti) upheld by the Mlmamsaka (who might 
allege that the medicine worked by reason of this capacity),
says that the drinking of the medicine produces an equi­
librium between the three humours, and it is this equilibrium 
which is the means of the subsequent curing of the disease. 
(Kusum. 1,11) (Comm.). The seeker after truth is urged
to drink the wholesome though bitter medicine of Jain 
Siddhantas (Syadv. p. 9, St. III).
Hardly worthy to be classed with medicine, though 
likewise compounded of herbs etc., are intoxicants. The 
Carvaka asserts that intelligence is produced from a mixture 
of the four elements (alone), just as the intoxicating power 
is produced from a mixture of kipva (ferment, bassia) and 
(other ingredients having no such power in themselves). (Sarv. 
But, syays the Jain, if consciousness is a property of 
matter, then it should be seen in every particmle of matter, 
as we see the power of intoxication in intoxicants (madya- 
angesu). (Syadv. p. 132, St. XX).
Chapter V. The Immanent story of ancient Indian culture, 
as reflected in the Upama.
(b )_The_Structure_of Society._
We shall include in this chapter references (so far 
as they illustrate various philosophical theories) directly 
appertaining to people of all social grades, e.g. Brahmans, 
kings, ministers, actors, thieves, soldiers, and slaves. 
Family relationships will also be included; likewise certain 
physical characteristics or defects affecting men*s relations 
with society; and some legends, e,g. those of Sunda and 
Upasunda, or Tala and Betala.
As the Brahmans were responsible for the so-called 
1 orthodox1 systems, we do not find many uncomplimentary 
references to their caste, save in Buddhist and Jain texts, 
(for which see e.g. Tevijja Sutta, Ry Rhys Davids, Dialogues 
of the Buddha Vol. I, p. 298 et seq.; also ibid. p. 105; 
and Suttanipata Vagga 3# Sutta 9, where we find that the 
Arahant is the true Brahman; birth alone does not make a 
Brahman. There is an uncomplimentary reference in the Jain 
Syadvadamanjarl, p. 69, St. XI, where the Brahmans are 
depicted as filling their stomachs with the proceeds of the 
sacrifices they perform.).
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In the orthdox schools, Indeed, it is a tacit assumption 
that a Brahman must necessarily be learned and pious. When 
one sees a young boy fulfilling religious observances (vrata-
dharin), one is able to assume that his parents are Brahmans 
(Sankhyakarika Comm* 15). In the same way, the cause is 
always Inferred from the effect; when one sees anything 
which is composed of the three gu$as (trigupam mahad-adi 
lingam), the natural conclusion is that it is an evolvent 
of Prakytl (pradhana). The Naiyayika uses this assumption 
of the Brahman’s integrity and learning to exemplify a 
possible "fraud" (chala) in logic: When a man says "This is 
a Brahman, so he must be possessed of learning and good con­
duct", his opponent replies "How is that possible? For a 
Brahman In childhood is not necessarily well-behaved or 
learned" (Nyayasutras, vytti, 1,54)* This is known as samanya- 
chala. (Cf. also Comm* on Byh. Up. 4,3,7 (beginning),- Brah­
mans and Vedic learning).
One of the arguments against a (periodical) creation 
an<ide struct ion of the world is "A Brahman must be born from 
a Brahman, but since at the beginning of a creation no one 
could be a Brahman (for want of previous merit), you could 
not establish the succession of Brahmans in the subsequent 
period either." The Naiyayika replies that certain plants 
(and scorpions) can be produced spontaneously (from manure, 
etc., and do not necessarily require a generator of their 
own species* Likewise, though usually a Brahman springs 
from a Brahman, yet there ng might be spontaneous production 
(of a Brahman) at special times, through the action of a
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particular fat© alone (and this would not clash with the 
Nyaya theory of different species of effects- "vaijatyasya 
karyata-avacchedakatvat11- for which see above, Ch. III,p.49-).
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We turn to the king, who is the centre of government.
He is commonly supposed to be in the happy position of being 
able to do as he pleases,- and in this he is classed with 
a Brahman, or a child (kumara) (Bph. Up* 2,1,19: illustrations 
of the Soul*s experiences in the dream state). As the king 
does what he pleases in his own realm, so pradhana disposes 
the subtle body (llngam) in different bodies (Sankhyakarika 
Comm. 42). An illustration of the mutual functions of the 
three gunas is the following: A king who strives for the 
good of his subjects (by enforcing law) brings happiness 
to the cultured, but misery and bewilderment (moha) to the 
wicked. Likewise one gupa (e.g. rajas) may occasionally par­
take of the functions of the other two (sattva and tamas). 
(Sankhyak. Comm. 12).
The king may, however, be restricted in his absobfcte 
power by his ministers (cf. Bph. Up. Comm. 5*6,1) or by 
his treasurer. Thus when the Supreme Self is compared to 
a monarch (Byh. Up. 4*4*22), it is explicitly stated in 
the commentary that there is no question in this case of 
ministers holding sway, for the Self is the independent 
lord of all beings, from Hirapyagarbha down to a clump of 
grass. (Cf. also ibid. 2,5*15* Comm.). There is a sidelight
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on the deputing of powers to a minister in the commentary 
on Pra£na Up* VI,3: "As for the illustration that the king 
is by courtesy called the dees doer, when his minister actually 
is, that is inapplicable* It is not reasonable to suppose that 
an unintelligent thing can take heed of circumstances, and 
work for the good of Puruga, and for the attainment of Puruga's 
emancipation1 • (This is the Vedantin's argument for the refuting 
of the Sankhya Prak^ti-Puruga combination)*
Certain 3ivaites hold that though G0d is the universal 
agent, he is not independent of the actions (aacrifices, etc.) 
of human beings, any more than a king, when exercising his 
bounty, is independent of the treasurer. It should be noted, 
however, that this does not detract in any way from his power. 
(Sarv. VII, p. 67). In a Jain list of "obstructions1 to right 
knowledge (avarapa), it is stated that antaraya (intervention) 
produces obstacles to liberality, as the treasurer (ko£a- 
adhyakga) hinders (the king by considerations of economy).
(Sarv. Ill, p* 31)* The useful side of the treasurer's work 
Is stressed in the commentary on Bjh. Up. 3,8,9: "As in life 
an accountant appointed by his master carefully calculates 
all itaems of income and expenditure, so are all divisions of 
time controlled by the Immutable (aksara Brahman)*"
When the soul leaves the body, it may be objected that it 
has no power to take up another, for it is dissociated from 
the body and organs; and there are no others who, like servants,
wait for it with another body in readiness, as a King's
retinue await him with a house for his use. This is the answer
The whole universe is the means to the realisation of the 
fruits of Karma, and when the soul goes farom one body to 
another in order to fulfil its object, the uhiverse provides 
the requisite means. Just as when a king is about to arrive, 
the Ugras (members of a fierce tribe, who sometimes act as 
policemen) and Sutas (charioteers or equerries) and village- 
leaders gather together and wait for him with foodk, drink 
and residences, so do all the elements await the person who 
has realised the fruits of his actions. And Just as the Ugras,
Sutas and village-leaders approach the king when he is about
to depart, so all the organs approach a man at the time of 
death, when breathing becomes difficult (urdhva-ucchvasin)• 
When the individual self departs for the next world, the 
vital force follows, as the Prime Minister follows the king; 
and then all the organs such as the organ of speech follow in 
their turn. (Byh. Up. 4,3,37-8; 4,4,2 (Comm.).
At SankhyatattvakaumudI 36, the respective functions of 
the external sense-organs, mind (manas), ahaqakara, and buddhl 
are compared to the functions of various officials in tax- 
collecting. The village overseers collect the taxes from the 
people, and pass them on to the governor of the district, who 
in his turn gives them to the supreme (finance-) minister, 
by whom they are them presented to the king. In the same way
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the senses cognise objects, and then pass the cognition on 
to manas, which establishes it (saqikalpya), and passes it 
on to ahaijkara. Ahajpkara forthwith applies the cognition to 
itself (abhimatya), and it finally reaches buddhi, the sarva- 
adhyakga, acting on behalf of the puruga. At Pra£na Up*
111,4, there is a reference to the king's appointment of 
officers to look after villages. Likewise the vital force 
(prgpa) eeHA&nde commands the other prapas (the organs- eye, 
etc.).
The king is ala> mentioned in connection with the army.
When soldiers gain victories or suffer defeat, the fruit or 
loss accrues to their master, the king, although he has taken 
no active part in the struggle. Similarly bondage (i.e. saipsara) 
and freedom, existing in the intellect (buddhi),are ascribed 
to Puruga, so long as the distinction between Puruga and Pra- 
kjti is not realised (SankhyatattvakaumudI 62; Vyasa on Yoga­
sutras 1,24 and 11,18). As the troops of the village-overseers 
and other officials are included in the troops of the prime 
minister, as well as having their own separate functions, so 
the sense-organs and manas and ahaipkara aid in the functions 
of buddhi, while at the same time performing their own respective 
duties (SankhyatattvakaumudI 37).
The army features again in a discussion on the nature of 
atoms (Nyayasutras 11,34 and vytti): "if anyone (i.e. a Buddhist 
objector) should say that it is like the case of an army, or
a forest, we reply that it is not so, because atoms (a$u) are 
beyond the range of the senses (atlmdriya)"• That is to say, the 
Buddhist observes, that though a single man or a single tree 
may be imperceptible at a distance, yet an armji or a forest 
would be perceived (as a mass) without cognisance of the separate 
units composing it; could this not be an analogy for an atom or 
a collection of atoms, say a jar ? It could not, says the Naiya­
yika, for the condition of perceptibility in the case of an army 
or a forest, is bulk (mahattva), and this could not apply to 
atoms, as they have no bulk and are supersensual (atlndriya).
Just as a number of men make an appointment to go and 
attack another body of men, and work in harmony, the lancers 
handling only their lances and no other weapon, the club-bearers 
their clubs, the swordsmen their swords, etc., so the various 
sense organs work in harmony, each having regard to the separate 
activities of the other organs. If it be objected that the men 
are animate beings, while the organs cannot work on their own 
without a guide, the reply is that they all work for the benefit 
of the Purusa ; the opponent is referred to the example of the 
milk and the calf (SankhyatattvakaumudI 31)*
As an inexperienced archer aims first at large targets 
and then at small ones, so the beginner in Yoga first learns 
the nature of the five gross elements etc... and then the subtler 
ones (Yogas. I. 17, V 1s gloss). Piercing the cehtre of a target 
ia a simile for something difficult of accomplishment, such as
the overcoming of worldly temptations, and the acquisition 
of merit. See Jacob III, p» 78*
It is said at Vai£. Sutras 111,20, that plurality of 
souls is proved by differences of status,- i.e. some folk 
are rich, others poor. We fi$d a similar contention on 
page 52 of Sarv. (Ch. V). The Sivaite says that duality is 
proved by inference. The Lord differs from the individual 
soul, because the one a is obeyed, and the other obeys: just 
as a king differs from his servant (bh^ya). As servants 
keep their master’s commands, through fear of his displeasure, 
(lit. "thunderbolt- vajra), so this world, * together with 
sun, moon, planets, etc., obeys the divine law (of Brahman). 
(Sankara1s Comm, on Ka£ha Up. VI,2,3).
Among the many Sankhya similes for the relation of matter 
and spirit, we find the followings "Just as a good and willing 
servant exerts himself for the comfort of his master, even 
though that master is ungrateful and confers no benefits in 
return, so Prakrti exerts itsfclf for the benefit of Puruga, 
without expecting any reward." (SahkhyatattvakaumudI 60. See 
also Sankhyak. Comm. 11: "vyakta is common to all, like a slave 
who is bought for money (mulyadaslvat)"). But further, Pra- 
kyti is represented not only as a slave, but as an unselfish 
person who works for his friend’s interests as if they were 
his own (svartha iva parartha arambhali), and does not expert 
or receive any thanks (Sahkhyakarika 56).
There is an amusing simile in Sankara's bhagya on 
Brahmasutras 3,1,8. Samkara states that when a man returns 
to earth in a new incarnation after a sojourn in the moon, 
he brings with him a remnant of past karma, called anuSaya,- 
Just as when oil is poured out a of a vessel, some drops 
still cling to its sides. When it is asked why he does not 
remain in the moon until the whole 6f his merit is exhausted, t  
the reply is that, just as a retainer serving in a king's 
household may eventually find his wardrobe reduced to a pair 
of shoes and an umbrella, and must then take his departure, 
so a man is unable to stay in the moon when he is only equipped 
with a small remnant of merit. (For the chattri-nyaya or 
maxim of the men with umbrellas, see Jacob I; and cf. dapjLi- 
nyaya, "men with sticks", Jacob II, p. 22. See below, "Reality 
of Fiction",for "shoes on the neck", and "shoe* on a foot 
already shod"£. For the men bearing the palanquin, see above, 
Chapter III, p.71• This simile also illustrates how all the 
words in a sentence unitedly convey its sense (Nyayamanjarl 
p. 397, 1. 12).).
Servitude is not always regarded as a degrading state, as 
we see from the following etymology of dasya, "slave": "To 
be a slave to Mahe£vara is to be a recipient of that independ­
ence or absoluteness which is the essence of the divine nature, 
a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things according 
to his pleasure (i.e. from da,to give) (Sarv. VIII, p. 74).
The Buddhist Madhyamikas hold that the doctrine of 
Buddha leads on progressively to a total void (sarva-£unyata), 
like the gradual steps of the mendicant (monk) (when he 
tries to obtain a footing in the house of a rich patron). 
(Sarv. II, p. 11). Each sense-organ, says the Sarikhya, 
is confined to its own objects (the eye to form and colour, 
the tongue to flavour, etc.), just as a mendicant lives by 
alms, and by no other means (Sankhyak. Comm. 28)* In another 
passage (ibid. 19) Puruga is referred to as neutral, like 
a wandering mendicant, who goes among villagers who are 
occupied with their various tasks, such as ploughing, yet is 
himself indifferent. While the gunas carry on with their 
functions, puruga is neutral and Inactive. Meanwhile, just 
as ordinary people go about their tasks (kriya) with the 
object of attaining freedom from desire, so avyakta (the 
primal principle) workd for the release of Puruga (Sankhyak. 
58).
Speaking of travellers, there is an illuminating proverb 
employed by Vedantins: f,A man who is already in a village is 
not anxious as to when he will reach it, as a man in a forest 
might be". The person whose meditation is fixed on the Self 
as identified with the vital force (prapa-atman) need not 
pray for its attainment (for he has already realised his 
identity with the Supreme) (Byh. Up. Comm. 1,3,28. See also 
below, "Reality of Fiction".) Cf. also Bjh. Up. Comm. 4,4,22:
nA man from Benares who wishes to reach Hardwar, does not 
travel eastward* And those who seek the three worlds are 
not entitled to the monastic life*#
The Importance of having a competent teacher is frequent 
ly stressed, e.g. ,fAs when a man is blindfolded and taken 
out of the land of the Gandharas, and left in an uninhabited 
district, he may start running forward in any direction,- 
but being a sensible person, when told in which direction 
the Gandharas lay, he would (when his eyes were unbandaged) 
ask his way from village to village until at last he found 
himself back in the Gandhara country. In the same way a 
man who has a teacher may attain right knowledge and release.1 
(Chand. Up. 6,14)*
The symbolic application of "path1 or "road” (to 
liberation, etc.) is too well-known to require discussion 
here. A few references, picked at random, ares Svet. Up.
6,15; Maitri Up. 4*1; 6,10; 6,30; Mup$. UP. 1,2,1; 3,1,6;
Sarv. XIII, end; SySdv. p. 179, St. XXXII.
Travellers were apt to be plagued by highwaymen and 
thieves, who must have caused great distress to caravans, 
for Vacaspatimi^ra (on YogasStras 11,30) states that a truth 
which proves injurious to living beings is not to be regarded 
as truths a man who has taken the vow of truth, and is 
subsequently asked by a gang of thieves whether he has seen 
a certain caravan pass, is not to be commended for his
veracity if he gives them the directions they are seeking.
When a man who is not himself a thief is seized in company 
with thieves, and regarded as one, this is taken as an illust­
ration of the nature of Puruga, who seems to partake of the 
characteristics of the three gupas, though in reility inactive, 
(Sankhyakarika 20), Scoffing at the Buddhist combination 
of momentariness (kga$ikatva) and a continuant consciousness 
(santana), the Jain says: MSeeking shelter under a "k^apika- 
santana'* is like being afraid of one robber and seeking 
refuge with another'*, (Syadv, p, 125, St, XVIII).
jjThe punishment for theft was severe, as we see from Ch.
Up. 6,16. When a man was seized and accused of theft, he was 
made to grasp a heated axe, and at the same time protest his 
innoaence. If he was innocent, the axe did not burn him;
but if guilty, he was burnt,(and subsequently put to death)^
After thieves, it will be appropriate to consider debtors. 
In the course of an important passage warning the credulous 
against exclusive belief in the efficacy of rites, it is stated
that the ignorant man regards himself as in the debt of the
gods, who may hinder him from attaining liberation, because 
he is useful to them and supports them by sacrifices, etc.
When once he has eliminated desire, which includes the wish 
to be protected by the gods, he can shake himself free of 
them, and devote his attention to the Self, and thereby 
attain liberation. (Byh. Up. Comm., 1,43c, 16).
The sthavaravadln, or advocate of permanence, opposes 
the following argument to the upholder of k§a$ikatva (moment­
ariness): "The thing acquires from its progenitor ("cause"- 
hetu) a nature which keeps it stable for some time, and then 
allows it to perish," But, says the kgapikavadin, this proves 
too much: even in the presence of the destroying agent, e.g. 
the hammer, the object (e.g. a jar) will maintain the nature 
which prevents its destruction, and so it will never be 
destroyed, for it will continually take on a new lease of 
life. An analogy would be the case of the debtor (a merchant) 
who puts off his creditors from day to day, writing that he 
will pay them on the morrow. But if may be rejoined that 
though the nature of a thing is persistent, it eventually 
perishes when brought into contact with a destroywting agent. 
The k§a$ikavadin retorts that nothing can alter the nature 
of a thing. If we see anything perish, we must assume that 
its perishable nature has been active from the beginning,- 
therefore it must perish as soon as it comes into existence, 
and the doctrine of k§a$ikatva is established. (Syadv. p.
104, St. XVI. See also above, p.103,Chapter IV).
For the contretemps of "daybreak near the toll-collector1 
hut", see below, "Reality of Fiction".
One of the best-known of Sankhya similes is that of the 
dancer, who, having given her performance, retires from the 
view of the spectators. In the same way Prakyti, having
n  *
worked for the benefit of Puruga, retires when the Puruga- 
artha (= the realisation of the distinction between matter 
and spirit) has been revealed. This simile is criticised 
in the Syadv. p. 100, St. XV, where it is said that the un­
intelligent Prakyti is not capable of such thought as is 
pre-supposed in the analogy. Further, says the Jain, the 
comparison does not exemplify what is sought to be established, 
viz. that Prakyti entirely ceases to work when the Puruga- 
artha is accomplished: for the dancer repeats her performance 
when the spectators clamour for her. The Jain argues, there­
fore, that mokga (liberation) is an attribute of Puruga, and 
takes place when all karma is exhausted. It is not logical 
for it to be dependent on the unintelligent Prakyti, for if 
Prakfti is by nature active, surely its activity will never 
cease? The Sahkhya reply,- namely that when the puruga- 
artha is accomplished, Prakyti automatically retires,- is 
easily refuted; if Puruga is an inactive spectator (cf. 
prekgakavat, Sankhyak. 65)# how can Prakyti, a senseless 
active principle, know when to retire?
A kindred illustration is that of the actor. Just as 
an actor assumes various roles, such as that of ParasJurama, 
or Ajata^atru, or the king of the Vatsas, so the subtle
body (lihga£arlra) assumes this and that gross body, e.g. 
that of a man or woman, or of an elephant, or of a tree. 
(Sankhyakarika 42; SahkhyatattvakaumudI ad loc.). The kle£as
or afflictions which exist in the mind do not really affect 
Puruga, though they appear to do so. It is as if an actor 
were impersonating Rama, and mimicking all his actions, but 
all the time not losing his own true nature. (Vyasa and 
Vacaspatl on Yogasutras 1,24)* Cf. Maitri Up. 4,2: "Like 
an actor (nata), always changing his attire (is the Individual 
Soul)". See "Reality of Fiction" for further references to 
actors.
In the Vedanta view, the body is like a wooden puppet 
or toy (yantra), which must be operated by an intelligent
a * .
principle, i.e. the Soul (itman)^ (Byh. Up. Comm. 3,4,1; 3,7,1). 
The same analogy is employed by the Jain in his confutation 
of the ^Onyavada: there must be a soul, for we see that a
puppet (daruyantra) does not open and shut its eyes, or move
its limbs, unless it is worked by an agent with a will of 
his own (Syadv. p. 119, St. XVII) (See also Kusum. 11,2,- 
above, Chap. III). With this analogy, compare the view of 
the creation as the "play" (Ilia) of the Creator, and see 
for example Bhagavadglta XVIII,61: "The Lord (I£vara) dwells 
in the heart of all beings, causing by his creative power 
(may$7 all beings to whirl around, like puppets on a wheel."
Besides being compared to a spectator, Puruga is some­
times termed a witness. Just as in daily life plaintiff and
defendant bring a dispute before a (neutral) witness, so 
Prakfti shows her activity before the impartial (but intelligent
puruga (Sankhyakarika 19 Comm.; and SankhyatattvakaumudI 19). 
(cf. also the designation “witness" as applied to IiSvara,
Kusum. 1,20).
With the exception of painting, this practically exhausts 
the more frequently mentioned occupations, so far as they 
illustrate philosophical theories. Painting is in nearly 
all contexts, an example for something having the (illusory) 
appearance of reality; accordingly we shall best deal with 
the subject in the "Reality of Fiction" chapter. We find 
mention of the (sometimes profitable!) pastime of gambling 
at Chand. Up. 4,1,4: 1 (To him who has right knowledge) all 
good things will fall, just as the lower throws of the dice 
fall to the winning throw (krta)."
The next topic is the human being in general, including 
parts of the body. A favourite example (with the Sankhya 
and Y0ga schools) for the operation of the three gunas is 
that of the beautiful woman, who inspires sattva (in the 
form of contentment), rajas (=jealousy) and tamas (=gloom) 
respectively in her husband, her co-wives, and a man & who 
does not possess her (cf. the same as applied to a jar, Chap.
Ill above) (Sankhyakarika 12; and see Yogasutras 11,28 (Vyasa)). 
The illustration is carried further in Vacaspatl1s gloss on 
Yogasutras IV,lg, where it is sought to establish the plurality 
of souls (purugas). The idea of Caitra differs from the 
ideas of Maltra, Devadatta, etc.; and one man cannot remember
what another has seen (this is a proverbial saying, for which 
see e.g. Sarv. VII,p.69; Vai£. Sutras 111,17; Syadv. p. 117,
St. XVII; p. 41, St. VIII; Comm, on Yogasutras 1,32; IV,4).
But different people can establish the identity of the 
object of their ideas. For example, they can come to the 
conclusion that the same woman is the object of many varying 
feelings on their part. Therefore the object must be different 
from the idea regarding it; and there must be a plurality 
of souls. This interpretation is borne out by the passage 
in SankhyatattvakaumudI 11, where it is stated that many 
spectators can remember a single glance from the eyes of a
i coquettish dancer. If there were nothing apart from conscious­
ness, as the Buddhist ViJnanavadlns hold, this would not be 
possible. (Cf. also the Jain criticism of the Buddhist theory- 
the pupil would remember an idea passing through the teacher’s
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mind (without its being voiced). Sarv. Ill, p. 21).
A Sankhya argument for the plurality of souls is that, 
if another possibility were admitted, everyone would die or 
become blind when one person died or was blinded (Sankhyak. 
Comm. 18). And one cannot say that the soul is really one 
and indivisible, but differentiated through its various 
limiting conditions (upadhls), i.e. the different bodies,- 
for then the division of birth, death, and the like would 
also be dependent on such upadhis. And we do not observe 
that a young woman dies when her hand is cut off, or is b o m
//L
when a part of her body such as a breast develops (Sankhya­
tattvakaumudI 18),
There Is a similar argument, from another angle, In the 
Commentary on Kusum. 1,15; this time the Naiyayika and the 
materialist (Carvaka) are the protagonists* The Naiyayika 
says that if the Self were identical with the body, then when 
a hand was cut off, the body ought not to remember the ex­
periences of that hand, as it would no* longer form a material 
part (upadana) of the body. The Jain, upholding his view 
that the soul is conterminous with the body, says that when 
a hand is severed from the body, it lies throbbing with life, 
for some ’’prade^as” (atomic parts?) of itman have gone with 
it (Syadv. St. IX, pp. 53-4). The Vai£e§ika, for his part, 
asserts that the soul is ubiquitous. Otherwise how could 
people who experience pleasure etc. in the Deccan, still ex­
perience such feelingsyhen they move to the midland country 
(madhya-de^a)? (NBT I I I , p. 69).
We have noted that the Carvaka regards the soul as 
identical with the body. The only liberation, for him, is the 
dissolution of the body. Among the logicians, on the other 
hand, a stock example of “upacaracchala” (fraud in respect 
of a metaphor) is the case in which the opponent quibbles
over the expression MI am eternal11, saying uHow can you be
eternal, since you were born of So-and-so?” (Here it is evident 
that by ”l” the speaker meant the soul not the body) (Nyaya-
*n
sutras 1,55, vptti).
A man who is attached to b k one woman does not hate 
all other women; he may te have been attached to others in 
the past, and there may also be others in the future (Yoga- 
sutras 11,4). This illustration concerns the statement that 
it is not the substance that changes, but the characteristics 
(cf. the example of gold, above, Ch. IV)* Or again, the same 
woman is regarded differently according as she is thought 
of as a mother, a daughter, or a sister* (Another example 
is that of the figure 1, which means something different 
according as it stands alone or is followed by one, two or 
three noughts) (Vacaspati on Yogasutras 111,13).
A very similar illustration is found in connection 
with the Syadvada, which is stated to be not an assertion 
of the absolute identity of Being and N0n-being, but only 
an assertion of their relation to the same subject from 
different viewpoints* Thus one man may be father, son, 
uncle and nephew, etc*-- it is all a question of relativity* 
Other examples are the many-coloured gem (mecakaratna), and 
multi-coloured cloth (citrapa^a), for which see above, Chap. 
III). (Syadv. p. 149, St. XXIV).
According to the Sankhya, pradhana is inferred from 
its resultant effects, m which may yet be like or unlike 
their cause, as a son may be like or unlike his father (Sankhjta- 
karika Comm. 8).
The sense-organs are termed “envious kinsmen", because 
they are born with a person, and turn his attention (through 
attachment to sense-objects) away from the Self. As soon 
as a man realises his Identity with the Self, his envious 
kinsmen are crushed (Byh. Up. 1,3,7; cf. also ibid. 2,2,1).
A kinsman of noble birth is generally assumed to be un­
friendly, owing to the constant rivalries between petty 
kings and chieftains, and one of the common terms for a 
kingfs enemy is the one used here, "bhjpatv^’bhratpvya", 
(cousin).
Prakptifs manifestation to Puru§a, and subsequent dis­
appearance, is charmingly illustrated by the analogy of a 
woman of noble family, who keeps herself withdrawn from the 
sight of strange men, but who one day is accidentally seen 
by one, and ever after is most careful to prevent such a 
thing from recurring (SahkhyatattvakaumudI 61). There is a 
variation on page 124 of Sarv. (Chap. & XIV): a woman whose 
faults have been seen by her husband does not return to him.
Coming once again to the theory of momentariness, we 
meet the examples of hair and nails, which grow and are cut. 
The kgaplkavadln says that an apparant recognition of a jar 
as the same Jar that was observed a moment ago, may be due 
to similarity, as in the case of hair, nails, etc. that have 
been cut and have grown again. The Vedantin, or Naiyayika 
opponent of the Buddhist replies thaiat in this case the re-
cognition is due only to an identity of species; we do not 
assume that the hair and nails have not altered, even though 
they appear identical. But in the case of a jar we have 
no evidence of growth, and proof that it is not the same 
jar as the one of a moment ago (See Kusumanjali Comm. 1,17). 
The same analogy is employed by the Naiyaylkas in an argument 
against the Mlmamsa docfctine of the eternity of sound. The 
Mlraaipsaka holds that we can recognise e.g. the letter g 
as the same letter that we have heard before. Such a re­
cognition, says the Naiyayika, is only due to identity of 
species, as in the case of a manfs hair which has been cut 
and has grown again, or of a jasmine which has blossomed 
afresh (Sarv. XII, p. 104). (Cf. also Syadv. p. 135,St. XXI).
The living (soul) is to be known as a part of the 
hundredth part of the end of a hair, divided again into a 
hundred, yet it is fitted for infinity. (Svet. Up. 5,9).
(Cf. the same simile as applied to the arteries which con­
verge in the pericardium, Kau§». Up. 4,19; Bph. Up. 4,2,3).
For the (erroneous) vision of a mass of hair (instead of 
a number of single hairs), see below, "Reality of Fiction".
The Yogin who is striving for liberation is particularly 
sensitive to the & "stream of pain" (duhkhasrotas), con­
sisting of the effects af good and bad actions. It is said 
(Vyasa on Yogasutras 11,15) that the enlightened may be 
compared to the eyeball, and the effects of karma to a thread
of wool. When such a thread comes Into contact with any 
of the other organs or parts of the body, It does not 
have much effect; but when it so much as touches the 
sensitive eyeball, it causes distress. Similarly the Yogin 
is sensitive even to future pain, which would not affect 
an ordinary person.
The physical affliction of blindness is frequently 
referred to. A purposeless regressus in infinitum is 
symbolised by "a continuous series of blind men" (andha- 
para^para) (e.g. Brahmasutrabha§ya 2,2,30.37). And those 
who think themselves wise, though really dwelling in the 
midst of ignorance, go about being tormented in their be­
wilderment, like blind men being led by a blind man (MupJ.
Up. 1,2,8; Maitri Up. 7,9).
But though the physical sight and hearing may be 
destroBdyed, the sight and hearing of the Atman is constant; 
e.g. a blind man may see his brother in a dream, or a deaf 
man hear a mantra (Ait. Up. 11,1 (p. 64, Anand. Edn.). And 
BFh'.-Up'v-Cenmv And two men who are afflicted with diverse 
physical defects may join forces and so accomplish their 
object. The best-known Instance of such a union is probably 
the Sankhya parable of the lane and the blind, each of whom 
can make up for the faculty which the other lacks (the lame 
man mounting on the blind man's shoulders and directing him). 
Having worked in harmony until their purpose, viz. finding
a way through the forest, is accomplished, they separate.
In the same way creation is brought about by Prakpti and 
Puru^a combined (just as a son is born through the union of 
man and woman,- cf. Sankhyak. Comm. 12: gupas are anyonya- 
mithunah; and Sarv. VIII, p. 78), and Prakjti leaves Puru§a 
when Puruga's liberation is accomplished, while Purusa, having 
seen Prakrti, goes to kaivalya (liberation) (Sankhyakarika 21). 
(Cf. Maitrl Up. 4,2: "(the individual soul before attaining 
liberation) is bound as a ciipple (pangu) by the bonds of the 
fruits of good and evil (deeds)").
Another parable, employed by the followers of the Praty- 
abhijna-dar£ana, or "recognitive" system, is that of the girl 
and her lover. A girl hears of the many good qualities of 
a certain suitor, falls in love with his description, and writes 
to him, begging him to visit her. When he arrives, she falls 
to see the qualities she has heard of, and is unhappy. But 
when her friends point them out to her, and she gradually re­
cognises them, she becomes quite satisfied and contented. In 
the same way, although it may be generally known that the 
personal self is identical with the Supreme Soul, this knowledge 
produces no satisfaction; but as soon as the spiritual preceptor 
has taught each individual to recognise in himself the attributes 
of Mahe^vara, such as omniscience and omnipotence, he is 
satisfied (Sarv. VIII, p. 79).
The Vedantins make use of a similar parable to illustrate 
the union of the individual soul with Brahman. A certain 
prince was left as an infant in the home of a hunter (vyadha), 
and brought up by the hunter as his own son. Thinking that 
he was himself a hunter, he performed the duties of one until 
one day a kind man told him who he was, and he then, knowing 
himself to be of royal blood, set about regaining his kingdom. 
Similarly the individual self, which is of the same category 
as the Supreme Self, has become separated from it through 
ignorance, and has assumed to itself the attributes of the 
body which limits it. But when a spiritual preceptor points 
out the identity of individual andSupreme Self, the individual 
becomes convinced of his high station, and abandons the pur­
suit of mundane objects.
A student of Western philosophy, when examining the similes 
current among the Indian philosophical systems, cannot fall 
to be struck by the intermixture of analogies from daily life 
and from mythology and legend. For example, the drinking of 
the ocean by Agastya, or the conversion of the kingdom of 
£ Dan^aka into a forest, were accredited exampl-ecH of the 
supernormal powers of Yogins (See e.g. Vyasa on Yogasutras 
IV,10). Other legendary or demi-legendary figures were Nahuga, 
Dhruva, and Nandl^vara (see e.g. Bha§ya on Y 0gasutras 11,12-3), 
all of whom underwent unusual transmigrations, owing to 
the effects of special karma.
The Sahkhyin says: It must not be thought that because 
the three guiyas are mutually contradictory, that they there­
fore destroy each other, like (the two mythological brothers) 
Sunda and Upasunda. On the contrary, they bring about a 
common object (like the three bodily humours, which cause 
illness if their balance is disturbed, but keep the body 
healthy when working in harmony). (Sankhyatattvakaumudl 13)* 
According to the Jain, different rival systems fight amongst 
themselves, and destroy each other like Sunda and Upasunda, 
leaving the Jina supreme (Syadv. p. 154, St* XXVI). Another 
legendary pair of demon brothers was Tala and Betala, whose 
example is quoted in connection with the erroneous attribution 
of characteristics where they are not applicable (as Tala,n^u 
went away as well as Betala when an offering of blood was 
given to the latter (Sarv. XII, p. 106).
Here again is evidence of the concrete*, outlook which 
does not permit of any hard and fast division between real 
life and fiction. We shall have more to say on the subject 
in Chapter IX ("Reality of Fiction11 )f but now we pass from 
the world of humans and superhumans to the animal kingdom.
C h a p t e r  V I .
Tfte Animal'World in Comparisons.
Striking features of animals are made use of by philo­
sophers to illustrate their theories. T^e extreme frequency 
of the jar among inanimate objects is in the animal world 
paralleled by that of the cow. This is quite natural, for Just 
as the jar is the most useful and common article in every-day 
life, so the cow - the giver of sustenance - is the most valued 
and indispensable of animals.
We have already seen (above, p. £*+ ) how jar and cow
are classed together as representing modifications of earth 
(pfthlvl). The familiar figure of the cow is easily recognis­
able, and can be pointed out without difficulty. Accordingly, 
when an objector complains that the Self has not been fully 
described, the Vedantln replies : "Brahman has none of these 
distinguishing marks. Hence it cannot be described as we can 
describe a cow by saying "T^ere goes a white cow with horns" 
(Brh. Up. Comm. 2,3,6; cp. also 3,4,2 where a horse is also 
mentioned). Some say (wrongly, according to-Sankara) that the 
self is an entity that has both unity and difference, Just as 
a cow is one as a substance, but has special characteristics, 
the dewlap etc. which differ from each other (Brh.Up.Comm. 
4,3,30). Perhaps the only comparison of Self with cow permit­
ted by the VeiLntin. Vedantln is the following : "Just as in the
world one may find a missing animal, such as a cow, by search­
ing it
through its footprints, - similarly when the Self is attained, 
everything is automatically attainefL"(Byh* Up* Comm. 1,4^7)*
The cow has no independence, but is subject to its 
owner. Similarly, a man who does not know the true natjire of 
the Self, and who worships the gpds thinking that they are 
different from himself, becomes subject to them and is used 
in their service as a cow is used for carrying loads or yiel­
ding milk (Brh. Up.1,4,10). See also Sarv. VI & VII; p. 66 : 
the master, the cattle and the fetter (= the Lord, the soul & 
the world). In the Sahkhya-Yoga philosophy, the gunas are x k |>k x 
represented as unchanging, though they appear to be possessed 
of the characteristics of the phenomena in which they reside, 
and therefore seem subject to birth and death, etc., just as 
we consider a man to have become poor when his cattle die, 
though there is no actual destruction of his own substance 
(Vyasa on Yogasutra 11^19)•
A propos of the cow we meet the usual discussion as to 
the nature of the Universal and the Particular. The vital force 
(prana) pervades the bodies of all creatures, from an ant up 
to an elephant, as the essential characteristics of a cow 
(gotva) are present in each individual cow (Byh. Up. Comm.
1,3;22).Although such eternal things as the ether are beyond
the grasp of sense, the nature of a cow is eternal (and percep­
tible)
(Nyayasutras, vrtti, IIf115)« Cp. also N.S.V.3.
The Vai£e§ika (Syadv. p. 3 6, st. XIII) asserts that the 
universal Being (satta) is not a substance (dravya),because 
the characteristic of a substance is that it should be made 
of many constituents or of no substance, but never of a single 
constituent substance. Like dravyatva, satta resides in each 
dravya; and nothing that resides in a single dravya can be a 
dravya itself. As the Universal “Being" (or "existence") is 
present in a single substance - e.g. gotva in a single cow 
no less than in many cows, - it cannot itself be a substance. 
Another proof of its unsubstantiality is that you eannot ride 
a£vatva or milk gotva, for you require for that the real part­
iculars and not abstract universals (Syadv. p. 86, st. XTV).
From the logical point of view it may be argued that the 
Universal which applies to one particular species is not prop­
erly universal at all. When we see cows we see particular cows, 
each with its own special shape and colour; we see no such 
thing as samanya - universal essence - of cows. Further, is 
this samanya one or many ? If one, is it everywhere or only at 
particular places ? If it is everywhere, why is it not found 
in the space between this cow and that cow ? Besides, if it is 
one, existing everywhere, why does not gotva Include also jars 
and cloths as well as cows ? (Syadv. p. 86, st. XIV). The pos­
ition is stated in the Nyayabindujlka : "The intervals between
the particulars include other particulars, as well as ether, 
(aka£a), which is destitute of particulars. Although the 
Universal "cown is perceived in some particulars, it 16 not 
perceived in others, e,g, in horses etc; nor in ether,. It 
follows that it is absent in these places,” (NBT III, p, 87)*
This distinction between different individuals of different 
species, as we shall see later ("Reality of Fiction”) formed 
a ground for the statement of impossible (or unlikely) changes 
of nature, e.g, "a cow cannot become a horse“, When we see a 
cow, we not only think of its likeness to other cows, but also 
observe its distinction from other animals such as buffaloes, 
horses, etc. (An "anaikantika" (inconclusive) inference is 
“it is a cow, because it has horns" (i,e, it might also be a 
buffalo)). But we may also say that there is no complete 
similarity between two cows (e.g. Vyasa on Yogasutras 111,53: 
a black-eyed cow, an auspicious cow, etc,); their likeness 
only becomes evident through their common contrast with horses, 
for example (e,g. Vacaspati on Yogasutras 111,13),—  and on 
the other hand cow and horse, as representatives of animate 
beings, are united in opposition to inanimate objects, such as 
jar and cloth. The all-embracing Universal, "existence”, is 
differentiated by being resident in cows, horses, etc,; but 
these sub-species are not really separate, for they all gorm 
part of the summum genus. (See Sarv. XIII, p. 117). And, 
from a purely practical standpoint, diverse objects may be
united in a common purpose, or through a common attribute.
Thus wick, oil and fire together gorm a lamp; and a number of 
animals,- cow, horse, buffalo, and elephant,- modify into 
a single substance, salt, when they are thrown together into 
a saltmine. Similarly the three gupas, although differing, 
may be united in a single function (Vacaspati on Yogasutras 
IV,14).
The cow Is used as an illustration of the incompatibilities 
of thought and language. The word, object, and idea "cow" are 
recognised as distinct from one another, and appear as such 
to the Yogin in savitarka-samadhi. In nlrvitarka-samadhi, on 
the other hand, the object alone, cow, jar, etc., is reflected 
in buddhl, which is "sva-rupa-£unya" (void of its own form,- 
i.e. not conceiving any ideas, but merely occupied with the 
realisation of the concrete object). (Vyasa on Yogasutras I,
42-3)(Cf. ibid. III,3> and VyasaJ; also 111,17). For the 
logical-etymologival point of view, see Nyayabindutlka I, p.8: 
"if the proper use of x the word involved nothing but dependence 
on the senses, then sense-knowledge (or sensation) alone could 
be called direct knowledge of the object signified, but not 
mental sensation, etc. Thus it is that the word go "cow", 
although it is derived (sic!) from the root gam, "go", is 
..generally accepted 6s denoting a cow, whether moving or not." 
(Cf. also Sarv. XIII, e.g. p. 114; 117).
The likeness of the gavaya (bison) to a cow, forming the
stock example of the use of upamana (comparison) as means of 
evidence, has been referred to abdve, Chapter. I.
The horns of a cow come into existence simultaneously, 
but are not related as cause and effect. Therefore it cannot 
be said (by the Buddhist) that perception and object are 
simultaneous, for they are related as cause and effect, (see 
Sarv. Ill, p# 21; Syadv. p. 102, St. XVI; and Vacaspati on 
Yogasutras 1,32)-.
The most important function of the cow is the providing 
of milk. A picturesque Sankhya simile is that of the milk and 
the calf: "Just as the unconscious milk (produced from grass 
and water consumed by the cow) streams forth for the benefit 
of the calf (that it may grow), and when the calf has grown, 
disappears,- so too does Prakyti, which is itself without 
feeling, work for the release of Puru^a.” (Sankhyakarika 27, 
and 57). In Byh. Up. (5,8,2) and Comm.) we are told that one 
should meditate oil Speech (Vac) as a cow, producing food for 
the gods in place of milk. Her bull is the vital force, and 
her calf the mind. (Cf. Sarv. XIII, p. 112: "Word (£abda), 
rightly used, because the desire-milking cow (Kamadhuk) in 
heaven."
Milk is an excellent example of satkarya (the production 
of the existent from the existent); we know that it is present 
in the cow, and no-one can say that it is unreal or non-existent 
prior to manifestation; but the cow must be milked before the
/sZ
milk is manifested (SankhyatattvakaumtldT 7*9 )• Further, milk 
itself has the potential power of being modified into curds, 
just as the whole universe is a modification (vikara) of 
original matter, but is not essentially different from it.
(See e.g. Vacaspati on Yogasutras 1,24). In Brahmasutrabhagya 
2,1,24, it is urged that Brahman has in himself the power to 
produce the world, just as the power to produce curds resides 
in milk* An objector may say that the action of heat is necess­
ary for the production of curds, so that milk is not the sole 
agency. The reply is that if the power to produce curds were 
not always present in ibilk, no amount of heat etc. would en­
gender it. The case for satkarya is stated succinctly in 
Sankhyakarika Comm. 9: MHe who desires something takes its 
material cause (upadana); w he who wants curds takes milk, not 
water. Therefore the effect is existent (in the cause) ”.
The Naiyayika points out that when milk is once changed 
into curds, it does not become milk again (Nyayasutras 11,111; 
and 118 (vrtti). The Buddhist ksaijikavadin uses the transform­
ation of milk into curds as an illustration of the moment-to- 
moment change in substances; but the Naiyayika retorts that 
in the case of milk and curds, we actually see the change tak­
ing place (and this is no reason for assuming that a similar 
change is going on in, say, a stone). The Sankhya, in his turn, 
points out that the milk does not vanish,- it only undergoes 
modification, and manifests new qualities (Nyayasutras III, 
81-3)•
Milk-^s no exception to the rule that objects of every-
A
day life are used to illustrate metaphysical problems: "Like 
butter in curds (or milK).., so is the Atman grasped in one's 
own soul#." (Svet. Up. 1,15-6) (and cf. ibid. 4,16). Ghee 
does not have its original nature destroyed by being heated; 
similarly the light of pure intelligence does not change (through 
having distinguishing attributes temporarily superimposed upon 
it). See Maitri Up. 7,11 (and Ramatlrthafs Comm, ad loc.).
Just as, when curds are churned, the most subtile portion 
rises upwards, and become butter; likewise when food is eaten, 
the most subtile po^rtion rises upwards, and becomes mind. 
Likewise the most subtile portion of water when drunk becomes 
prana; and of fire (tejas),- speech.. (Ch. Up. VI,6,1).
The eternal sweetness of the milk of cow, goat, buffalo, 
etc., is used by the Jains as an analogy for the endurance 
of the quality "sthiti" (Sarv. Ill, p. 31). And "as in the 
milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, etc., there exists, by its 
excessive or scanty nature, a special capacity for producing 
its several effects (curds, butter, etc.), so in the different 
material bodies produced by our actions (karma-pudgala) there 
exists a special capacity (anubhava) for producing their res­
pective effects." (ibid., p. 31-2 ).
For "milk and cowdung", see "Reality of Fiction". A mix­
ture of milk and water signifies an intimate union between 
two things (an example of anupalabdhi- see Chap. I; also a
particular figure of speech in poetics (samkara)) .The swan 
is popularly supposed to have the power of separating milk 
and water; see e.g. Ka£ha Up. Comm. 11,2: "The wise man con­
siders the relative importance of the good and the pleasant, 
and divides them as a swan divides milk and water,—  and
follows the good." (for milk^Ir^tne symbol of gurityj.
As the cow is the giver of sustenance, so the bull is the 
symbol of virility# The hymns of the Veda are packed with 
references to the bull who rains down (parjanya); and in 
Sankhyakarika 13 (Comm.), the quality of rajas is illustrated 
by two bulls who are incited to wrath when they meet.
The philosophers sought to make the mysterious vital force 
(prana) more understandable by personifying it as various 
animals, notably the calf and the horse. Thus in the Byh. Up. 
(2,2,1): "He who knows the calf (£i£u) with its resting,-place, 
its special resort, its post and its tether, kills his seven 
envious kinsmen". Here the "calf" is the vital force, strength 
its post, and food its tether (which holds it chained within 
the body); while the sense-organs in the head are the envious 
kinsmen.
But when the vital force rebels against its captivity, and 
seeks to escape from the body, it is likened not t^k docile 
calf, but to a fine strong horse, who tears at the pegs to 
which his feet are tied (padvl^a^anku) (Bph. Up. 6,1,13; Ch. Up. 
5,1,12; cf. also Comm, on Brh. Up. 2,5,19; and Ch. Up. 8,12,3:
"Pra$a is yoked to the body, as a dr aught-animal is yoked 
to a wagon".
In the famous Kajhaga simile of the chariot, the senses 
(indriya) are represented as horses, which may either be well- 
controlled by the chariot-driver (buddhi), or unrestrained, 
when they are allowed to roam at will (Ka£ha Up. 3,3-5; cf. 
also Maitri 2,3-4; Svet. Up. 2,9; and Sankhyakarika Comm. 17s 
"The chariot with spirited horses* goes smoothly through the 
supervision of the charioteer; likewise the body through the 
supervision (adhigthanat) of the soul". Elsewhere (Ch. Up. 
8,13,1) the horse is a simile for the Soul, which, in perfect­
ing itsiplf, shakes off evil as a horse his hairs; and shakes 
off the body, as the moon releases itself from Rahu's mouth.
It is typical of the all-embracing nature of Indian thought, 
that an illustration drawn from daily life is here found side 
by side with one from mythology,- and that both are designed 
to clarify the mystical course of liberation, (see also the 
description of a symbolic horse sacrifice, where the different 
parts of the horse represent parts of the universe^- Byh. Up. 
1,1,1-2). Lastly, an example of an inference which is entire­
ly fallacious is "because it has horns, therefore it is a horse" 
(VaiiS. Sutras II1,1,16; and see "Reality of Fiction".).
The donkey, being inferior to a horse, cannot hope to 
catch up with a man mounted on horseback, and bring back what 
he has carried off. In like manner, a statement established
through the authority of Sruti cannot be contradicted by 
Smyti, mere secular knowledge (e.g. Tantravartika 1,3,3)* The 
donkeyfs braying serves to guide people in the dark (Brh. Up. 
Comm. 4,3,5)* For the imaginary “donkey’s horn," see ,fReality 
of Fiction”. Practically the only specific references to
the donkey’s relation, the mule, are in connection with the 
current belief that a she-mule dies when in foal. (aSvatarl- 
garbha-nyaya)• As her offspring, the foal, is the cause of 
the mule’s death, so knowledge, which springs from ignorance, 
forthwith destroys its source (ajnana) (Raghunatha. See Jacob 
II, P* 5)* A kindred saying is the vyScikl-garbha-nyaya, re­
ferring to the female scorpion.
Sheep and goats are not greatly in favour as symbols for
A
philosophical theories. Probably the most important reference 
to the goat is the cryptic expression, found for the first time 
at 3vet Up. 4,5, Meka eva aja..”, the one (inborn) goat, with 
three sons, red, white and black (i.e. the three gu^as of 
Sankhya). This goat represents the material principle, Prakrti; 
but the pun on !,a-ja" is of more importance than the actual 
animal. The maxim of the "she-goat and the sword” (aja-krpanlya) 
illustrates an accidental happening (see Jacob I).
As regards sheep, a continuous stream of sheep signifies 
blind imixtation of others (as with us in Europe); while the 
psychological effect of certain mental impressions is compared 
to grey sheep’s wool (papdvavikam) (Byh. Up. 2,3,6; see also
above, p.~lh).
Among domesticated animals, the dog is usually regarded 
as a symbol of impurity; thus even a severe penance, when 
vitiated by desire, produces only disgust in the Lord, like 
milk (or butter- payasa) that has been licked by a dog (Sarv.
XV, P* 137). Even cow’s milk becomes impure when kept in a 
vessel made of dogskin. Likewise those teachings of the Buddha 
which seem to correspond with Sruti, have no authority (for 
Brahmans), and are not to be regarded as salutary (Jaiminlya- 
nyayamalavistara, 1,3,4)* But the faithful watchdog deserves 
man’s gratitude: see e.g. Hitopade^a 11,3.
Patanjali illustrates the vartika Mekade£a-vikytam- ananya- 
vatM by saying "the cutting off of a dog’s ears or tail does 
not turn it into a horse or a donkey”; while the attempt to 
straighten a dog’s tail is an illustration of wasted effort 
(£>ee "Reality of Fiction”).
The striking feature of the cat is its ability to see in 
the dark; and therefore in the Nyayasutras, 111,38, for example, 
the peculiar light which can be observed in the dark in the 
eyes of cats and other feline creatures is considered to 
strengthen the hypothesis that there is also such a light in 
the form of a subtle substance in human eyes, constituting the 
sense of sight. In the case of cats, et^c., the connection of 
eye with object suffices to cause perception, without external 
light; but the human eye requires light to enable the connection
of eye and object to be effective.
Cat and mouse, like snake and ichneumon, fawn and lion, 
and other antipathetic pairs, illustrate two things which are 
naturally inimical, tiUfi* truth and untruth. In the life of 
the jungle, the ruling principle is the "survival of the fittest
Among sem$-domesticated beasts of burden, the elephant 
and the camel are most frequently mentioned. The elephant, a 
large animal with a distinctive shape, is an example for per­
ception, which must take precedence over inference: "-^ f one 
sees an elephant, one does not need to infer its existence 
through its foot" (or its trumpeting) (Kumarila, Tantravartiiia 
p. 87; Upaskara on Val£. Sutras 111,2,10). In this connection 
there is the usual converse to be considered,- if we seem to 
see an elephant in what is really a lump of clay or a heap of 
straw, our vision must be defective. And similarly our con­
sciousness, because we are blinded by illusion, appears in a 
form which in reality it does notH possess. But see Vedantasara 
195: "In the state of savikalpa-samadhi, the revelation of 
the Absolute (advaita) shines forth even in spite of continued 
consciousness of duality, as in the case of seeing a clay 
elephant, we know that it lj3 of clay."
The parable of the elephant and the blind men (Syadv. p. 86 
St. XIV) provides an analogy for different views, each partially 
true, held e.g. in regard to the relation of samanya and vi- 
£esas (whether the particular, oi^bhe genus, can be regarded
as the sole reality, or whether a mixture of the two). Each 
blind man grasps one particular part of the elephant, and forms 
his concept of the animal accordingly; the complete picture 
is not realised by any of them, nor is it made up of the sum 
total of the partial aspects,- but on the other hand each one 
realises a portion of the truth, which would be complete for 
one in possession of all his senses. (See also ibid. p. 129,
St. XIX. This simile is also used to illustrate the different 
views held by the ignorant about I£vara or Brahman, among 
Vedantins). Elsewhere (Syadv. p. 122, St. XVIII) the doctrine
of momentariness is admitted by the Jain to contain a partial
truth, like the gaja-nimllika, elephant’s blinking. (The elephant 
is supposed to keep only one eye open at a time, when looking 
from side to side).
Error, incompetence, and contentment (viparyaya, a£akti, 
tu§Ji) are represented in Sahkhya philosophy as forming a goad, 
prior to acquiring siddhl (the attainment of right comprehension, 
or, more usually, supernatural powers. Siddhi leads to tattva- 
jnana; and tattvaflnana to mok§a). Just as the goad or hook 
of the elephant-driver keeps the elephant in check, so people 
who are mastered by these three tendencies become subject to 
ignorance; therefore one should avoid them, as the elephant 
avoids the hook (Sankhyak. 51; and STK ad loc.). It is character­
istic that it is the elephant’s point of view that is considered
here, not the driver’s.
Apart from a few general references, which might apply 
equally well to any other animal, the camel is mentioned 
specifically in connection with its habit of eating thorns# 
Sankara, in disagreeing with the Sankhya theory that things 
in themselves cause pain or pleasure or bewilderment, says 
that the differences in people's own tendencies (bhavana)
(or a£rg£a), produce varying effects on the part of the sense- 
objects (Brahmasutrabhasya 2,2,1). Xnandagiri's comment con­
tains a reference to the peculiar pleasure experienced by a 
camel in eating thorns. (Cf. "one'man's meat is another man's 
poison"). This practice led to the camel's being looked down 
upon, and regarded as an outcast among its fellow-animals:
"of what use is this thorn-eater to us?” (Pancatantra 1,8; 
HitopadeiSa 4,9)* Cf. Kusum. 111,12, upamiti, where the descrip­
tion of a camel, with a long neck, and eating thorns, leads to 
the (re-)cognition of such an animal when it is seen later.
There are three timid animals which feature frequently 
in proverbial sayings produced in polemical discussions with 
the object of refuting the opponents the deer, the hare, and 
the mouse. A weak argument is dubbed as effective as "a young 
deer's standing up to a full-grown lion (or hyena)" (Sarv. XI, 
P* 97, etc.); while an impossible argument is likened to the 
horns of a hare or of a mouse, or to the expectation of germin­
ation from* a seed eaten by a mouse (Sarv. II; X; etc. See also 
"Reality of Fiction").
In the Pali Buddhist scriptures, citta (mind, conscious­
ness) is repeatedly likened to an ape or monkey,- inquisitive, 
inconstant, and insatiable: 11 Just as an ape in the forest, 
roaming through the woodland, clutches a bough, lets go and 
clutches another, so is what is called citta, mind, ever 
changing as it arises and ceases” (Sanayutta-Nikaya 11,95; 
quoted by Mrs. Rhys Davids). This is a concrete simile which 
has found frequent depiction in Buddhist symbolic art.
When We see a monkey jumping about in a tree, we do not need 
to infer that the tree is moving as well as the monkey. There 
is a lengthy argument on the subject of the "conjunctions and 
disjunctions" of monkey, tree and space, on p. 194 of Nyaya- 
kandall (summarised by Randle, page 113 of "Indian logic in 
the Early Schools"). Srldhara holds that motion is perceptible, 
and does not deed to be inferred from "conjunctions and dis­
junctions"
We may also mention a mediaeval simile concerning bhaktl, 
"participation" between soul and God. The Vadagalais or follow­
ers of the Northern school of Ramanuja, held that liberation 
through the favour of ¥isnu was only possible when the devotee 
co-operated actively, as a young monkey holds fast to its mother 
when she is carrying it to a safe place. The Tengalais, or 
followers of the Southern school, were of the opinion that man 
must throw himself entirely upon the mercy of God, like the 
kitten which is carried in its mother’s mouth, without itself
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being active. (See Glasenapp, Der Hinduismus, MUnchen 1921, 
p. 386).
The lion and tiger complete our list of the x mammals 
which find favour as philosophical illustrations. The lion’s 
glance (siipha-avalokana), i.e. looking forward and backward, 
is applied to a word in a sentence, which is connected with 
what precede* and with what follows; or it sometimes refers 
to a recapitulation of subject-matter (e.g. SahkhyatattvakaumudI 
7)* The "lion in the forest1' exemplifies two things which 
mutually aid or protect each other.
A favourite figure is the narasiniha-nyaya, the union 
of man and lion. The Jains use it to exemplify the complexity 
of existence: things are neither exclusively permanent (nitya), 
nor exclusively impermanent, but are in reality both,- a com­
plexity like the man-lion or cock-serpent (kukku$fc^-sarpa).
The same applies to bheda-abheda, a distinct category of 
existence (Syadv. p. 20, St. V; p. 128, St. XIX). The Ramanujas 
argue against this view, asserting that the man-lion or the 
elephant-headed G-ane^a are not really complex or multiform, 
for the separate parts have separate natures, complete in them­
selves, and no true connection with each other. Therefore 
these examples are inapplicable to such doctrines as existence 
and non-existence at one and the same time, because they both 
exist, they though in their separate parts they are incongruous. 
(Sarv. IV, p. 37)* Note that both Jains and Ramanujas take
it for granted that beings with two separate existences can 
exist (See "Reality of Fiction"). The "man and lion" figure 
is also usedflt in Alajmkara.
The tiger in India is the best-known and most feared 
of wild animals. The Indian equivalent of "between the devil 
and the deep" is "ito vyaghrah itasta^f" (on the one side a 
tiger, on the other a precipice), and this is applied to philo­
sophical dilemmas from which no outlet is apparent, (e.g,
Syadv. p. 122, St. XVII). In the Brh. Up. Comm. 1,4,10, the 
gods are represented as being distressed over the loss of a 
worj&shipper (through ±x his attaining right knowledge), Just 
as a man is distressed when one of his domestic animals is 
seized by a a tiger. (See also VacaspatimiiSra on Yogasutras 1,31)* 
The vision of a tiger ready to pounce, as revealed to a man 
in darkness through a flash of lightning, is used as an in­
stance of the (practicallY) simultaneous production of per­
ception, conviction, application to oneself, and effort (adhy- 
avasaya,- properly "mental effort", but here it seems to 
include both the decision ancfc^ he subsequent action of
running away) (Sankhyatattvakaumud! 30).
Among reptiles, the snake easily Carries off the honours 
as prime symbol and illustration. The uncanniest and deadliest 
of all animals, it inspires fear and awe through its ms mysteri­
ous properties, namely its distinctive shape and (seemingly) 
inexplicable gliding motion (the snake is commonly called
gudha-pada, "having hidden feet", and it is said that only 
a snake can see a snake's legs), its glittering eye andjforked 
tongue, the periodical shedding of its skin, and- most fear­
some of all,- its power of inflicting almost instantaneous 
death by an injection of venom. All these characteristics 
find abundant mention in Indian literature, and provide the 
foundation for an extensive serpent cult in which snakes of 
everyday life and of mythological fame flourish side by side.
In the philosophical texts, the most frequent mention 
of the snake is in connection with the mistaken notion that 
a rope in the dark is a coiled serpent (See "Reality of Fiction? 
but note that owing to taboo notions a snake is euphemistically 
referred to as "rope", "toothed rope", etc.).
The casting of the slough naturally suggested an allegory 
for reincarnation, and eventually for final liberation. For 
instance: "Just as the dead slough of a snake, when cast off, 
would lie on the anthill, so does this body lie.., but that 
which is bodiless and immortal, the vital force (prana), becomes 
pure Brahman, and pure brilliance (tejas)." (Brh. Up. 4,4,7; 
and cf. Comm, on Pra£na Up* V,5). The ant-hill is recognised 
as the usual haunt of snakes (especially cobras), and this 
connection is exemplified e.g. in the Vammika-sutta (No 23) 
of the MajJhima-Nikaya. Here an allegory represents the 
human body as an anthill, at the bottom of which a cobra lies 
concealed,- symbolising the "Almsman in whom the cankers are
i4><l
no more*1’ (Vogel, Indian Serpent-Lore- additional notes).
The number of references to the snake’s poison and bite 
is too large to be dealt with at any length. As far as philo­
sophical significance is concerned, the likening of* the 
senses and sense-objects to dangerous serpents immediately 
suggests itself. Puns on "grasping1 igraha and atigraha, etc.) 
are made more complete by comparison with deadly reptiles, while 
the connection of senses and objects is made very clear by 
exaggeration, as in Maitri up. 4,2 s "Like one bitten by a great 
sanake- bitten by objects of sense" ^the objects being definitely 
active). Cf. Sarv. AV, p. 141s "The serpents of the senses 
are consumed by regulation of the breath."
A snake*s poison is supposed to contain the devouring 
power of fire, and accordingly the snake is regarded as an 
eminent possessor of the semi-magical quality te.las. When 
knowledge has been attained, the power of avidya (ignorance) 
is as negligible as that of a snake whose fangs have been re­
moved (Sure£varafs vartika on Brh. Up. bha§ya 1,4,1746). (see 
also Vacaspati on Yogasutras 11,55*- the connection between 
a serpent and its poison, as an analogy for the poison df the 
kle^as). Though its poison is deadly when inflicted on others, 
the snake itself is not affected by it. In the same way, although 
Brahman is the substratum of ignorance (avidya), yet the effect 
of ignorance is seen only in and through created beings. A 
dogmatic statement which defeats its own end (e.g. "nothing
is known1*) is compared to a snake biting its own body (Udayana, 
itmatattvaviveka p. 67).
The pain consequent on attachment to worldly pleasures is 
forcibly illustrated by the simile of a man who, being afraid 
of the bite of a scorpion (=non-attachment, loneliness), is 
bitten by a poisonous snake. (Vyasa on Yogasutras 11,15).
(for the spontaneous production of scorpions, see Kusum. 11,2). 
The snake and the ichneumon are quoted as examples of innate 
hostility between two things (e.g. Paifcatantra V,2; and Xtma- 
tattvaviveka p. 53); and, like the cat and the mouse (see above, 
Chap. I), they illustrate "proof from non-existence" (abhava). 
I.e. when we see that the ichneumon is absent from its usual 
haunts, we conjecture that its natural enemy the snake is 
present (though there is no true vyapti here) (Nyayasutras 11,7)• 
Conversely, if we see a snake getting angry, we infer that an 
ichneumon is hidden in the bushes (Upaskara on Vai£. Sutras III, 
1,13).
In the Vedanta, the relation of the Supreme Self and the 
individual soul is regarded as analogous to that of the snake 
and its coils. Viewed as a whole the snake is one, undifferent­
iated, but an element of difference appears if we view it with 
regard to its coils, hood, and so on (Brahmasutrabha§ya 3,2,27). 
This simile may be compared with those of lake and water, or 
forest and trees (Chap. VII below). In a different application, 
the serpent’s coils are used to exemplify the relation of jnana
' n
and karma. The Vai£esika asks, "If there is no distinction 
(hheda) between jnina and karma, how is their relation of 
agent and instrumental cause (kartr and karana) to be accounted 
for?" The Jain replies, "On the analogy of a serpent who 
makes a coil of his body by his body. It may be said in criti­
cism that the relation of kart£ and karapa in the case of the 
serpent is simply imaginary. But this is not so, for we actually 
see the effect, viz. the coil..? Even a hundred efforts of 
imagination could not make us believe that a pillar was going 
to wind itself into a coil." (I.e. there cannot be a kartj- 
karaiia-bhava in the case of purely static objects; tdyadv. 
p. 43, St. VIII).
The Jain seeks to strengthen his argument in favour of 
the soul*s co-extension with the body, by saying, "Atman w may 
well abandon its former size (and grow with the growth of the 
body) without ceasing to be. Take, for example, the case of a 
snake which can change its size by expanding or contracting 
its hood." (Syadv. p. 53, St. IX).
The hooded serpent was supposed to carry a priceless 
jewel in its hood,(besides being in a general sense the natural 
guardian of the earth’s treasures). Such jewels were believed 
to possess magical or healing properties (in contrast to the 
obvious destructive powers of the snake; cf. inoculation), but 
nobody was likely to be in a$ position to test such properties, 
particularly fch in the case of the mythological serpent-demons.
Accordingly an unrealisable aim is compared to "an instruction 
to obtain Taksakafs crest jewel as a febrifuge1 (Nyayabindu- 
$Ika p. 3). But on the other hand mythology is put to a 
practical use in the explanation of the different postures of 
Yoga (cf. the kundalinis), e.g. Vacaspati on Yogasutras 11,47: 
the Yogin is recommended to concentrate on the idea of Ananta, 
the thousand-hooded serpent, and thus attain absorption of his 
mind. (Ananta was regarded as a paragon of asceticism).
References to reptiles other than snakes are practically 
negligible In the philosophical texts. Two references to the 
iguana (godha) will be found under "Reality of Fiction", while 
the Sankhya simile of the tortoise and its limbs has been dealt
(cUo^p. Ttpy
with above; and we shall meet "hair on a tortoise" in Chap.
IX.
An amphibian reptftle, the alligator, is regarded as the 
natural complement of its habitat, the lake, and the "hrada- 
nakra-nyaya’,' like the vana-siijiha-nyaya, is illustrative of 
two things mutually aiding or protecting each other (Vedanta- 
kalpataruparimala, p. 100).
The frog, half-way between the reptile and the fish, is 
already familiar to us in the Rlgvedic age (e.g. the comparison 
of the Brahmans with frogs, RV^ v.xoj, which is not to be taken 
as insulting, as it would appear to a European. The croaking 
of frogs evidently had some mystic significance (perhaps because 
of association with the coming of the rains), for it forms one
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of the seven similes for the sound-Brahman, the 11 sound of the 
space within the haart,f, which is heard when the ears are 
covered (Maitri Up. 6,22).
Frogs are supposed to become assimilated to the earth on 
the cessation of the rainy season, and only to revive when 
the rains fall once more. Similarly, the mind of the Prak^ti- 
laya (a particular class oi Y0gin) enjoys a state of freedom 
for some time Ibetween incarnations), but once more becomes 
associated with a body, by virtue of the non-completion of 
karma. (Vacaspati on Yogasutras 1,19) • The same figure is applied 
to the alternate manifestation and disappearance of words 
(sphoja) at ibid. I, 27; and cf. also 11,17. In the two latter 
passages it appears to be plants (udbhid-ja),not animals, which 
are supposed to revive with the rains.).
A helpless person is compared to a frog in a waterless 
well (e.g. a person in the grip of samsara: Maitri Up . 1,4).
The Man£uka-i>luti-nyaya, maxim of a frog's leap, indicates the 
skipping of one rule, and passing on to another (in grammar, 
or in Alamkara). Lastly, an alternative for the Imaginary 
,!horns of a hare1' is Ma crest of matted hair" (ja^abhara) on 
the head of a frog (Syadv. p. 86, St. XIV).
The movements of fish are not so easily observed as those 
of other animals (although Death espied the gods, hidden in the 
three Vedas,MasB one sees a fish in water1'- Ch. Up. 1,4,3), and 
accordingly similes containing references to fish are not very 
frequent; but there is a notable one in the Brhl Up. (4,3,18):
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"As a great fish swims alternately to both banks of a river, 
the nearer and the farther, so does this infinite being (the 
Self) move to both these states, the dream- and waking-states.1 
3a£ikara explains that the point of the illustration is that the 
self is distinct from the body and organs, and ultimately 
unaffected by all limiting adjuncts. The separateness of 
fish and water is used to exemplify the relation of Puru^a and 
Prakrti,- matter and spirit being distinct and yet interconnected 
(Mahabharata XII, Mokjadharmaparvan). (Alternatively, Purusa 
dwells in Prakrti like a wasp in a fig).
At Maitri Up 6,26,-the control of the breath is represented 
as a sacrifice: "As the fisher (£akunika) draws in those who 
wander in the waters (i.e. fish) with his net and sacrifices 
them in the fire of his fetomach, thus does one draw out these 
breaths with Om and sacrifice them in the fire that is free 
from ill (anamaya) (i.e. the Universal Self).". Though not e£ 
strictly of philosophical application, the matsyanyaya, indicat­
ing the oppression of the weak by the strong, may be mentioned 
in passing.
The easy, effortless flight of birds provided the philo­
sophers with a ready-to-hand analogy for the liberation of the 
soul. Here the body is usually regarded as a cage, from which 
the bird must escape (e.g. Sarv XI, p. 95; and cf. introduction 
to Brh. Up. 4,4,3* In the former passage, a Naiyayika opponent 
is represented as objecting to the Jain comparison with a bird,
on the ground that it leaves a doubt as to whether the soul 
possesses form or not)* The vital force (prana), while it 
remains in the body, is like a fluttering bird, which causes 
its cage (the body) to vibrate (Sankhyakarika Comm* 29). A
<x\-
more detailed comparison occurs^Vedantasutra 2,4*9* in the 
course of a discussion on prana: 11 Just as eleven birds shut 
up in one cage may, although each makes a separate effort, move 
the cage by the combination of their efforts, so the eleven 
pranas (breaths) which abide in one body may, although each 
has its own special function, by the combination of these func­
tions produce one common function called prana” (Thibaut's 
translation)* As long as the soul continues to identify itself 
with matter, thinking "This is I”, or "That is mine", so long 
does it remain bound (binding itself by itself), like a bird 
in a snare, (and so long does it continue to pass from incarna­
tion) (Maitri Up. 6,30; and 3*2)*
The simile of the bird is also applied to the dream state: 
"Preserving its lower (or worthless) nest (the body) by means 
§f the vital force, the one golden immortal swan (of spirit) 
soars out of that nest" (Brh. Up. 4*3*12). Then follows an 
account of the dreamless state of the soul: "As a hawk (£yena) 
or an eagle (suparna), having flown about in the air, exhausted 
folds together its wings and prepares to alight (on its nest), 
so the spirit hastens to that condition in which, asleep, it 
feels no desire and sees no dream" (Byh. Up. 4,3,19). The
following passage from the Chandogya Up* (6,8,2) also has 
reference to this state: "As a bird fastened with a string, 
after flying in this direction and in that without finding 
a support (ayatanam) elsewhere, (comes down) and resofcts to 
this same string, evem so the mind, after flying in this 
direction and in that without finding a support elsewhere, 
resorts to breath alone; for the mind has breath (prapa) as 
its x fastening*" Cosmical unity is emphasized (Maitri
Up. 6,34) by a reference to the golden swan, or diver bird 
(madgu) "who dwells in both the heart and sun"; (for the swan 
as metaphor for the soul, see e.g. Svet* Up. 1,6; 3*18; 6,15; 
Maitri Up. 7,7fj cf. the "Paramahanisa", an ascetic of the 
highest order,^^*^ •> * ^ ^ 0
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The followers of the Purpaprajna system hold that Soul 
and the Lord are completely distinct entities, like a bird 
and the string that binds it; and only the man who 
realises their difference can be liberated (Mahopanigad, quoted 
in Sarv. V, p. 57, with a view to refuting the opinion expressed 
in the Tattvavadarahasya, viz. that the example of the bird 
tied with a string teaches unity, or at any rate close inter­
connection). In the Fra&na Up.,(IV,7) dependence on the Supreme 
Soul is likened to the flight of birds to a tree, which serves 
as their resting-place, just as the Stman is the resort
of all; while in the Mundaka Up. (3,1,1; and also Sveta^vatxara 
4,6), Individual soul and Supreme Soul are represented by two
birds, companions on the same tree, one of whom (i.e. the 
individual) eats Bweet fruit, while the other (the Supreme 
Self) looks on without eating. In this comparison, only the 
impartiality of Brahman is dwelt upon, not its vastness or 
all-embracing character; and for this reason it is not as con­
vincing a simile as e.g. that of the rivers converging in the 
sea.
In the commentary on Kusum. V,l, it is said that "the 
world depends on some being who is able to prevent it from 
falling, because it is steadfast (dhrtimattvat), like a stick 
supported (in the air) by a bird."
An example of a syllogism which is "indefinite in regard 
to locality" (aSrayana-asiddha) is "there is a peacock in 
this cave, because we hear its cries"; for if there are a 
number of mountain caves close together, therp may be a mistake 
as to the exact location of the peacock (Nyayabindu^Ika III, 
pp. 68-9)# The peacock’s cry is regarded as a sign of approach­
ing rain, and forms part of a threefold inference of rain, the 
other two signs being the swelling of the river, and the carry­
ing off of their eggs by the ants. When an objector says that 
these phenomena x may result from other causes, e.g. the cry 
of the peacock may have been imitated by a man, while the river 
may have been dammed up, and the ants’x nest damaged,- the reply 
is that there is no fault in the signs (linga) leading to right 
knowledge, since the actual cry of the peacock differs from
that uttered by a man (while the carrying off of the eggs 
resulting from fear is different from that which heralds rain 
(and the other signs of rain are lacking); likewise the damming 
of the river produces a different swollenness from that due to 
rain,- i.e. two apparently Identical results may be differenti­
ated by referring back to their cauees) (Nyayasutras 1,35-6),
The longing of the peacock for the cloud is a favourite Kavya 
fancy. (See also Ugaskara on Vai£. Sutras 111,2,11: even when 
water is in sight, inference of water is made for corroboration, 
from the sight of waterbirds (valaka).
We have seen (above, p.t&0) how the swiftest possible 
succession of sense-percoption, mental grasp, and determination 
is illustrated by the sudden vision of a tiger. In the corres­
ponding passage of Sankhyak arika, it is shown how the same 
process takes place^nuch more slowly when there is a doubt re­
garding anything seen at a distance; e.g. when a person cannot 
decide whether a certain object is a post or a man, and is grad­
ually led to the conclusion that it is a post, from seeir^ a bird 
perched on it (or a creeper growing on it) (Sankhyak. Comm. 30; 
cf. ibid. 46). One of the example for non-perception (anupa- 
labdhi) resulting from intermixture of equal things (samana- 
abhiharat) is the non-perception of a particular pigeon among
a number of others (Sankhyak. Comm. 7); while a bird flying 
high in the sky is not perceived (although there is technically 
no obstruction to perception), owing to too great distance (ati-
dufcat) (STK ad loc.).
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The usual similes adduced to ridicule views opposed to 
one's own include several about birds. Most of them will be 
found in the "Reality of Fiction** chapter, e.g. “Cooking one- 
half of a hen and keeping the other half for laying” ’’Examining 
the teeth of a crow”, and “Looking for the footprints of 
birds in the sky” : and it will be shown that, in the concrete 
Indian view, these are not such absurdities as they seem,
A roundabout way of doing a thing is illustrated by the "baka-
bandhana-nyaya”, the maxim of the capture of a crane. A man,
wishing to secure a crane, puts s butter on its head, waits ]
until the butter has melted, run into its eyes andfex blinded 
it, and then captures the bird (Vivarajiaprameyasahgraha, p. 262, 
line 9) (Something like our ‘‘putting salt on a bird's s tail”). 
The Jain, having demonstrated the futility of his opponents^ i
(Buddhists') doctrines, asserts that those opponents (kutlrthya) 
should return to the true belief, on the analogy of the little 
birds who fly away from the mast of a ship, but return to it 
when they are unable to see land (Syadv. p. 127, St. XIX).
An equivalent of the “lion’s glance" (above, p.lW>) is the 
maxim of the crow’s (single) eyeball, which is supposed to 
move at will from one socket to the other. This is generally 
used of a word which applies to two portions of a sentence; or 
of persons or things fulfilling a double purpose. The simile 
of the alighting of pigeons on a threshing-floor is used,
particularly in Alaijikara, to illustrate the production of a 
certain effect by the simultaneous action* of numerous eaues 
causes (e.g. Nyayamalavistara 11,1,3 (p. 621); Sahityadarpana 
739)* The “accident of birth”,- the determination of the 
family into which a man is born,- is represented in Ya3as- 
tilaka II, 153 as a purely fortuitous occurrence, like the 
accidental seizing of a quail by a blind man. (This seems to 
be contrary to the usual k arma theory). The seizing of a 
pigeon by a hawk, or the “crow and the Palmyra fruit1' (which 
drops on to its head and kills it) Is also maxims expressive 
of an accidental happening (e.g. Nyayabindu^Ika p. 6: “even 
accidentally (kakatallyapi) there is no accomplishment of an 
object (arthadiddhi) arising from! false knowledge”). The 
“crow as a destroyer of curds” (kakadadhighata) represents the 
figure of upalaksanam, or pars pro toto. If a bo# were urged 
to protect the curds from the crows, it would imply that dogs 
and all other possible raiders were also to be warded off 
(Bhart^hari, Vikyapadlya 11,314)*
Owls, like cats, can see in the dark (see e.g. Syadv. 
p. 14, St. V). We shall meet them in a discussion on the nature 
of darkness, below, Chapter VIII.
A curious remnant of the age of magic is the injunction 
“Let him who desires to kill his enemy by incantation offer 
a hawk",- quoted in Kusumanjali (Comm. 1,11; V,13) as an example 
of a command producing not only the desired effect, but also
an undesirable result (viz. hell) for the performer. Lastly, 
any account of the importance of birds as philosophical illust­
rations would be incomplete without a reference to the “cosmic 
egg” which forms a basis for one of the principal theories of 
creation (e.g. Brh. Up. (and Comm.) 1,2,2, etc.; Ch. Up. 3,19, 
1-2 (an egg consisting of a golden half-shell (the heavens) 
and a silver one (the earth). Here the mountains form the outer 
shell, cfcouds and mists the inner skin, the rivers veins, and 
the sea the liquid.).
Among insects, the spider occupies a place apart, by 
reason of its capacity for producing a thread from its own 
body, and then moving about on the web of its own construction. 
In the Vedanta view, Brahman is both the material and the 
efficient cause of the universe, just as the spider (luta), 
through its own Inborn nature (sva-pradhanataya) is the effici­
ent cause of the web, and through the nature of its body, 
is also the material cause (Vedantasara 56). The same simile 
appears in Brh. Up. 2,1,20: “As. a spider (urnanabhi) goes 
forth by means of the thread (it produces)., so from this Self 
go forth all organs, all worlds, all gods and all beings.”
And in Mund. Up. 1,1,8s “As the spider sends forth and with­
draws (its thread), as the plants grow on the earth, and as 
hairs arise from a living person, so in this world do all 
things together come out of the Imperishable One (ak$ara).“
Svet. Up. 6,10 refers to "the one who covers himself,
like a spider, with threads arising from primary matter (pra- 
dhana).."; while Maitri 6,22 uses the same simile with a 
different application: "As a spider rising up by means of its 
thread (tantu) attains a free space, even so does the meditator, 
rising up by means of Oiji, attain Aden independence"(svatantrya: 
a pun on the word tantu, by which it is made clear that indep­
endence is something to be striven' after by oneself alone, 
no outside help availing).
A Yogin can walk over a spider's web without breaking it: 
see “Reality of Fiction".
In accounts of creation, and in summaries of all living 
creatures, the ant is taken to be the limit of minuteness 
(e.g. £ulagraha-pipllikavat, Sankhyak. Comm. 40|^'"~The Ramanuja, 
arguing against the Jain idea of the co-extension of soul and 
body, asserts that in that case the soul of a human being 
would not be able to x occupy (subsequently) the body of an 
elephant; and on entering the body of an ant, it would lose 
the capacity of filling its former frame. (Sarv. IV, p. 37). 
Above (p.m} we have referred to the inference of approaching 
rain from the fact ofjthe ants carrying off their eggs; and 
see above, Chap. IV, for the two examples of harmonious co­
operation between many individuals,- an anthill made by many 
ants, and a beehive made by many bees.
The honey of bees provides a synonym for the finest essence
of anything (or an effect, = anna). (Cf. Kusum. 1,1)• Thus 
Byh. Up. 2,5,1: "This earth is honey to all beings, and all 
beings are honey to this earth." Sankara explains: "Just as 
a beehive is made by a great many bees, so is this earth made 
by all beings. Likewise all beings are the honey or effect of 
this earth." The same applies to the Self within the earth, 
and within the body; and to the corresponding four entities 
in the case of water, fire,air, sun,the quarters, the moon, 
lighting, cloud, ether, Dharma, truth, and the Universal Atman. 
(Bph. Up. 2,5,1-14)* In the Chand. Up. (3,1-3,5) there is 
a detailed description of the sun as "the honey extracted from 
all the VQdas",- each set of rays representing certain honey­
cell s, with their appropriate bees and flowers. The upward 
rays are regarded as the most important, for their bees are 
the Upani§ads, and their flower Brahman. In smother passage 
of the same Upani§ad (6,9,1-2) the condition of the various 
Juices which go to make honey is used as an analogy for the 
individual souls when they are absorbed in Brahman: "As the 
bees prepare (nlti§thanti) honey by gathering the juices of 
different genuses of trees and causing them to be unified, and 
as then (those juices) are not able to discriminate "I am the 
essencejbf this tree", or "i am the essence of that tree",- 
even so, indeed, all creatures here, although they are absorbed 
into Being (sat), know not "We have been absorbed into Being" 
(in deep sleep and in death).." (Cf. also Maitri Up 6,22; and
Comm, on Pra£na Up. IV,1).
The Carvakas back up their creed of "carpe diem" by quoting 
the popular saying, "When a man can find honey in an Ark a 
tree on his way, why should he go to the mountain for it?"
I.e. one should enjoy present pleasures, and not worry about 
the future; or according to another interpretation, if one 
can accomplish an object by simple means, it is not necessary 
to adopt a roundabout method. But to the Sahkhya-Yoga school, 
as indeed to all non--materialista , indulgence in pleasures 
of sense may be compared to the eating of a mixture of honey 
and poison,- having pain as its result (e.g. Vacaspati on Yoga­
sutras 11,15; also Sarv. XI, p. 9 6 ) (Cf. also "licking honey 
from the edge of a sword", an illustration of vedanljia; Sarv. 
Ill, p. 31).
A noteworthy illustration of the subordination of senses 
to mind (citta) is employed twice by Vyasa, in his Yogasutra- 
bhasya: "Just as the bees fly, when the queen (in Sanskrit, 
"king") flies; and rest, when the queen rests,- so the senses 
become restrained, when the mind is restrained" (pratyahara) 
(11,54). And when the Yogin masters the method of control of 
body by mind, and is able to transfer his mind (during his 
lifetime) to another person's body (this is one of the siddhis)- 
on that occasion the senses, etc., follow the mind, as the 
bees follow their queen. (111,38). Vyasa was not the originator 
of the simile, however, for it appears in PraSna Up., 11,4,-
this time emphasizing the subordination of mind as well as 
senses, to prana, the vital force.
Another insect with a special peculiarity of its own is 
the firefly; and accordingly the mistaking of its luminous 
glow for fire, or for a light, is used as an example of errone­
ous perception, to be corrected by other means of evidence 
(Sankara on Brh. Up., 3,3,1)* (See also ibid. 4,3,6). The 
spasmodic illumination of the fire-fly (indragopa) provides a 
symbol for some mental impressions (such as a flash of intuition) 
(B^h. Up. 2,3,6). When the knowledge (of a Yogin) becomes in­
finite, then little remains to be known,- as little as a glow­
worm Jin (comparison with) space (akaSa) (Vyasa on logasutras 
IV,31). A fleeting pleasure is also compared to a glowworm 
(e.g. Sarv. XI, p. 97).
During the B^h. Up. account of transmigration (4,4), and 
Sankara1s commentary thereon, many similes for the passage of 
the soul from one body to another are accepted or rejected.
For instance, does the soul leave the old body and go to another 
like a bird going to another tree? Or is it carried by another 
body serving as a vehicle to the place where it is to be born?.. 
Finally, it is decided that the appropriate illustration is that 
of a caterpillar, which goes to the end of a blade of grmss, 
reaches out and takes hold of another support, and then draws 
itself over to its new resting-place. In the same way, the 
transmigrating self prepares a new body before leaving the old
one, and when that new body has been fashioned in accordance 
with past karma, the old one is discarded in its favour (Byh. 
Up. 4,4,3; see also above, Chap. IV, p.'SS’^ and Comm, on Ait?
Up. 11,1 (p. 74, Anand.).
A man who, in his ignorance, becomes absorbed in the path 
of ritual, and fails to know his Self, is compared by the 
Vedantin to a silkworm, which becomes helplessly enmeshed in 
its own cocoon (Bjh. Up. Comm. 1,4,17). The simile of the 
£alabha, the moth which flies recklessly into a flame, is more 
favoured in Kavya works than in philosophy; it signifies a 
person who runs heedlessly into danger, or, according to Meru- 
tunga, one who is envious of someone else{s brilliance, and 
seeks in vain to diminish it (Quoted by Jacob, III, p. 85).
G-naJ&s and flies represent minor worries; and are seen 
when one has had a blow on the eyes (like our "seeing stars") 
(Comm, on Pra£na Up. VI,4). At the junction of the two halves 
of the cosmic shell, there is an opening as large as the wing 
of a fly (Brh. Up. 3,3,2).
Among the Jain divisions of Jlvas or souls, the lowest 
of the "moving" Jlvas are those possessing two senses only 
(touch and taste),- and in this category are classed worms.
The maxim of "worms bred in poison" Indicates a state of things 
which, though fatal to others, is advantageous to whose who 
are used to it (cf. the camel’s eating thorns) It is referred 
to in Sankara's commentary on Byh. Up. 6,1,14, where the food
of the vital force is under discussion. The vital force being 
present in allh beings, must subsist on the food eaten by all 
beings; but this does not mean that, while associated with the 
body of, e.g. a Brahman, it should not refrain from eating 
food forbidden by the scriptures. Vyasa (Yogasutras 11,9) 
asserts that, (^ven\asja worm just born knows the fear of death, 
and as this fear cannot be explained by perception, inference, 
or tradition, we are led to believe that the pain of death 
has been experienced in a former life.
The animal kingdom, then, provided the philosophers with 
ample material for their musings; and we can observe how close 
was their observation of nature, and how unceasingly the£x 
sought to bring their theories into line with everyday life. 
Comparisons which to the European seem a little strange, even 
ludicrous (see for example the calf = vital force, and frog = 
Brahman), are quite natural for the Indian, who seeks to bring 
all things into relation with one another, and to whom even 
mythology and so-called "illusion" are potentially real and 
concrete.
Chapter VII. _The_V e getab 1 e_K i ngdpm_in Comparisons._
It is scarcely possible to deal with more than a brief 
selection of the countless references to vegetation,- seeds, 
trees, flowers, fruits,- with which almost every page of 
Sanskrit literature is besprinkled. Just as in English, 
there are innumerable allusions, scarcely metaphorical any 
longer, to the "seed", "root" and "fruit" (of good and evil 
deeds, etc.). We shall in general only quote passages con­
taining worked-out similes or metaphors.
The relation of seed to shoot is employed, in one form 
or another, in the argumentations of practically every philo­
sophical school. We have already had occasion (above, Chap.
Ill) to refer to the eternal series of seed and shoot, a 
permissible regressus in infinitum; and to the principle of 
kurvadrupatva, efficient form, which operates e.g. in rice 
when it is engaged in producing a shoot. The eternal succession 
of seed and shoot can be confirmed by the evidence of the 
senses, so there is no fault in it (see e.g. Kusum. Comm. 1,4). 
On this analogy the Jains accept an eternal succession of 
revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers (Sarv. Ill, p. 25); 
while elsewhere (Sarv. VII, p. 73) the same comparison is 
used to illustrate the never-ending, never-beginning series 
of the results of action (karma). (Cf. also Safikhyatattvakau- 
mudl 52).
But the seed cannot give rise to the shoot without external
aid; there must be concurrent causes, such as earth, water,
sun, wind, etc* The Buddhist K§anikavadin (exponent of
/momentariness") argues as follows: When the seed takes on
the assistance of the complementary causes (sahakarin), it
must do so with the assistance of other subsidiaries,- for
otherwise the seed would always be producing a germ* This
second addition (ati^aya) in its turn would require to be
aided, and thus we should have a regressus in Infinitum; and
would/
this in its turn wil^/lead to a second and a third infinite 
regression*. 0n the other hand, let it be granted that an 
addition identical with the entity (=seed) is taken on. In 
this case, the former entity (the seed minus the addition) 
does not exist any longer, and a fresh entity identical with 
the addition, and styled kurvad-rupa (efficient form, or effect- 
producing object) comes into being: and thus the doctrine of 
momentariness is established (Sarv. II, pp. 8-9). The retort 
of the Naiyaylka has already been mentioned (above, tfhap. Ill; 
and cf. Kusum. Comm. 1,16). The Jain, from his relativity 
standpoint, asserts that the seed always possesses the power 
(£akti) of producing a shoot, and yet uses the power only 
occasionally, when the accessories, viz. water, soil, etc., co­
operate. But because the putting forth of the shoot is occasion­
al (kadacitka), it does not follow that the power of putting 
forth the shoot is also occasional (for, in a certain way, it 
is eternal (nitya)). (In the same way, because "aham-pratyaya"
(fundamental notion of self.} a “variety of application" (upa- 
g yoga-vi£e§a) of Atman) is occasional, it does not follow 
that the uI,f or "Self" is occasional). (See Syadv. pp. 118-9,
St. XVII; and cf. also ibid. p. 17, St. V, for a further 
criticism of kganikatva) •
The doctrine of momentariness is linked up with the doctrine 
of "santana",-^continuous stream of consciousness, which 
accounts for memory,- a familiar instance being the following: 
When mango seeds, after being treated with sweet juices, are 
planted in carefully ploughed soil, there is a definite cer­
tainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the joints, 
the stem, the branches, and the buds etc., and so on by an 
unbroken series (paramparaya) to the fruit itself. Or again, 
when cotton seeds have been sprinkled with lac juice, there 
will be a similar certainty of finding a redness in the cotton,- 
through the same series of shoot, etc. (I.e. in each line or 
"stream" of successive experiences the entity of one moment 
reaps the fruit of the previous moment's action; but one parti­
cular line of experiences, say X, cannot suffer and remember 
the sensations of another line of experiences, say Y).
The Jain objects to this example being used to account 
for memory (since there is no memory in the cotton of what was 
done to the seed); moreover, he says, the example does not 
confirm the theory of k§anikatva: for if everything were moment­
ary, then the redness applied to the seeds should not last
until it reached the fruit. Accordingly the Jain syllogism, 
"Where there is otherness (difference) there can be no memory" 
(yatra anyatvani tatra smytir-na bhavati) is not invalidated 
by this example (Sarv. Ill, p# 20; Syadv. p. 125, St. XVIII).
The Sahkhya philosopher, who says that the existent can 
only arise from the existent, naturally disagrees with the 
kurvad-rupa theory, for this would mean that all products 
could be produced at any time, without a cause being operative 
("Barley is produced from barley, and rice from rice; if the 
non-existent could be produced, then rice-grains could arise 
from chaff"—  Sankhyak. 9). He points out that although the 
shoot only becomes manifest after the destruction of the 
seed, yet it is not the destruction of the seed, but rather 
something real and active,- viz. a portion of the seed itself,- 
which causes this manifewtation. Only the already existent 
entity can be manifested, as e.g. the oil in sesamum seeds, 
which is brought to light through pressing (e£-» 
kau»udl-9v Cf. 3vet. Up. 1,15: "as oil in sesamum seeds., so 
is the Atman grasped in one's own soul, if one looks for it 
with true tapas"), or the grain in corn (through threshing) 
(Sankhyatattvakaumudi 9i; Sarv. XIV, p. 121). And conversely, 
nothing can be produced from an inactive cause; sesamum oil 
cannot be pressed from a stone,(or from sand (sikata)), be­
cause the latent effect is not present there, as it is in 
sesaaum grains (STK 15).
But even over this example we find the well-known polarity
appearing. Reference has been made above (p.£3) to the question 
of the possibility of a jar's being produced by the will of 
the thaumaturgist, without materials. Alternatively, the yogin 
may produce a tree, without the use of a seed (Sarv. VIII,p. 78). 
Further, we have the case of spontaneous generation: a certain 
herb can either be produced from the seed of its particular 
species, or it may arise from the manure of rice-dust (Kusum.
11,2 (Comm.)). See also Kusum. Comm. 1,11: the Mlmamsaka be­
lieves in a particular power (£akti), such as ensures that only 
rice is produced from rice-seed, and also that ploughing in a 
certain month (owing to a "£akti“ or capacity in the ground) 
produces a good crop several months later. The Haiyayika replies 
that it is the qualities of the various atoms which produce 
distinctions.
The seed and the shoot are mutually dependent; and so also 
creation is twofold: "There can be no subtle body without the 
conditions for it; nor can there be a fulfilment of the con­
ditions without a subtle body" (na vina bhavair llngam na vina 
lingena bhavanirvyttlh) (Sankhyakarika 52). The mark of buddhi 
is adhyavasaya, "mental effort, determination"; this quality 
is latent in buddhi, as the shoot is latent in the seed (Sankhyak 
Comm. 23); and the effects of karma are ready to take a man to
the next world, "like a seed about to sprout" (B^h. Up. Comm. 
4,3,9).
Turning to metaphysics and psychology, we find the example
of the seed and shoot quoted against the ep exponent of the 
recognltive system: "If the divine nature is essential to
the soul, there can be no occasion to seek for this "recogni­
tion"; for if all requisites are supplied, the seed does not 
fail to germinate because it is unrecognised." In the reply, 
a distinction is drawn between "external" and "internal" act­
ivity; the first is illustrated by the seed and the shoot it 
produces, and the second by the intuition of the nature of the 
self, which determines happiness. For the purely mechanical 
function, no "recognition" is necessary; but for the unification 
of individual and impersonal Soul, a recognition of the nature 
of the soul is essential (Sarv. VIII, p. 79)•
A slightly different angle on the nature of cause and effect
is found in the Hyayabindul^Ika. Here it is the logical point
of view which is expressed. The shoot is the effect caused by
the seed, but it is not capable of cognising its cause. In
cognition, on the other hana, the product: (= the cognition)
cognises the sense-object which is its cause (see NBT I, p. 18).
The seed, even if we do not perceive it, is capable of producing 
a shoot. But smoke, the logical mark (linga) of fire, will not 
produce the cognition of the presence of fire, if we do not
perceive it (See NBT II, p. 22).
The seeming miracle of the production of a huge tree from 
a tiny seed could not fail to engross the philosophers* attention 
Vacaspatl (on Yogasutras 11,19) says: "Nyagrodha seeds are cer-
tainly not capable of giving rise at once to the full-grown, 
dense Nyagrodha tree, which is able to protect people from 
the heat of the sun.. The tree only developes gradually through 
the successive appearance of shoots, leaves, and branches."
In the same way there is a set order of development for every 
evolvent of Prakyti. The eternal fig-tree (a£vattha) with 
root above and branches below (each root being continuous 
with its own branch) is a symbol for samsara. Its root is the 
highest, for the tree extends from Brahman down to the immove­
able (Katha Up. VI,1; Maitrl Up. 6,7; and cf. Chand Up. 6,12). 
Those who are not fit for liberation (lit. svarga, "heaven") 
cling to a meagre bush, though a large banyan tree is before 
them (Maitri U^.7,8).
There is an interesting discussion on possible changes of 
letters (in sandhi), Nyayasutras II, 105 et seq. The Naiyayika 
says that letters are not changeable, (e.g. from i or I to y 
in sandhi), for by reason of increase in the original, there 
would be increase in the product. "Tftls is not true", replies 
the advocate of change (Sankhya); "for modifications may be 
smaller, equal, or larger in comparison with the original material 
For example, the thread formed from cotton is smaller in bulk 
than the raw cotton; or a cocoanut tree, smaller than a banyan- 
tree, is produced from a cocoanut, which is larger than the 
banyan-seed. The Naiyayika, in disposing of this objection, 
replies: "I referred to the discrepancy between the products
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whose original matter was unequal (i.e. the x resulting from 
combination of short JL with another letter would be less in 
bulk than the x  resulting from combination with long I ) ;  the 
example of the tree and the seed is not in point, and is a 
metaphorical fallacy (upacaracchala)• Accordingly I uphold 
the theory of substitution, not of change*11 (The discussion 
is continued with the illustrations of gold, milk and curds, 
etc., for which see above, p. 84, etc.). (See also below, p. 286).
As the existence of seeds is inferred from the appearance 
of blades of grass shooting up in the rainy season, so it is 
inferred that he who falls into a state of ecstasy when hearing 
of the path of liberation, has acquired a store of Karma tending 
to liberation (Vyasa on Yogasutras IV,25)*
It is only natural that, in a land of predominantly luxuriant 
tropical vegetation, there should have been an extensive metaphor! 
cal application of the biological processes of growth and decay. 
Sankhya and Vedanta alike counsel the uprofcting of the "tree 
of relative existence", which has karma as its seed, and ignorance 
as the field in which it grows (see e.g. Byh. Up. Comm. 1,4,7; 
Sankhyakarika Comm. 67). SankhyatattvakaumudI 67 expands this 
metaphor: "When the field of buddhi is watered with the water 
of the kle£as (afflictions), then the seeds of karma send 
forth their shoots; but how can they do so when they fall 
upon a barren waste, from which all the water has been absorbed 
by the fire of right knowledge?" Normally it is eeed
the seed itself which is represented as having its germinating 
power destroyed by fire: e.g. Sarv. XV, p. 143s "This foremost 
of men (the enlightened Yogin) finds that the seeds of the 
kle£as, like burnt rice-grains, are bereft of the power to 
germinate, and they perish together with the mind (manas)11 
(See also Vyasa and Vacaspati on Yogasutras 1,1; 11,2; 11,4; 
11,10,11,13; 11,26; 111,49; 111,54; IV,27). We find the same 
illustration in the Syadvadamanjari, p. 170, St. XXIX: "Just 
as the shoot cannot grow when the seed has been burnt, so the 
shoot of existence cannot grow when the seed of karma has been 
burnt." In much the same connection there is mention of seeds 
spoilt by contact with oil (Vedantakalpataru p. 545, 1. 17); 
or eaten by a mouse (Bauddha chapter of Sarv., p. 9, at the 
close of the passage already referred to (above, p. ):"Qn 
the second alternative {i.e. if a supplementation is taken on) 
the expectation of its permanency is as reasonable as expecting 
seed eaten by a mouse to germinate" (See also "Reality of 
Fiction".)
In the Yoga system, trances may be divided into sablja 
and nirblja (with and without seeds). The "seedless" is that 
which has no object for its basis (corresponding to the nir- 
vikalpa-samadhi of the Vedantin) (Yogasutras, passim). As an 
alternative explanation, Vacaspatimi^ra suggests that the seed 
consists of the abode (aSaya) of afflictions and actions (kle£a 
and karma), and when these have vanished, the trance is "seed­
less" (Yogasutras 1,18).
At Nyayasutras IV 42 et seq., there is a discussion as to 
whether the fruit of good and evil deeds can ripen a long while 
after the deeds are committed. The Naiyayika points to the 
example of the tree, which bears fruit many years after the 
seed was planted. But the (materialist) opponent retorts that 
in that case the substratum is the same, but it is not so in 
the case of fruit (of actions) in a subsequent life (i.e. he 
does not believe in a continuant soul).
The relation of the particular to the general comes in 
for its share of notice: e.g. Kusum. V,£: "A particular effect 
has a particular cause". The Commentary explains: "Nor may you 
say that the effort of the experiencer (bhoktr) is the cause 
only in (individual) action (cesta), and not in action generally 
(kriya-samanya)because even though a particular kind of 
effort may be the cause in the case of (individual) action, this 
does not preclude volition generally as the cause of action 
generally; otherwise, because a particular seed is the cause of 
a particular shoot, it would follow that seeds in general (i.e. 
the class, seed) could not be the causes of shoots in general." 
Put more simply, this seems to mean that the relation of cause 
and effect exists between the general classes (genera) as well 
as between the particular representatives of the species.
On p. 107 of Sar/. (C.iap. XII) we find the following 
passage: "Wrong knowledge (as well as right knowledge) is a 
particular kind of knowledge, and the totality of the Universal
enters into the totality of the particulars, just as the totality 
"tree" enters into any particular tree, as e.g. the £in)£apa; 
(otherwise we might suppose that the particular had no instru­
mental cause at all)." (SamagrI = totality, materials, effects).
As the genus "tree** can be conveniently subdivided, it 
features frequently in* syllogisms, e.g. "This is a tree, because 
it is a ^iip^apa11, or "there are no trees here, because there 
sire no £im£apa trees'.’ In the latter case, we are told to imagine 
two adjoining hills, the one covered by forest, the other con­
sisting of bare rock alone. We cannot say that there are no 
£lip£apa trees on the wooded hill, as we are not near enough to 
distinguish them; but in the case of the bare rock we can pro­
nounce a definite judgment. (Nyayabindutlka II, pp, 36-7. See 
also p. 44 ibid.)
At a distance, when we see a tree, we cannot say definite­
ly "it is ax £im£apa tree"; but we can say "it is a tree". When 
we are nearer, we say "it is a tree, and it is also a £im£apa"
The notion "tree" and the notion "£lm£apa"differ only by reason 
of the differences in exclusion (vyav^tti-bhedena) (i.e. when 
we think of "£imi5apa" we mentally exclude banyans, figtrees, 
etc.; when we think of "tree" as such we mentally exclude rivers, 
mountains, etc.) (NBT III,p. 53.) In Chapter II of Sarv. (p. 6) 
it is likewise stated that there is an invariable concomitance 
expressed by "A gim£apa is a tree",- if a 6im£apa were to lose 
its tree-nature it would lose its own self (for there is a
relation of samanadhikarapya between them). (A tree on a 
mountain in the distance is an example of anupalabdhi,- see 
Chapter I above. For the perception of a "moving tree", see 
Chap. I, sind also "Reality of Fiction").
We come to the well-known Vedanta simile of the forest 
and the trees. As trees considered as an aggregate Eire denoted 
as one, viz. the forest, or water is collectively called a 
lake, so also ignorance, existing in individual souls (jlvas), 
and being diversely manifested, is collectively represented as 
one. Conversely, as a forest, from the standpoint of the units 
that compose it, may be designated “a number of tliees", and as 
a lake from the same point of view may be spoken of as quantities 
of water, so also ignorance when denoting separate units is 
spoken of as many* And as the ether limited/favacchirma) by 
the forest is identical with the ether limitecT'^by^the trees,
(or as the ether reflected in the water is identical with the 
ether reflected in the lake), so I^vara and Prajna associated 
with the individual and aggregate Ignorance are identical.
Lastly, like the unlimited (anupahita- not assocxiated with an 
upadhi) ether which is the substratum (or support: adhara) of 
the ether limited by the forest and the trees, or ih of the ether 
(= sky) reflected in the water and the lake, there is an un­
limited Qonsciousness (caitanya) which is the substratum of the 
aggregate and the individual ignorance as well as of the con­
sciousness (IiSvara and Prajna) associated with them, This is
called "Turlya"• (The same simile is also applied to the 
subtle and gross bodies (suksma- and sthula-£arlra), according 
as they are regarded as an aggregate or as separate entities).
The sum total of the gross, subtle and causal (karana) 
worlds makes a huge universe (prapanca), as the sum total of 
smaller forests makes a large forest, or as a collection of 
smaller lakes makes a vast expanse of water. Consciousness 
associated (upahita) with this (universe), from VaiSvanara to 
IiSvara is also one and the same, as the ether limited by a number 
of smaller forests is the same as that limited by the large 
forest of which they form part, or as the sky reflected in 
different smaller lakes is the same as that reflected inthe 
vast expanse of water which they form (Vedantasara 36,40,47-9, 
90,96, 116, 118-9. For ether and all-pervasiveness, connected 
with trees etc., see Nyayabindu^Ika III, p. 86).
The relation between forest and trees has been referred 
to above (p. \3>l ) in a discussion on the nature of atoms. Vacas- 
pati (Yogasutras 1,43) uses this example, too: "The notion of 
a wood as a single whole comes into the mind, because the inter­
vals between the trees are not perceived, although they exist.
The theery, therefore, which speaks of the atoms as being 
visible and gross in themselves and as having no intervals, is 
false." Elsewhere, it is said that a group is of two descriptions 
The first is that in which the distinction of individuals dis­
appears in the whole, e.g. the body, tree, herd, or forest. The
second is where there is a distinction between different in­
dividuals of the same group, as in the case of a group of both 
gods and men.. The homogeneous group may be further subdivided 
according as its parts are self-contained entities, as e.g. a 
forest, or dependent on other parts, as in the case of a tree, 
a body or an atom. (Vyasa and Vacaspati on Yogasutras 111,44).
We find the "group" idea in connection with the Mlmaijsa 
tenet of eternity of sound, e.g. in Sarv. XIII, when the power 
of x "sphota" is under discussion: the opponent holds that it 
cannot be the single letters which convey the meaning of a word, 
for a collection of separate letters, without any one pervading 
cause, cauld never convey an idea, any more than a collection 
of separate flowers could format a garland without a thread to 
unite them. Nor can it be the aggregate of letters which is 
efficacious, because the letters are separate and successive, 
inlike a group, e.g. of different kinds of trees (dhava, fchadira 
and palala), or af an elephant, a man and a horse, seen together 
in one place. Another biological figure is employed in the reply 
to this accusation: "The seed is implxanted by the sounds, and 
when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition (avrtti), 
the word is understood simultaneously with the last uttered 
letter"(Sarv. pp. 115-6).
Let us glance ohce again at the Nyaya view of the relation 
of parts and whole. (Nyayasutras 11,28 et seq.). Someone may 
say that perception is nothing but inference, for when we see
e.g. a tree, we only see a part of it and Infer the existence 
of the rest. The Naiyayika replies (S^tra 30) that in every 
perception of a part there is also the perception of the (in­
visible) whole which is made up of the parts (and yet teas a 
separate existence). An opponent objects (vytti on Sutra 31) 
that there cannot be such a thing as a whole,- merely a con­
glomeration of parts,- for we see contradictory characteristics,
.
e.g. shaking (in one part of a tree, and not in another), (or 
redness in one part of a cloth and not in another). The Naiyayikai 
reply (Sutra 32) is that if there were no such thing as a whole 
(apart from the parts), everything would be imperceptible, for
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bulk (mahattva) does not appertain to atoms.
The Nyayabindu (and TIka) contains several references to 
the Jain theory of universal animation. One of the Jain syllog­
isms is: "Trees are sentient beings, because they ee sleep"
(i.e. close their leaves at night) (NBT II, p. 23). But the 
Buddhist points out that this syllogism is not of universal 
application, for all trees do not close their leaves at night. 
Another deduction is "Trees are animate beings, because they 
die when deprived of their bark". The Buddhist does not accept 
this statement, for he defines death as characterised by an ex­
tinction of sensations and sense-organs (vijnana-indriya-ayur- 
nirodha) ; and this kind of death cannot take place in trees.
The Jain credits plants with a single sense, the sense of touch, 
and maintains that death in plants does not differ materially
from death in human beings; but the Buddhist argues that death 
from exsiccation (£osa) cannot be taken as a proof of the 
previous existence of consciousness* He asserts, therefore, 
that this syllogism has an unreal reason (hetu) (NBT III, p. 67)* 
(But on the other hand it should be remembered that it x was 
a particularly Buddhistic belief that trees were inhabited by 
spirits- cf. "ystksa in banyan tree"). (See above, p#vo«|, where 
the capacity of a tree for repairing itself is quoted as a 
proof for the existence of a soul).
The Vedantic view of the all-pervading Soul provides a 
variation on this theme* For example, Ch* UP* 6,11: !lIf one 
were to strike at the root of a large tree, it would bleed, 
yet still live. Likewise, if one struck in the middle, it would 
bleed, yet still x live; and also if one struck at the top.
Being pervaded by the life force, it would stand there, drinking 
in moisture, and rejoicing. But if the life principle leaves 
one single bi^i^ch, then that branch withers. It leaves a 
second, a third: they wither. Then life leaves the whole, and
the whole tree withers. Only when abandoned by life (Soul), 
does it die. The life force itself (= Soul) does not die.1
As a complement to the above, there is a passage in the 
Brh. Up. (3>9,28) in which the certainty of the rebirth of man 
is deduced from his likeness to a tree: uAs is a tree, the lord 
of the forest, so verily is a man. His hairs are its leaves, his 
skin its outer bark. When he is wounded, blood flows from his
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skin, as sap from the bark. His flesh is its inner bark, and 
his sinew its innermost layer of bark. H^s bones lie beneath, 
as does the wood, and his marrow is comparable to the pith.
If a tree, after being felled, springs anew from its root, from 
what root does man spring forth after he is cut off by death?
Knowledge, bliss andBrahman comprise the root of the universe,
/
from which man springs forth anew". (Cf. Ka. Up. 1,6: "a mortal 
decays like grain, and like grain is born again"). (for further 
references to trees, see e.g. Sarv. V, p. 56; Mupd. Up. 1,1,7; 
Svet. Up. 3#9; 6,6. The Khadira and the Palana, see "Reality of 
Fiction"; similar is the "rice and thejSyamaka grain"- two 
separate entities^-.Nyayavartika p. 46).
When the body becomes emaciated and decay sets in, then the 
soul detaches itself from the parts of the body (afiga)a as a 
mango, or a fig, or a peepul fruit is detached from its stalk,- 
and betakes itself to another body, for the continuance of the 
vfcital force (pra^ayaiva) (B^h. Up. 4,3*36). Sankara is so 
convinced of the truth of his beliefs that he says "when both 
scriptural evidence and argument start to demonstrate the unity 
of the Self, they can show it as clearly as a bilva fruit on 
the palm of one’s hand" (Introduction to Brh. Up. 3,1,1} cf. also 
Ch. Up. 7f3,l£# This simile is also applied to the vision of 
(future) things on the part of a Yogin- NBT I, p. 1 5 , though 
here the fruit is a myrobalan (amalaka). See also Sarv. IX, p. 
80).
The analogy of two fruits attached to one stalk is used by 
writers on Alarakara to illustrate a particular kind of parono­
masia,- the combining of two meanings in one word. In the 
opinion of some philosophers, the production 4e of sound is 
to be compared to the simultaneous bursting forth of the buds 
of the Kadamba tree (see Bhasapariccheda verse 166) (while the
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more usual simile is that of^ave&-undulation (vlcitaraflga)) •
All the philosophers were pleased to fancy their doctrinal
expositions as "garlands of flowers" (e.g. Syadv. p. 179, St.
XXXII; Kusumanjali (a title suggestive of this idea) 1,1 and
V,19). The last reference contains a £lesa: "What does it matter
whether this handful of flowers of moral philosophy, of flaming
beauty, perfumes the right and left hand or not (or, "the sa-
paksa and vlkpaksa of my argument")?"; while the former (1,1)
bristles with double meanings, (see also Sarv. I, p. 1: "Who is
not delighted with a garland of many various flowers?" (= the
different philosophical systems) ^ /A^garla^S7 of flowers is
/v
classed with sandal-wood and lovely women, as being illustrative 
of fleeting pleasures, which distract one fromHfc striving after 
liberation (e.g. Sarv. XV, p. 133; Vedantasara O  , etc.)
Sankara (Brh. Up. 2,3,6) pokes fun at his rivals{ #rong 
notions of the nature of the self. Having referred to the 
principal rival schools, he continues: "Some self-styled follow­
ers of the Upanisads (i.e. the followers of Bhartrprapanca) 
divide the universe into three: 1) the gross and subtle elements;
2) the Supreme Self, and (3) the sum total of one’s meditations, 
actions and previous experience, together with the individual 
self which is x the agent and experiencer.•.• They also estab­
lish a connection with the logicians by stating that the actions 
etc* abide in the subtle body (linga^arlra)• Then, afraid that 
this is too much like Sankhya, they conform also to the Vai^esika 
view by saying that Just as odour, which abides in flowers, can 
be conserved in oil through bailing, even when the flowers are 
gone, so even when the subtle body is gone, all actions etc* 
are conserved in a portion of the Supreme Self". There is 
another reference to this simile in the Commentary on ibid* 
4,3,22, where Sankara points out that it is inappropriate to 
the topic.
Flowers feature again in a discussion on the nature of the 
soul, Syadv. St. IX, p. 49. xhe Jain says that Atman is “madhya- 
ma-parlmanal, adjusting itself it to its medium, or the body in 
which it dwells. This, he says, is borne out by our conscious- 
nessJfc for we are not conscious of ourselves as either infinitely 
vast or as infinitely small, but as co-exifcnsive with our body.
If the case of a flower, which emits its fragrance beyond itself, 
is quoted, this is no exception; for it is minute particles of 
odonous substance (gandha-pudgala) that go out to the nose (and
then return to the flower) (this approximates to the Vai^egika 
view,- cf. Upaskara on Vais. Sutras VIII, 1,4: contact with
odours of imperceptible dispersed particles of campaka flower or
camphor is due to substance) (For flowers which perfume a cloth, 
see above, p. IS ). Another point of view is expressed in 
Sankara^ Comm, on Badarayana Sutras 2,3,23: As a drop of sandal- 
oil, applied to one part of the body, produces a pleasing sensa­
tion throughout the whole body, so the Soul, though having its 
abode in one spot only, yet gives the impression of pervading 
the whole body.
The Jain sees no absurdity in the proposition, "Devadatta 
is living; he a is also dying". He says that "petals" (dalika) 
of life are falling from us all the while that we are living.
It may be argued that the word "death" ought only to be applied 
to the last stage of extinction, not to the whole period pre­
ceding the final decline. But this is wrong: the word "death" 
should apply to the whole process of the falling away of the 
petals of life, even before the last petal drops (Syadv. p. 106, 
St. XVI) (For jasmine blossoming afresh, see above, p.h+S').
Of particular flowers to be used in similes, by far the 
most popular is the lotus, to whose role in Alaipkara we have 
referred above (Chap. II). As India*s flower par excellence, 
it has a special symbolic and mystic significance (cf. connection 
with sun and moon), which we can observe from the fact that the 
heart, the vital internal organ, is referred to as a lotus.
For instance: "The state of lucidity (jyotismatT) is the light 
shining in the lotus of the heart. Let the mind be concentrated 
upon this lotus.. It has eight petals and is placed with its face
downwards. Its face has first to be turned upward, by the process
IS
of the expirative control of the breath.. In its stalk^the 
artery of Brahma (brahma-nadl) with its face upwards.." (Vacas- 
pati on Yogasutras 1,36. See also Vyasa on Yogasutras 111,34:
"In the lotus-like cavity, the temple h in the city of Brahma, 
the intelligence lives". Also e.g. Ch. Up. 8,1,1-2; Maitri Up.
6,1; also e.g. Brh. Up. Comm. 4,3#7; 4,4,1; 4,4,22).
There is a curious argument for the metempsychosis doctrine 
in Vacaspati's gloss on Yogasutras IV,10. The laughter or tears 
of a newly-born baby are taken as evidence of memory of the 
pleasure or pain it has experienced in a former existence. If one 
should say that such laughter or tears can be taken to be natural, 
like the buddhng and blowing of a lotus, the answer is that even 
this is not inherent, otherwise it would not stand in need of 
another cause for its manifestation. The contributory (agantUKa) 
cause of the opening of a lotus flower is the contact with the 
rays of the sun. Similarly the happiness of a baby, which is in­
ferred from smiles, should also be considered as a proof of a 
previous life. (Cf. also Nyayasutras 111,18).
The Yoga school holds that the Soul is infinitely vast: 
"Everything which possesses the quality of being larger or 
smaller, has a limit bejiond which it cannot go, as is the case
with the lotus, the emblic myrobalan, and the bilva tree. The 
quality of largeness exists in these to a greater or less extent. 
But in the Self the largeness is such that there is no greater
largeness"(Vacaspati on Y0gasutras 1,25. Cf. Ch. Up. 3,14,3:
"This my self within the heart., (is greater than the great, 
and smaller than the small)".
Impressions received by the mind may resemble a white lotus 
(probably = calm, pure thoughts) (Brh. Up. 2,3,6).
The follower of the Vai^esika system objects to the Jain 
theory of body-sized Atman, saying that if it were true, mutilation 
of the body would involve mutilation of the soul. "Agreed," 
says the Jain* "Do you not see that when a limb is cut off, it 
continues to throb with life? If you ask, fHow do the parts 
unite again?1 I say that they were never absolutely separated, 
in the manner in which a lotus-fibre (tantu) is separated from 
the stalk. It is only a temporary severance, and reunion may be 
brought about by fate (a£rfeta) (Syadv. p. 54, St. IX).
The Mlmaipsaka holds that knowledge (jnana) cannot be self­
revealed; there must be a jnana of the jnana, and so on in
succession. The Jain replies that there is no proof that the 
jnana and the jnana of the Jnana arise one after the other. It 
may be argued that they do arise one after the other, but that 
the succession is so quick that we do not perceive it. For instance, 
when we run a needle through a pile of one hundred lotus-leaves, 
it seems as if we have pierced them all simultaneously, whereas 
actually they have been pierced consecutively. The Jain replies 
that between the first and the second jnana must come the "jijnaja" 
of the jnina- the desire to know the knowledge (so that in any
case one cannot say that the one immediately follows the other.
And the very fact that a jijnasa must precede a jnana, proves 
that jnana does not depend upon another jnana, but is actually 
self-revealing (Syadv. p. 76, St. XII).
The (liberated) soul is supposed to be as undefiled as
the leaf of a lotus, from which impurities roll off like water 
(Sarv. XV, p. 125; Chand. Up. 4,14,3; Maitri Up. 3,2, etc.) (For 
the "lotus in the sky", see "Reality of Fiction").
Let us close this section with a few miscellaneous plant- 
similes. According to the Jains, the soul, when freed from the 
bonds of karma, rises upward, just as a gourd (alabu) rises in 
the water, when the clay which encased it is washed off. (See
"Reality of Fiction" for gourds sinking and stones floating).
Symbols
Alternative s-irollas are the elastic seed of the castor-oll plant, 
or the natural upward tendency of a flame. (Sarv. Ill, p. 33).
The aupa^amika state df the soul arises when all the effects of 
past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise,- as when 
water becomes pure through the mud sinking to the bottom by the 
influence of the clearing nut-plant (kataka) (Sarv. Ill, p. 28).
The Vedantln explains that during the waking state the 
Self, being (falsely) identified with the organs etc., cannot 
be shown as separate from them, as a stalk of grass is extricated 
from its sheath. It is for this reason that the world superimposes 
all activities peculiar to name and xx form on the self, and the 
self on those activities (Brh. Up. Comm. 4,3*7). (Cf. also Katha
Uf
Up. VI,17).
The Sahkhy a-Y oga tenet of parinama Is Illustrated by the 
condition of barley-grain which has been kept in a granary for 
a number of years, and has at last been reduced to a state of 
disintegration, so that it falls apart at a touch. This cannot 
take place in the case of new grain, but is a result of gradual 
change of condition (avastha) (Vacaspati on Yogasutras 111,15).
For the "chaff" of doubts (£anka-tu§a), see Kusum. IV,6, Sarv. XI, 
p. 92; and s cf. Sarv, VII, p. 73, where mala (natural taint) 
is compared to the husk in rice)
The Vedantin is versatile in coining similes to illustrate 
the impermanence and illusory nature of the world. We find a 
heap of them in Byh. Up. Comm. 1,5,2, where it is said that the 
world resembles a flowing river or a burning lamp (in its transi­
ence), is lacking in fibre like a banana or plantain otalk, 
and comparable to foam, Illusion, a mirage, or a dream. We may 
add to these Jugglery, and a city of e&eurds clouds in the sky 
(Comm, on Katha Up. VI,1; and cf. Maitri Up. 4,2). U~>
The various Juiees of plants are supposed by the foil 
of the Sankhya school to be modifications of the water which falls 
to earth as rain. In reply to the question, "How can the single 
gunas manifest themselves in different forms?" he says, "through 
modification, like water. For just as the rain has only one 
flavour as it falls from the cloud, but alters its flavour accord­
ing to the kind of ground on which it falls, so that it takes on
ower
the flavour of the fruits of the cocoanut, the fan-palm, bilva, 
myrobalan, clrabllva, praclnamalaka and kapittha, becoming sweet, 
sour, bitter, pungent, or astringent; in the same way the three 
gunas are subject to modifications which model themselves upon 
their original (pradhana), and between them give rise to the 
entire visible world, in which people and objects differ according 
to the predominance of the different gujas (Sankhyakarika and 
STK, 16). Vacaspatimi£ra (gloss on Y 0gasutras 111,14) says that 
earth is possessed of five qualities (gandha, rasa, etc.), corres­
ponding to the five senses; while water possesses four, and so 
on. He continues: "A modification of all these is seen in the 
variety of all the forms of juice, etc., found in the roots, 
fruits, flowers, leaves, etc. of tree, creeper, cane-plant, etc. 
All these cannot be the modifications either of the ground or of 
the water different in nature from themselves.'1 (i.e. the existent 
comes from the existent and all is of the nature of all).
The follower of the Pur^iapraJna system says that as the 
juices of various trees differ, likewise the deity and the indiv­
idual soul (Sarv. V, p. 57. For the Juices unified in honey, see 
Chap. VI above).
Thorns are classed with snakes as causes of pain,- see e.g. 
Upaskara ofi Vai£. Sutras 1,1,4; X,l,l; X,l,6; and Vyasa on Yoga­
sutras 11,17- knowledge as the means of avoiding pain. The Naiya- 
yika points out that when a person absentmindedly traads on a 
thorn, the internal organ speedily draws his attention to this
occurrence. This proves that the contact of sense-organ and 
sense-object is the essential condition in perception (as one
can be conscious of sensation without paying attention) (Nyaya- 
sutras III, 100).
Cavilling and argument are permissible when one wishes to 
determine and protect the truth,- just as one shields seeds in 
a field by surrounding it with thorns and branches. (Nyayasutras 
IV,3).
Turning from the plants themselves to the means of carrying 
on agriculture, we may mention two references to the task of 
the husbandman. The first likens the preparation of the mind for 
a receptive attitude towards Influences leading to liberation, 
to the task of the husbandman (k^etrika), who does not actually 
lead the water with his own hands to the roots of plants, but 
simply removes the obstacles, so that the water may flow down from 
one field to another, and seep into the soil of its own accord 
(Vacaspati on Y0gasutras 11,18; Vyasa on ibid. IV,3. Cf. also the 
Vedanta theory of perception, below, p.x*i>3 , Chap. VIII). The 
other passage occurs in Chap. VI of barv. (p. 65), where it is 
stated that man's actions may sometimes be fruitful and sometimes 
fruitless, according as the creator furthers them or not. But 
this will not prevent men from performing works, for they will 
engage in them as the husbandman engages inha husbandry, though 
the crop be uncertain. The field and the "knower of the field" 
are common metaphors forVhe body and the soul: see e.g. Svet. Up.
5,3; 6,16; Maitri Upt 2,5; 5,2; Bhagavadgita XIII, 1-4*) •
An argument that will not hold water is likendd to a well 
dug in sandy soil, whose sides are liable to fall in (Brahmasutra- 
bhasya 2,2,32); or alternatively to a rotten pumpkin (kusmanda) 
(Sarv. IV, p. 49; and XII, p. 108). The maxim of the well-digger, 
used by Raghunatha, is applied as follows; "As the mud and dirt 
which falls down while a well is being dug, is washed away by the 
water, so the faults and stains of wrong knowledge are washed 
away by the realisation of non-duality". (See Jacob III, p. 24). 
Finally, the maxim of the laying-down of an irrigating canal is 
an example of one thing serving more than one purpose,- for the 
canal not only promotes vegetation, but also provides drinking- 
water.
Other references to vegetation will be met incidentally in 
other chapters: for example, see "Reality of Fiction" for the 
"crystal and the flower" (which makes it appear coloured); and 
see 6ah$ Chapter I (and also "Reality of Fiction") for "sweet 
sandal" as an example of alaukika-pratyaksa,- an out-of-the- 
ordinary perception.
Chapter VIII. The Blements (mahabhutani) and their role 
jLn^regard to_Upamiu
The remaining natural phenomena may be divided up among 
the five (sometimes four) "gross elements" of earth, water, 
fire, air and ether (pythvl-ap-teJo-anila-khani), each of 
which has a special relationship with one of the sense-organs. 
(See e.g. Nyayasutras 111,55)* Among the Carvakas, the four 
elements (ether being excluded) are the sole originators of 
mind and matter alike.
The element of earth has the characteristic quality of 
"odour" (gandha). It includes the earth itself, mountains, 
plains, stones and rocks, and also enters into the composition 
of bodies of all kinds, and precious stones (the latter being 
chiefly compounded of light or fide). In the account of 
creation, e.g. Byh. Up. 1,2,2, it is said that "that which 
was there like froth on the water was solidified and became 
this earth". Earth, then, is not the primary element, but it 
is the most accessible and tangible (though, curiously, it 
is "air" which is accorded the quality of "touch" (spar£a)). 
According to the Val3e§lka system, the first four elements 
are grouped together, as being composed of indivisible atoms; 
while ether is classed as an eternal substance, together with
time and space,and is accordingly in a different category
K
from the other elements, (whose atoms are eternal, but whose 
modifications are transitory). (See Vai^egika Sutras, passim;
and Tarkasangraha. The Jain theory is similar: earth (e.g.) 
is both permanent (nitya) and impermanent (anitya), as 
regards its atoms and modifications respectively.’ In the 
Jain classification of 11 immovable" (sthavara) souls, we 
find earth, water, fire, air, and trees; but a distinction 
is made between e.g. the dust of the road, which is simply 
"earth" (And inanimate), and a brick, which is an aggregated 
"body of earth", and as such may be inhabited by a soul 
(Sarv. Ill,p. 29).
The earth itself typifies material things as opposed 
to things spiritual, and must not be regarded as eternal 
(e.g. Vyasa on Yogasutras 11,5). When the all-embracing 
nature of the soul is being illustrated (Ch. Up. 3#14,3)» 
it is first said to be more minute than a grain of rice, or 
of barley, or of mustard, or of millet, or even^the kernel 
of a grain of millet. Then, widening out into the cosmos, 
it is said to be greater than the earth, greater than the 
sky, greater than these worlds.. Man's horizon must on no 
account be bounded by the limits of this earth.
The particular fold in the earth's crust which is known 
as a mountain is well-known in India, the land of the world's 
highest peaks. It is therefore small wonder that a mountain 
should often be referred to by the philosophers as a repre­
sentative of something unmistakable and obvious. For instance 
the Self cannot be pointed out like heaven or Mount Meru,
for it is the very Self of those who seek to point it out
(Byh. Up. Comm. 4,4,20). Elsewhere (Bph. Up. Comm. 2,4,12) 
Sankara opposes the cognition of mountains and the like th 
the cognition of the only true Reality: "There may he things 
in the relative world as big as the Himalayas, for instance, 
created by a dream or illusion, but they are not real (trans- 
cendentally)".
A critic of the validity of upama as a prama^ia says that 
it is never argued, on the ground of there being a very slight 
similarity, that a mustard-seed is like Mount Meru (Nyayasutras 
11,2 42)(Cf. Upaskara on Vai6. Sutras 4,1,2). We find mustard- 
seeds and mountains mentioned as examples of existent (and 
momentary) things on p. 10 of Sarv. (Chap. II)* A favourite 
syllogism for establishing the existence of a Supreme Being 
is "the mountains, seas, etc., must have had a maker, because 
they are effects, just like a Jar." And if the opponent argues 
in return that they cannot have had a maker, because they were 
not produced by a body (i.e. embodied being), (since no such 
person is visible), he is confounded by the fact that his 
syllogism seeks to prove too much ("since they were not pro­
duced" would have sufficed) (Sarv. XI, p. 97. See also Sarv. 
VII, pp. 67-8).
A legitimate inference (according to the Sankhya-Yoga 
school) is "the Vindhya mountain does not move, because it 
is not seen going from one place to another, like Caitra"
(Vyasa on Yogasutras 1,6-7). The Sahya and Vindhya mountains 
are examples of absolutely separate things (see above, Chap* 
III). The mountain is the abode of jewels,- see above,
Chap. IV, for Mount Rohana and its gems.
Being easily visible from a distance, the mountain is 
the stock stronghold of (suspected) fire, as evidenced by 
the syllogism f,The mountain has fire, because it has smoke"
(as we see the connection between smoke and fire in the kit­
chen)". The knower of Brahman does not provide a refuge for 
faults, just as deer and birds do not resort to a mountain 
that is on fire (MaitrS Up. 6,18).
The elevation of a mountain naturally suggests superior­
ity: "Having attained the illumination of wisdom, the wise 
man is no longer an object of compassion; he has compassion 
on others, as one upon a mountain looks down upon those in 
the plains." (Vyasa on Yogasutras 1,47). "acala1,1 the "immovable" 
mountain, and guha, mountain cave, have a religious signific­
ance: for instance, Brahman dwells in the heart, as in a 
cave (guha)^(uUjO x ?* wvd").
The stones and boulders that help to compose a mountain 
have a precarious existence, for when their support is removed, 
they roll down into oblivion. Similarly when the Y 0gin has 
attained liberation, buddhi and gupas disappear together 
(lit. "buddhi has done its duty. The gu^as recede intojtheir 
cause (sva^karape), and disappear together with it"), for 
they can no longer find a support, "like stones rolled down
from the edge of a hill-top1' (Vyasa on Yogasutra 11,27).
If a disputant presents a faulty case, objections will fall 
upon him "like a shower of stones" (Sarv. II, p.8)
But on the other hand, a stone is the embodiment of 
lifelessness and Impassivity (e.g. Maitr^ Up. 2,7s "inanimate 
and lifeless, like a stone"). When the (fallacious) syllogism 
"He is not free from passions, because he possesses the 
faculty of speech" is presented, an example by contrast is 
that if something has no passions, it cannot speak, as e.g. 
a stone. In this case, although both the attributes are absent 
in a piece of stone, this example cannot be taken to prove 
the proposition ("everyone who is free from passions does 
not speak") in its general application (Nyayabindu and £lka 
III, p. 96) (See "Reality of Fiction" for "a piece of stone 
does not produce a germ", also for "floating stones" and for 
the Y 0gin's supernatural power of entering a stone, etc.).
The impassivity of the stone also has its useful side, 
for it is a sign of strength. In the account of the conflict 
between gods and Asuras (Chand. Up. 1,2,7-8; and Bph. Up. 
1»3*7), the gods are represented as asking each organ of 
sense in turn to chant the Udgitha for them; and each organ 
the Asuras were able to smite with evil. But when it came 
to the turn of the vital force within the mouth, the Asuras 
once more attempted to strike with their evil, but this time 
they themselves were shattered, as a clod of earth is shattered
when striking against a solid stone or rock. Likewise 
anyone who wishes evil to one who knows this, is shattered,- 
for he who knows the secret of union with the vital fortfe 
is as a solid stone.
When the phrase "the Self in the midst of the organs"
(Bjh, Up, 4,3#7) is used, Sankara hastens to point out that the 
use of the locative case implies that the self is different 
from the organs, as e,g. "a rock in the midst of the trees" 
indicates only proximity, not identity.(Divested of the light 
of the Self, the organs are like wood or clods of earth (Bjh, 
Up, Comm, 4,4,18; cf, Kaug. Up, 2,14)), This is presumably 
said in order to refute the possible suggestion of a school 
of Carvakas, who identify the Self with the sense-organs 
(See Vedantasara 125),(But note that the locative case is 
often used in the sense of "submerging in", which implies 
identity,- e.g, in the case of the dharapls or tubular vessels
yJWvW aiu- iw Hm .
of the body,^a~t time~~of death)
A stone, being a portion of the element "earth", must 
have the quality of smell; but this is not directly cognisable, 
though it exists. Similarly, according to the Sarikhya, pra- 
dhana, primal matter, exists, though it cannot be cognised 
(Sankhyak. 15)* It is pointed out by Upaskara on Vai£. Sutras 
2,1,1; and i 4,1 »9; that smell Ijb perceptible in the ashes 
of a stone, though not in the stone itself.
Physics and metaphysics are comhined in a comparison
Wt
between atoms and moments of time, as follows: MWhen a piece 
of stone is divided up again and again, until it reaches a 
point beyond which it cannot go, it is said to have reached 
the limit of minuteness* The minute portion which then remains 
is called an atom. Similarly, the utmost limit of minuteness 
of time is a moment11 (which corresponds to the atom in space) 
(Vacaspatimi^ra on Yogasutras 111,52). Time is real and con­
crete in Indian thought (cf. astrology), but space is still 
better known, and space-notions underlies time-notions*
Another portion of ’’earth11, namely desert land, is 
referred to in two passages of the Brh. Up. Comm. Sankara 
first propounds the view of the followers of Bhartypaapahca, 
who say that, instead of the individual self being inseparable 
from the Supreme Self, there are actually three entities: 
one composed of the gross and subtle elements, one (the highest) 
being the SUpreme Self, and the third, intermediate tyjbween 
the two, consisting of the sum total of one*s b meditations, 
actions and previous experience, together with the individual 
self, the agent and experiences They go on to say that ig­
norance, though it springs from the Self, is not an attribute 
of it, Just as a desert does not affect the whole earth (2,3,6). 
In the other passage (3*2,13), it is stated that (according 
to Bhartyprapanca), a man is not liberated even though the 
grahas and atlgrahas (sense-organs and objects) hav and their 
causes have been uprotted, for he is separated from the Supreme
Self by Ignorance, the "desert on earth11, and remains In 
an Intermediate stage, from which he may be released through 
meditation on the Self. Sankara asks, "How can the dis­
embodied man, after his organs have been destroyed, attain 
the realisation of the Supreme Self through hearing, reflection 
and meditation?" His conclusion is that the followers of 
Bhartjprapanca cannot make out a convincing case for their 
"desert and earth" theory, for they are caught on the horns 
of a dilemma. (Cf. "rain on a saline barren waste", below, 
"Reality of Fiction"*)
There are other things which might justly be connected 
with the element of earth: jewels, minerals, or for that 
matter vegetation and the animals which live on the earth.
But these have for the most part been dealt with under other 
headings, and only certain baroad physical features are 
left for this chapter. With regard to the minerals, however, 
there is one important one common to both earth and water, 
namely salt; and this shall serve as a connecting link between 
these two elements. It is found in salt mines on earth, 
but it is soluble in water, and is abundantly present in the 
sea,- and it is the connection of salt with water which 
provides the philosophers, from Upanigadic times on, with one 
of their favourite similes.
At Chandogya 6,13, in the course of a detailed exposition 
of the nature of the Self, and of the world-renowned phrase,
"tat tvam asi" ("That art thou”), the pupil is instructed 
to place a lump of salt in water, and return on the morrow.
The following day he is told to seek for the salt,- and 
behold, it has vanished. He then sips from all parts of the 
water, and finds that the salt has pervaded it entirely. And 
so it remains. In like manner, says the teacher, the Truth 
(sat) pervades everything, yet the uninstructed cannot per­
ceive it.
This simile is in common use among Vedantic writers. It 
appears in almost the same form in Byh. Up. 2,4,12; "As a 
lump of s&lt ±x thrown into water dissolves into the water, 
and it is not possible to take it out, but from whichever 
part one takes (water), it tastes salt,- likewise this great, 
endless, unbounded reality is one mass of intelligence (vi- 
jnana-ghana)". (Cf. also Byh. Up. 4*5*13) Any differences 
which seem to exist between the individual and the Supreme 
Self are due to ignorance, for in reality there is nothing 
but the Supreme Self, homogeneous like a lump of salt. (See 
also ibid. Comm. 3*8,12; 4*3*21; 4,4,22; Vedantasara 198, 
and Maltrl Up. 6,35; 7,11).
In the Purpaprajna system, which teaches duality, the 
Mahonpanigad is quoted, to prove that "like fresh and salt 
water", et€., soul and the Lord (I£vara) are for ever different. 
(Sarv. V., p. 57).
The simile of the solution of salt in water also extends
to logic, for the discovery of a sea-water pool which tastes 
salt (in one part) leads to the conclusion that the rest of 
the water is also salt; and this is taken as an example of 
"£e§avat" inference, - the inference of the nature of the 
whole from knowledge of the part. (Randle gives a different 
interpretation of "iegavat", - see his "Indian Logic",Ch.III). 
In the Byhad. commentary (1,6,1), all sounds are declared to 
spring from Speech (Vac), like particles of salt springing 
from a salt rock; for they are all modifications of a single 
genus and Cf.ibrd.4,3,33. Likewise different animals thrown 
together into a salt mine approximate one to another, as their 
differences become obliterated (See above,p.70). Salt (borax 
salt?) is used for repairing gold (Ch^4*17*7 - see above,Ch.1V) 
Another illustration which dates from the Upani^ads, 
and which is more or less the monopoly of the Vedanta 
philosophy, is that of the rivers merging in the sea. For 
example in the Mun^Laka^s "As the rivers flowing into the ocean 
disappear, leaving name and Cu m  (namarupa), so he who knows, 
being released from name and form, is absorbed in the Heavenly 
Being, who is higher than the high (parat param)"(Mu$$. Up. 
3,2,8; a parallel passage is Pra^na Up. 6,5)# This image is 
worked out in greater detail at Chandogya Up.6,10, :l-2) "These 
rivers., flow, the Eastern towards the East, the Western 
towards the West. Coming from the sea, they flow into the sea. 
There the sea comes into being. As there they know not
" I  am this one", "l am that one", even so, indeed, all 
creatures here, though they have come from Being(Sat) (sc.and
will be absorbed into Being again), know not "We have come
... ^
from Being . (Cf.Comm on Brh.3*8,9, - the divine law which• a
causes some rivers to flow to the east, and others to the west.
The simile of rivers and the sea is worked out in 
several passages of the Byhad.O^.(text and commentary), and posal 
objections to it as illustrative of the unity of Brahman are 
posited and answered. At 2,4,11, - a key passage- all the 
sense- organs, mind, and the organs of action (karmendriya), 
are stated to be the goal of their special objection, as the 
ocean is the goal of all kinds of water. And through successive 
steps each object of action, together with its receiving organ 
(N.B.graha and atigraha) is merged in Pure Intelligence, and no 
limiting adjuncts remain, but onl^ r the Self is left, boundless 
like the ocean. Here and in the following verse (2,4,12), it 
is not oiily the rivers and such like bodies of water that are 
mentioned as becoming one with the ocean, but also the charact­
erising parts of the ocean itself, namely foam, bubbles,waves. 
We may sec a wave rise and fall, as it seems vainly to seek 
escape from the sea, but always and inexorably it is drawn back 
and made to sink its individuality in the whole; and so with 
foam and bubbles appearing now here, now there, but never 
marring the unity of the vast expanse of water. Similarly the 
elements, transformed into body, organs, and sense-objects have
their individuality destroyed or absorbed through the 
knowledge of Brahman. (See also comm on 3,2,11; 3,5,1)*
, H _Vouju---
4,3,33; 3,7,2 whose external forms, like the
waves of an ocean, are the 49 maruts").
Some, having a limited comprehension of the Vedanta 
ideals, say that the Internal Ruler is the slightly agitated 
state of the ocean of Supreme Brahman, the Immutable, while 
the individual self, which does not know that internal ruler
(= the iSvara) is the extremely agitated state of that ocean.
or
(Byh.Comm.3,8.12). The followers of Bhartyprapaftca, too, 
contend that the example of the ocean and its parts does not 
illustrate unity, but both unity and plurality.^See also 
^Byh.Up.Comm.5,11)•
We are forcibly struck by the way in which similes may 
be turned and twisted until the real issue is obscured. In 
the earlier passages of the Byhad., cited above, the imagery 
of the ocean and its parts seems perfectly suited to illustrate 
the unity of Brahman; and yet a little father on (Byhyp.5,1.1) 
this very simile is seized upon by an opponent, and condemned 
as "inappropriate11 by the orthodox VedantinI And the example
of the rivers and the sea is taken to represent simple duality
in the Purnaprajna system (Sarv.V.p.57); Mahopanigad): "Like
rivers and the sea..., so are Soul and the Lord for ever
different." That is the whole fault of metaphors and similes: 
one, or perhaps two or three, characteristics of a thing are 
taken and transferred to something else, like and yet not like;
and the opponent forthwith picks on the other characteristics 
which have been ignored,- quite rightly for the purpose,- 
and proceeds to demolish the entire theory, hoisting its 
advocate with his own petard. Nevertheless, the Indian 
philosopher, refusing to be divorced from the concrete, con­
tinues to seek m ever better and more fitting similes, which 
alone can drive home his (otherwise) abstract and abstruse 
theories.
Elsewhere (Brh. Up. Comm. 2,4,10) Sankara admits that
when the limiting adjuncts of the Supreme Self, "name and
form", or individuality, are differentiated, that is separated
from their original source by ignorance, it is impossible
taxt for the uninitiated to tell whether they are identical
with or different from it, just as it is impossible to tell
whether the foam of water (regarded as an impurity) is a
part of the ocean, or is separate from it for the time being.
(See also Comm, on ibid. 1,4,7; 1,5,2; and see above, Chap.
VII, p.xu). The Maltr'lt Up. (6,35) has a similar thought:
"They (=the individual souls) who rise forth perpetually like
0|» •
the spray-drops.."; and cf. Aitareya Comm. 1,1 (p. 24, Snand.):
A
foam and water illustrate the difference and non-difference 
(bheda-abheda) of atman and world (jagat).
When the ascending ratio of Joys (ananda), starting 
with human enjoyment, and being multiplied a hundred times in 
geometrical progression until the unit of joy in the world of
Brahman (as Hirapyagarbha) is reached,—  has been elaborated, 
it is stated that the Joys of all the worlds are but particles 
of the supreme Joy of Brahman, at which mathematical cal­
culations cease; just as the drops of the ocean are innumerable 
infinite particles of a vast body of water (Byh. Up. Comm., 
4.3,33).
The symbolic use of the ocean extends beyond the relation 
of Atman and Brahman. Any great man may be called "ocean 
of compassion11 (karu$a, kypa), "ocean of knowledge", and 
the like; while as an epithet applied to a divine being,
"ocean of Joy" or "compassion", as the case may be, is of 
frequent occurrence (e.g. Kusum. V,18: "Though our minds 
have long been plunged in Thee, the ocean of Joy"). Anyone 
who is under the influence of delusion is said to be plunged 
in a sea of bewilderment or darkness, as for eiample (in 
the Yoga system) one who has an excess of the quality tamas 
(Sarv. XV, p. 131); whereas the mind concentrating itself upon 
the notion of "I am" becomes like a waveless ocean, calm,
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infinite, pure egoism^tasmita-matram) (Vyasa on Yogasutras 
1.36).
The most well-known of all the metaphorical "seas", and 
one that is common to the systems, with the exception of the 
materialists, is the "sea of saipsara" (cycle of existences), 
from which no unenlightened person can escape. There is a 
graphic description of the sufferings of one who is submerged 
in this sea, at Altareya Up. 1,2 (pp.35-6, Snand.), where
there is a fully elaborated description of the ocean of 
samsara- its waves, sharks (=death), wind, storms, shores, 
raft (=full knowledge, purna-Jnana), etc. This metaphor 
is a particular favourite with the Buddhists; and it has 
spread from the philosophical and religious texts into Kavya 
and other branches of literature,- perhaps chiefly because 
it offers such rich opportunities for punning (£legas) (e.g. 
graha = "shark" and "sense-organ") (Cf. the titles of various 
works, e.g. Katha-sarit-sagara, the ocean of streams of story).
The man who succeeds in crossing the ocean of samsara
(or in mastering any branch of knowledge) is known as "pira-
ga", one who has gone to the farther shore". It is the normal
term for a fully fledged student of the Veda, or (in Buddhism)
for an Arahant in his final existence (Pall"Paragu"). The 
very titles of the two great systems of Buddhisib, "Mahayana" 
and"Hlnayana" (great and lesser vehicles) indicate that they 
were intended to carry the devout across the sea of samsara.
The"farther shore" seems to have been more frequently that 
of a river than that of a sea: thus Svet. Up. 2,8: "A wise 
man with the Brahma-raft (u^Lupa) should cross over all the 
fear-bringing streams". Or Mup<JL. Up. 2,2,6: "Thus meditate 
upon the Atman as Cto. Good fortune to you in crossing to 
the farther shore beyond darkness!" (Cf. also ibid. 3,2,9; 
Maitri Up, 6,30; and Kau§. Up. 1,4#).
Most of the Uganigads contain references to Brahman as 
a boat, a raft, or bridge (or dam- setu), whereby one may
cross over ignorance and darkness (e.g. Maitri Up. 7,10;
Mun£. Up. 2,2,5; Svet. Up. 6,19; Mup$. Up. 1,2,7). There is 
a sustained metaphor at Maitri Up. 6,28, descriptive of 
the progress of a soul striving after the Supreme: "Hafcflmg 
sla$n the doorkeeper (ahajpkira- see above, Ch. IV),.. having 
crossed over with the raft of the syllable Oiji to the other 
side of the space in the heart, in the inner space which 
has been revealed one should enter the hall of Brahman". 
("Crossing over death"- see. ISa. Up. 14; MaitrT Up. 7,9).
The Bfh. Up. Comm. (2,5,15) has a plea for the orthodox 
method, of studying with a teacher: "Those alone who tread 
the pa?k shown by the Sruti and spiritual teachers, trans­
cend ignorance. They alone will succeed in crossing this 
unfathomable ocean of delusion, and not those others who 
follow the lead of their own clever intellect." A recognised 
guru or the founder of a system is said to have "gone to 
(or "seen to") the "farthest shore" of the ocean of logic, 
or whatever it may be (e.g. Sarv. p. 1).
Besides combining all beings and including all beings, 
the Supreme Self is conceived as having the function of 
separating the different worlds, by interposing itself between 
them like an embankment or dam (setu). From this angle, the 
sea is regarded as both combining and separating the terri­
tories which flank it,- and here the dam does not serve as a 
link, but rather as a greater barrier than the sea itself 
(Byh. Up. 4,4,22; Ch. Up. 8,4,1; Maitri Up 7,7; cf. also
>s;
Comm, on Byh. Up. 3*8,9)•
The relentless ebh and flow of the ocean- or river-
wave s may give rise to philsophising on the finality of
one’s actions: "Like the waves in great rivers, that which has
previously been done cannot be turned back. Like the ocean
tide, hard to keep back is the approach of death.11 (Maitri
Up. 4,2). The rhythmical ebb and flow has its counterpart 
Se*-\«6
in the/^aves of sound which travel to and from the organ of 
A
hearing (vlcl-taranga-ny aya, e.g. Bha§apariccheda, verses 
165,166).
We find a sustained metaphor describing the nature of 
the individual soul^at Svet. Up. 1,5s
"We understand him as a river of five streatns from five
sources, impetuou^^and crooked;
/
Whooe waves are the five vital breaths, whose original
source is fivefold perception (buddhi),
With five whirlpools, an'^impetuous flood of fivefold
misery,
Divided into five distresses, with five branches.” (or:
with fifty divisions-panca- 
X  sad-bhedam)
(Translation from Humefs ”13 principal Upanigads").
The individual soul may apprehend the Supreme Soul within
itself, like water in rivers (or oil in sesame seeds, butter
in cream, or fire in the h fire-sticks,- i.e. the one ia
bound up with the other) (Svet. 1,15). And the ceaseless
flowing of rivers provides an image for the sound-Brahman 
within the heart, which may be heard when the ears are 
closed (Maitri Up. 6,22). The falling of the (heavy tropical) 
rain is another simile at the same passage. Ska A flowing 
river, being transient and unstable, provides a symbol for 
the x evanescence of the relative universe (Byh. Up. Comm.
A continuous stream or current (pravaha or dharavaha) 
is used as a metaphor for a persistent state of mind, and 
the like. For instance, a syllogism is brought forward by 
the VaiSegikas to prove that the nine vi£ega-gunas of atman 
must cease to exist in the state of mokga. It is based on 
the hetu "santanatvat", i.e. "hecause they ajre streams" 
(Syadv. p. 38, St. VIII) (Cf. also the Buddhist "stream" 
(santana or santati) of consciousness). According to the 
exponent of Yoga, the "stream" (nadl or srotas) of mind 
flows both ways, towards good and towards evil. The stream 
of happiness flows down the plane of discriminative know­
ledge, towards perfect independence (kaivalya), while the
to rebirth (Vyasa on Yogasutras 1,12). See also Bhagya on 
Yogasutras 1,32- the "one-pointed mind". When the stream 
of buddhi is unhampered by the disturbing gupas, (rajas and 
tamas), and when Ignorance has been removed, the Yogin 
attains intellectual illumination, and is ready for release
1,5,2).
stream of sin flows down
(Vyasa on Yogasutras 1,47; and cf* 11,26)* The Vedantic 
conception of "antahkaraya-vytti", (the modification of 
the internal organ, which takes the form of the object 
perceived) is similar,- 11 (There is no variation of knowledge) 
in the case of a continuous stream of cognition" (Vedanta- 
paribhaga I)* Cf* the theory of perception, ibid.:antah- 
karana^ going out through the door of the eye or other sense- 
organ, takes the form of the object,- Just as the water 
of a lake issues through a hole (=drain-pipe) as a thin 
stream, and forthwith takes the form of the field it enters* 
The "stream of guyas" (guyaugha) which defiles the soul 
and carries it along in the wrong direction, is referred 
to at Maitri Up. 3,2.
A H/dwing river, being transient aj*d” unstable pror* 
vides a symbol for the evanescence ofy€he relative Universe 
Byh. /J/p* Comm. l,5*2jC See above for an account of the V d -  
Vedanta theories of reflection and apparent limitation, as 
illustrated by the examples of (a) a forest and its trees, 
and the space enclosed by them; and (b) a lake and its waters, 
and the skies reflected in them.
It is not to be wondered at that in a country like 
India which is dependent on the regularity of the monsoon, 
rain should be a variety of water that greatly engrossed the 
philosophers when they sought to illustrate their theories
with examples from daily life. THe Sankhya school points 
out that the unintelligent rain(water, jalay) acts forthe 
welfare of living creatures; likewise the unintelligent 
Prakyti may act for the liberation of the soul (Sarv.XIV, 
p. 123)* T^e rain falls on all places alike, without dis­
crimination as to whether there is need of water or not; in 
the same way the various rules of grammar are applied at once 
to many examples (Fayini chapter of Sarv. p. 112). At Brahma- 
sutrabhagya 2,3,42, Sankara affirms that Just as the rain 
causes the production of barley, rice, shrubs, etc., by its 
action on the seeds, so God, making use of man's previous act­
ions, impels him to either good or evil. Here, in contrast 
to the Sankhya view, the rain is not regarded as functioning 
spontaneously.
Althpugh the rain falls upon all places alike, yet its 
effect will differ according as it falls on barren or fertile 
ground (cp. the parable of the Sower and the Seeds). "As water 
rained upon rough (impassable, durga) ground runs (to waste) 
in different directions among the mountains, so he who sees 
qualities (dharma) separately, runs after them alone. As pure
water poured fortfyinto pure, is assimilated (and keeps its
/
original nature) so becomes the soul of the sage (muni) who 
has discriminative knowledge"( Ka^ha Up. IV.14-15). In the 
Sankhya view, the modifications fof the three guyas, and the 
degree in which they are present in different objects, may be
likened to the different flavours of the juices (from fruits) 
of various trees which are regarded as proceeding from the 
rain, as it alters its taste according to the ground on which 
it falls (Sankhyakarika 16), So the three gupas which proceed 
from one original source (pradhana) may yet assume various 
modifications, without any inconsistency. For the variety of 
all forms of juices (Yogasutras III.14) see ch.'ll, above 
and for rasa in poetry cp. ch.*^ , )•
An example for anupalabdhi (non-perception) owing to 
an intermixture of equal things (samana-abhiharat) is a num­
ber of rain-drops fallen from a cloud into a lake - for they 
cannot be separately recognised after being merged in the 
whole (Sankhya tat tvakaumudl 7 )*
We have noted in chapter II (above,p^) that the chief 
function of the cloud, as reflected in synonyms referring to 
it, is the pouring forth of water. A certain trance-condition 
in Yoga is the "cloud of virtue", dharma-megha, not because 
it obscures right action, but because it "pours forth showers 
of light upon all the virtues (or qualities, dharma) of 
things to be known” (Vfs gloss on Y.S. IV.31). T^e coming of 
the rain-clouds brings happiness to the world in general, but 
it also means activity for tillers of the field and sorrow 
for separated lovers, so on this analogy it is evident to the 
follower of Sankhya that the gunas, though each has its own
predominant characteristic, may share, in a lesser degree, 
each other1 s attributes (anyonyavyttaya£, S.Karikal2).
Tke Sankhya school places the inference of (future) 
rain from the observation of a heavy cloud in the class of 
purvavat inference, i.e. inference based upon former exper­
ience of the sequence of clouds and rain. (This would not be 
a valid inference for the Buddhists who hold that causes are 
not necessarily followed by their (usual) results). The Nai- 
yayikas too admit the validity of such an inference, but the 
Mlmamsaka seeks to bring it under the head of arthapatti, con­
jecture : "since the cloud is not in the same place as the-r&4* 
rain, this is not an instance of invariable concomitance 
(vyapti); therefore the case does not fall under the head of 
inference" (Nyayasutravytti, book II, 69 sq.). T^e Naiyayika 
replies that arthapatti must certainly be included under iiw 
ference, as there ij a vyapti between rain and cloud (rain 
must come from a cloud, though any cloud does not necessarily 
cause rain). The upholder of arthapatti replies to the object­
ion that rain does not always result when clouds are observed, 
by saying that when rain does not result, the arthapatti has 
served its purpose (Nyayasutras & jytti, II. 70 - 72). (Or : 
it is a legitimate conjecture to deduce the existence of 
clouds from the experience of rain; but not to conjecture 
that there will be rain, from having seen clouds).
Vq
We have had occasion to refer (above* pp«n>) to the 
threefold inference (applying to all three times) of rain 
from the state and activities of river* peacock and anta 
(Byayasutras II.35>36, and Sankhyatattvakaumudl 33)* T^e 
regularity of the rains is hinted at in Kusumafljali II.2 :
11 If you wish to prove that the days fcf the rainy season 
have been uninterruptedly preceded by similar rainy days, 
you must first have the condition (up'Sdhi) that they have 
been preceded by a certain period of the sunTs course limited 
by its entrance into certain sdgna of the Zodiac; and so 
here if you would prove that day and night must have been 
uninterruptedly prededed by day and night (i.e. that the mtua* 
mundane creation has no beginning and no end), then you must 
have as hhe an uninterrupted sajpsara of beings
(due to previous m karma ) 11 •
As an offset to its function of giving rain and there­
by causing fertility, the cloud has the negative property of 
obscuring the light of the sun, - and in this capacity pro­
vides an analogy for the darkness of ignofcance, hiding the 
light of knowledge. "Thus obstructions (avarapa) cloud the 
knowledge ard intuition (dar£ana), as a cloud obscures the 
sun, or a shade (virodhayaka-kumbha) the lamp11. (Jain ch. of 
Sarv. p. 31). In the Vedintic view, Just as a small patch 
of cloud obstructs the vision of an observer, and conceals
(for him) the sun which really extends ,!for many miles", 
similarly ignofcance, though limited by nature, is able 
to conceal the Self which is unlimited and not subject to 
saipsara (Vedantasara 52). The second stage of samadhi, 
trance absorption, is that in which the Saint contemplates 
the reality as though it were veiled by a thin cloud,while 
in the third and final stage it is clearly revealed (Nyaya- 
bindutlka I.p.15). According to the Jains, the mind is affect­
ed by dogas or taints of passion, etc., but the fact that 
these dogas may vary in power and number points to the fact 
that they may be eradicated altogether, on the analogy of a 
screen formed by clouds which (sometimes) cover the sun.
(Syadv. at. XVII, p. 120). The Atman in Vedanta is for ever 
untouched by such relative attributes as hunger and thitst, 
as the sky is untouched by impurities like clouds etc.
(Byhad. Up. Comm. 3»5»1)*
The Buddhist doctrine of kgapikatva (momentariness) 
is well illustrated byihe fleeting nature of clouds :"Whatever 
is, is momentary like a cloud and like (all) these existent 
things" (Sarv. II, p.10). Bwt an opponent, seeking to refute-4fc 
this dogma, says :"ln the example of the cloud, etc., was your 
"momentariness" proved by this same proof, or by some other?
It could not be the former, because your desired momentariness 
is so metimes^visible^^n the cloud, and therefore, as your 
example is not a proved fact, your supposed inference cannot
stand. Nor can it be the latter- because you might always 
prove fell your doctrine by this new proof (if you had it)..,f 
(Sarv. Ill, p. 21). Such a presentation of a x (seemingly 
insurmountable) dilemma was very much in vogue among the 
philosophers, as constituting an easy method of confusing 
an opponent during a saipvada.
A favourite simile, remarked on above (p . l v o )  is "like the 
drop of water on a lotus leaf",- usually applied to the im­
purities which do not affect the immortal soul. The example 
of the mirage in the desert, a common analogy for the futility 
of mundane existence, particularly among the Sankara Vedantins 
(who liken the relative universe to a mirage, which vanishes 
when the truth (i.e. Brahman) is known) will be discussed in 
Chap. IX.
The normal characteristics of water, notably its coldness 
are averred by the Carvakas to arise from its own nature, not 
from any external cause (i.e. God) (Sarv. I, p. 4 ). The sweet­
ness of (fresh) water is considered by some schools (not 
Vai£egika) to be an inherent quality, d4££ distinct from the 
function of the atoms composing the water (e.g. Vacaspati on 
Yogasutras 1,43).
It is the nature of water to flow downwards when pouted 
on to a higher level; but an embankment may be made to check 
its downward flow. 1^ the same way, the quality of sattva, 
which appertains to buddhi (intellect), is naturally pleasing
and luminous, and if unchecked, it tends towards discriminative 
knowledge; but it is often hindered by a predominance of 
rajas or tamas, which can only be removed by leading a blame­
less life, or by the practice of Yoga (V's gloss on Yogasutras 
11,28). When a farmer desires to lead water down from one 
bed to another, he simply removes the weeds and other obstacles, 
and allows the water to make its own way to the desired spot. 
Similarly, when vice, the obstacle to virtue, is pierced 
through, the creative causes making for advance are enabled 
to take effect (Vyasa on Yogasutras IV,3; see also 11,18, and 
above, Chap. VII, p.X\3). When no obstacles impede its flow, 
water is all-pervading; and 11 the divine organ of speech" like­
wise becomes all-pervading when ignorance and attachment dis­
appear (Byh. Up. Comm. 1,5#18).
Water has, of course, a cleansing effect (see e.g. Kusum. 
V,17)* But the agency of the clearing nut-plant is sometimes 
required to remove contaminating mud; and this simile is 
applied to the aupa£amlka state of the soul, when the effects 
of past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise (See 
above, Chap. & VII, p.Xio). The mixed (jni£ra) state is as when
N
the soul, like the water, is partly purestSarg. Ill,p. 28).
Another use of water is as an aid in certain handicrafts
Ss
such as pottery. Jars, for instance, are not produced spont­
aneously from their causes, but are helped into manifestation 
by water, etc, (Vacaspati on Yogasutras 111,14; and cf. ibid.
ov/
IV,3), This statement is by way of qualifying the theory 
of satkarya, viz., that effects are already latent in their 
causes*
The Mlmaipsaka, seeking to establish the existence of a 
special quality "capacity11 (Sakti), asks "How (otherwise than 
by admitting this quality) will you account for the liquidity 
of water being prevented in ice (or hail- karaka) et£.?" The 
Naiyiyika replies that there is no necessity to assume a 
separate capacity conducive to the production of ice; it is 
to be explained by a conjunction of water with special causes 
(e.g. cold atmosphere) (Kusum. Comm. 1,12). An inference to 
prove that the meanings of words in a sentence are invariably 
connected, would break down because of Involving too much 
(anaikanta), for it would have to apply to such phrases as 
"he sprinkles with water" (an impossibility in the case of 
water in the form of ice) (Kusum. 3,13). In the course of a 
mystical speculation (Bph. 6 ,2 ,1 6) Sankara says: "The liquids 
called faith which were offered in the fire x of heaven and 
took the form of the moon,- i.e. with which a new watery ]pody 
was built for the enjoyment of the ritualists in the moon,- 
melt on the expiration of the fruits of their past karma, like 
a lump of ice in the sunshine." In the text on which this is 
based, all the elements are linked together, in a description 
of the cycle of rebirth (See above, Chap. IV, p.Us). (See esp. 
Byh. Up. 6,2,9-14).
Water and fire are for ordinary purposes regarded as 
diametrically opposed. In the Nyayasutras (1,47, vytti), an 
example of a contradictory (viruddha) reason,- a reason 
invariably attended by the negation of what is to be established, 
is "This is fiery, because it is a lake (hrada)"; an^the lake 
is the normal vipakga in the syllogism "The mountain has fire 
because it has smoke". But in the account of creation it is 
said that fire rests on water (see e.g. Bph. Up. Comm. 1 ,2 ,2 ); 
while credence is attached to the myth of the fire in the ocean 
(va<Javagni) (see e.g. Svet. Up. 6,15)* Fire, indeed, is associ­
ated with fertility (in trees, in water, and cf. the digestive 
fire, which works with water). Moreover the Jain, true to his 
tenet that all things are related, avers that as water and fire, 
the two elements are opposed; but as substance (dravya) they 
are one (Syadv. p. 89, St. XIV).
As a connecting link between the aqueous and igneous 
elements, we may now deal with the reflection of the sun or 
moon in water. In the Vedanta philosophy, the comparison with 
such a reflection is considered to be the most satisfactory 
illustration for the "entrance" of the Supreme Self into the 
universe. Before the manifestation of the universe, the Self 
is not perceived, but it is later observed within the intellect, 
like the reflection of the sun, etc. in water (Bph. Up. Comm. 
1,4,7). And as the reflections of sun and moon vanish when 
their cause, the water, is removed; and only the sun and moon
themselves, the realities on which the reflections are based, 
remain, so in the end only the endless infinite Pure Intelligence 
remains, shorn of limiting adjuncts (ibid, 2,4,12-3). The 
same sun may be reflected in different sheets of water, giving 
the appearance of plurality, though actually the various re­
flections become merged in the orgiginal reality. In like manner 
all seeming differences in the universe and all that pertains 
to it are like reflections of the one Supreme Self, and have 
no existence apart from it. (Byh. Up. Comm. 1,4,7)*
Above (p.lov) we have discussed the reflection of conscious- 
ness in the mirror of buddhi, by which Puruga appears to be 
affected, though in reality remaining aloof. This happens in 
the same way as when the moon is reflected in pure water. It 
then appears to be transferred into the water, though actually 
it is s in no way dependent on the water for its existence, 
(vacaspati*s gloss on Yogasutras 11,20). Buddhi is predominantly 
of the nature of one or other of the three gupas; and when 
consciousness is reflected in it, the gupas in question appear 
to belong to consciousness (caitanya), just as the moon in 
the water appears to tremble on account of the unsteadiness 
of the water (Vacaspati on Yogasutras 111,35)* This is Just 
another example of the linking-together of all phenomena which 
is so markedly characteristic of Indian thought (See also 
Vacaspati on Y 0gasutras IV,22).
Although the reflection of the moon is not the real sub-
stantial moon, yet it has a certain reality from the very 
fact of its being perceptible (see below, ‘'Reality of Fiction"), 
and moreover it cannot be said that, because the reflection 
does not exist as a moon, therefore the real moon does not 
exist, -^ n the same way, because consciousness is reflected in 
buddhi, and appears to assume its characteristics, it does 
not follow that consciousness itself is non-existent. The mind 
is coloured (uparakta) both by the object of perception, and 
by the impartial Furu§a (See above, Chap. IV, p.\oH) (Vacaspati 
on Yogasutras IV,23) see also Byhb Up. Comm. 2,1,19 for a similar 
illustration inregard to the dream state).
A certain school of Buddhists (Y-ogaoara?.) contends that 
jnana (knowledge) is produced by artha (the object of knowledge), 
and that the jnana which is the effect cognises the artha which 
is its cause. In reply, the Jain says that such an idea is 
contrary to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, and inquires, 
"As regards your contention that jnana apprehends objects because 
it springs from objects, and because it possesses their form, 
we ask whether these two causes operate together or separately?..
If separately, the first moment of the potsherd (ftapala) would 
apprehend the last moment of the jar, because the one produces 
the other; and jalacandra (reflection of the moon in water) 
would apprehend nabhascandra (the moon in the sky), because the 
one bears the form of the other (tadakarata)" (Syadv. p. 108,St.16) 
The Vijnanavadln relies upon the following inference to
prove that Jnana and artha are not separates As the cognition 
(jnana) of an object is invariably found together with that 
object, therefore they must be identical, as for example an 
illusDDy moon has no separate existence apart from the real 
moon (See Sarv. II, pp. 13-14)* In^ bis case, the reference is 
not to a reflection of the moon, but to the actual perception 
of an illusory moon, owing to eye-dlsease (tlmira). (See also 
"Reality of Fiction", and Bjh. Up.. Comm. 1,4,10).
The simile of "the moon upon the bough" (£ikha-candra) 
illustrates an apparent connection between two objects which 
are not actually related (applied to certain aspects of Brahman, 
Taittirlyabhagyavartika 2,1,2321 cf. also Vivaranaprameyasarigraha, 
p. 202 (quoted by Jacob Vol. II,p. 45.)*
Strictly speaking, there is little of "fire" about the 
moon, but fire and light are connected, and the moon comes 
under the heading "fire" mainly because of its association with 
its co-illuminator, the sun, which represents one division of 
the triple Agni, as manifested on earth, in the atmosphere, 
and in the heavens (bhur, bhuvah, svar). The celestial fire 
is represented by the sun, moon, and planets; the atmospheric 
by the lightning, and the terrestrial by the fires on earth, 
in which we include that of the lamp. (See e.g. Maitri Up± 6,24: 
"the Brahman that is beyond darkness, that shines in yonder sun, 
also in the moon, in fire, in lightning.." The mindral fire 
(in gold and Jewels, etc.) has already been dealt with above.
Incidentally, it is perhaps worth remarking that the legendary 
connection of fire with water (vadava-agni,) probably originated
I***--/
with the observation of the flashes of lightning occurring in 
the midst of a rainstorm. This is borne out by the existence 
of a later Vedic triad, Sun, Indra, fire,- where Indra must 
represent the fire of the atmosphere, as connected with rain 
and thunder (cf. the theory of creation which emphasizes the 
generative power of water- e.g. Rigveda X,121).
The moon and its light (candra and candrika) typify two 
inseparably connected objects. This fancy is a favourite one 
in the Kavya literature. Moon-beams are proverbially pure, 
because of their white radiance: a Yogln is advised to con­
centrate upon the forms of moon, sun, n planets or precious 
stones in order to attain internal lucidity, a state in which 
he becomes inspired (Vyasa on Yogasutras 1,36). Gold and 
precious stones, though of the nature of light (taijasa), are 
not visible without the aid of external light, while the moon 
(like the lamp, which will be discussed below) is self-luminous. 
The fact of this difference between things which outwardly 
resemble each other is taken by the Jain to prove that it is 
impossible to assume a uniformity between things of one element 
(as the Vai£egikas do) (Syadv. p. 14, St. V).
Moonlight, being much less powerful than sunlight, helps 
to cause a different kind of perception from that which is 
possible in the daytime. Similarly, full knowledge of the unity
of the Self may he attained by divergent processes, as e.g. 
as a result of one’s actions in a past life, or through intense 
meditation and reflection (Brh. Up. Comm. 1,4*2). When the 
individual self is about to leave the body in which it abides, 
the sun appears as clear, shorn of its beams like the moon.
For the rays which had formerly come to aid the ’’being in the 
eye" now consider that their duty is x discharged, and come no 
more (Brh. Up. Comm. 5,5,2).
It is noteworthy that the moon is regarded as particularly 
associated with the mind, in contradistinction to the sun, which 
is connected with the eye (e.g. Brh. Up. 2,5*5; 2,5,7, etc.:
’’This moon is like honey to all beings.. The same with the 
shining, immortal being who is in this moon, and the shining, 
immortal being identified with the mind in the body.." (sun 
and eye at 2,5 ,5 ; see also ibid. 3 ,1 *4 ; 3*1 ,6 ; 1 ,3,1 4; 1 ,3 ,16; 
3*2,1 3; 4 ,1 ,6- the moon is the presiding deity of the manas
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(mind)". But cf. Bfh. Up. 1,5,4: "the mind is the sky"- here 
there is no mention of either moon or sun, and it may be a case 
of totum pro parte). At Pra£na Up. 1,5, it is said that the 
moon is substance, wealth (rayi), while the sun is the 1 ife-breath 
(prana). In another passage (Chand. Up. 6,6,5) we are told 
that the mind consists of food (because one who has not eaten 
cannot think clearly). Now the moon is conceived as the food 
of the pitys (its waning being accounted for by the diminution 
of the food supply). So it is not impossible that the association
of moon and mind may have some relation to the semi-mythological 
belief that the moon is the goal of the pityyana, the path 
traversed by ritualists. For the pityyana is the lower path, 
the way of those who pin their hopes on rites and on calculations, 
(and who have not divorced themselves entirely from mundane 
pleasures), as opposed to those who rely on meditation and 
revelation (the eye = truth = the sun). The x pale, cold light 
of the moon fades into insignificance beside the blaze of the 
noonday sun, beneath which nothing can remain unrevealed 
(pratyak§a, perception, and pratibha, revelation, inspiration, 
are most reliable).
Like all other material objects, the moon is impermanent; 
the taking of the non-eternal to be eternal is Mthe possession 
of such notions as that*, the firmament with the moon and the 
stars is permanent.." etc. (Vyasa on Yogasutras 11,5).
References to the moon*s waxing and waning, the bright and dark 
fortnights, etc., are more common in the secular than in the 
philosophical literature (But see Byh. Up. 3 , 1 , "Through 
identification with the moon one goes beyond the bright and 
dark fortnights, just as through identification with the sun
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onex goes beyond day and night"). We find a punning comparisonV~~^ 
with the inflxuence m  of the moon on the tides, at Syadv. 
p. 1, lines 5-8; "The sea of good thought is awakened into 
activity by the illustrious Hema-candra;"
The liability of both sun and moon to eclipse (in^Sanskrit;
"being swallowed by the demon Rahu") affords an analogy for 
the limitations to which the soul is subjects, and which it 
endeavours to overcome. E.g. "(the liberated soul)., shaking 
off the body, as the moon releases itself from the mouth of 
Rahu" (Chand.Up. 8,13,1); and Byh. Up. Comm. 4,3,7: "(It is 
hard to discriminate between the self and the intellect, for) 
the self is perceived as associated with the intellect, as the 
planet (or demon- graha) Rahu is t with the sun and the moon 
(when they are covered in eclixpse)".
Turning to logic, we find an example of a thesis contra­
dicted by conventional acceptation: "The word "hare-marked"
(£a£in) does not mean the moon" (Nyayabindu III, and Tlka, p. 6 3). 
Such a thesis is inadmissible, since it runs counter to the 
generally accepted meaning of the word la£in. (Vinltadeva adds, 
on this point, that this thesis x is also overthrown by the 
fact that "every word can have any meaning", since the meaning 
of a word is a matter of conventional agreement: "You may if 
you like call the- jar -a moon". The characteristic mark of the 
moon (hare- or deer-mark) is referred to again by Vacaspati on 
Yogasutras 1,49, during a discussion on the validity of praaana: 
"it is not necessary that the reality which is to be known should 
cease to exist, just because there is no means of knowing it.
Those who rely upon the ordinary means of knowledge (i.e. per­
ception, mainly,) do not doubt the existence of a deer-like mark 
in the moon at a time when only the other side (or only a small 
portion) of the moon is visible." A stock example of the use
of Inference, proceeding from the known to the unknown, is 
"The moon and stars are moving objects, because they are seen 
going from one place to another, like Caitra" (e.g. Vyasa on 
Yogasutras 1,6,7).
The other planets and stars are usually mentioned in com­
pany with the sun or moon, and not very often separately.
For instance, an example of non-perception 0anupalabdhi) through 
being overpowered (abhibhavat) is "One does not see the planets 
and stars in the daytime, owinfg to (theii? light's) being over­
powered by that of the sun" (Sankhyakarika 7). There is, however, 
one maxim that is worthy of note: the Arundhatl-pradar^ana- 
nyaya, "the pointing out of the stair Arundhatl". Anyone wishing 
to locate the tiny star Arundhatl is first directed to look at 
bigger and brighter stars, thus gradually training his eye until 
he is able to find the right star. In the same way, the differ­
ent (wrong) views of the nature of the Self (e.g. that it is 
the body, the organs, one's son, etc.) are not wholly valueless, 
for by discarding each of them in turn one is enabled to arrive 
at the truth. (See Nysimhasarasvatl's Comm, on Vedantasara 134; 
and cf. Brahmasutrabhasya 1,1,8). The astronomer (who was 
nearly always an astrologer at the same time) was held in high 
repute in India, and the Jains in particular believed that 
such a man must be omniscient. A Jainistlc syllogism ("Omniscient 
or absolutely trustworthy is a man who teaches astronomy, as 
e.g. R^abha, Vardhamana, and others") is quoted in Nyayabindu
(Tlka III, p. 95) 9 and refuted on the ground that it is by 
no means definitely established that the teaching of astronomy 
gives one a claim to omniscience or trustworthiness (aptata).
Cf. Upaskara on Vai6. Sutras 11,20, where an illustration of
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"doubt” (sagi^aya) is that an astronomer may or may not predict 
an eclipse correctly. For the rising and setting of nak^atras 
and stars, and Inferences therefrom, see Upaskara on Vai£.
Sutras IX,2,2; and see ”Reallty of Fiction" for "consulting 
the stars after performing the head-shaving ceremony"*
A good few of the attributes of the moon also apply to
the sun* For example, it rises and sets, is subject to eclipse,
and is material and Impermanent ("The essence of that which 
is gross, mortal, limited and defined is the sun that shines"*.) 
But the "being that is in the sun", the divine spirit, Is the 
essence of that which is subtle, immortal, unlimited and un­
defined. (Brh. Up. 2,3*2-3). In the Commentary on ibid. 2,3,4* 
it is said that the eye is the essence of the three elements 
of the body (= the three humours); for it is that which lends 
importance to the three gross elements in the body, just as 
the sun does with reference to the gods. This connection of
sun and eye, with its emphasis on the importance and infallibility
of perception (pratyak^a) has already been dwelt upon more than 
once, for it is of the utmost importance to an understanding 
of the Indian viewpoint. Cf. Katha Up. V,ll: "As the sun, the 
eye of the whole world, is not tainted by the external faults
of the eyes, so the one internal Itman of all living things 
is not tainted by the world's misery, being outside it." Here 
Sankara in his commentary explains "bahya-do^a" as "unclean 
things that are perceived by the eyes",- not as "errors of 
vision"•
The rays of the sun have a mystic significance, and a 
connection with the light in the eye ("The eye is the Uktha 
(source) of all forms (rupa), for all forms spring from it")*
As the rays of the setting sun all become merged in the brilliant 
orb itself, and go forth again when it rises, evem so does 
everything here become one in mind (manas-$, the highest god. 
(Pra^na Up* IV,2). When the master Yogin has created his 
impromptu bodies at will, he draws them in again "as the sun 
draws in its rays" (Vacaspati on Yogasutras IV,5). There is a 
sidelight on the composition of the sun-rays at Syadv. St* VI, 
p. 26; "The case of jnana (knowledge, regarded as an attribute 
or guna of atman) is sometimes illustrated by the analogy of 
the rays^bi^the sun*, which, though a guijia of the sun, travel 
out and illumine the world* But this analogy will not bear 
scrutiny. The rays are not a guna of the sun, but a substance 
(dravya) made of luminous matter (pudgala); luminosity (praka^a) 
is their guija, and cannot travel out of them. Similarly, Jnana 
is a guna of atman and cannot travel out of atman." The true 
analogy, * for which see above, Chap. IV, is that or a
magnet, which works at a distance. See also Maitri Up. 6,26;
and 6,31 (all living creatures come forth into this world, as 
light-rays come from the sun); and Sarv. IV, p. 40,lines 11-14 
(gem, sun, etc*, and Atman and knowledge).
It would he wearisome to recount all the possible vari­
ations of the symbolic application of the sun and its light,- 
e.g. the light of knowledge, which illumines ignorance as the 
sun dispels the darkness; ori the self-luminous Soul , which 
like the Sun, requires no other light to reveil it. For 
figurative "illumination1 is not monopolised by Indian thinkers 
though the heat and light of the sun are more powerful and 
striking in India than in northerly climes. But there are one 
or two passages which may profitably be mentioned, as for 
example the exposition of the "light of the self", Bph. Up. 
Comm. 4 *3,2-30.
The Vedantin sets out to prove that there i s an internal 
self-luminous light within the body, yet separate from it, and 
not material. When the sun and moon have set, and the fire has 
gone out, and sound (lit. "speech") is stilled, then the Self 
serves as the light for a man (4,3,2-6). A materialist may urge 
that there is never an absence of such lights as the sun, etc., 
to enable one to perceive this self-effulgent light as isolated 
from the body and organs. The Vedantin1s reply is that in the 
dream state, when the man is oblivious to all external light, 
the Self is his light. In the waking state, the light of the 
Self may be obscured by the functions of the organs, intellect,
mind, external lights, etc. But X in dreams, since the organs 
do not act and the lights such as the sun, that normally help 
them, are absent, the Self becomes distinct and isolated, and 
creates bodies and Impressions and surroundings of its own 
accord (4,3,9-10). And the Self then passes on from this dream 
state to the state of deep sleep (sugupti), in which it realises 
its identity with all, having shed ignorance. For Ignorance is 
not a natural characteristic of the Self: whatever is natural 
to a thing can never be eliminated,- as for instance the heat 
and»t light of the sun. (4,3,20).
There is another point of resemblance between the Self 
and the sun. Just as the light of the sun, coming into contact 
with the things it is to illumine, appears as green, blue, 
yellow, etc., although in reality it is just pure white light, 
so the light of the Self, revealing the whole universe as well 
as the organs of sense (eyes etc.), assumes their form (Byh. Up. 
Comm. 4,3,7; 4,3,30). (Cf. also Sarv. VIII, p. 77s the unity of 
light and the unity of the Deity). Ignorance is * illusorily 
superimposed upon Brahman, but Brahman, like the sun, illumines 
ignorance and its product £t (in the shape of the universe), and 
also like the sun it is never affected by ignorance.
Above (Chap. II) we have referred to the customary class­
ification of objects according to a common shape, colour, etc. 
as for Instance "something red" can be a man, plant or animal 
(£opo dhavatl, "the red (horse) is running" is an example of
"ajahallakgapa", a rhetorical figure: see Vedantasara 164-5).
The path of liberation, which is realised by a Brahman is 
conceived as being white, blue, grey, green or red (Byh. Up. 
4,4,9). This is explained by Sankara either as denoting the 
arteries sugumna, etc., which are fancied as filled with 
different coloured liquids (see Byh. Up. 4,3,20); or alternative­
ly as denoting the "path of the sun" (i.e. the spectrum- cf. 
Chand. Up. 8,6,1)-, and Kaug. Up. 4,19). There was a mystical 
association between the chief artery, sugumpa, along which the 
soul was supposed to travel when leaving the body at time of 
death, and one of the sun's >»a (seven) rays, termed sugumna.
Among other notable colour-associations are the white, red, and 
black of the three Sankhya gu$as, sattva, rajas and tamas (see 
e.g. Svet. Up. 4,5); while the elements of fire, water and £b 
earth (lit. "food").are distinguished by red, white and black 
colour respectively (See Chand. Up. 6,4,1-4). The colour “blue" 
(nlla) is the a common illustration of something (i.e. a quality, 
as opposed to an object) perceptible.
As light is the forerunner of the sun at sunrise, so 
mental illumination (pratibha or taraka) precedes discriminative 
knowledge (vivekaja-jnana) (Vyasa on Yogasutras 111,33). The 
time-sequence between the sun and its light is compared (Nyiya- 
sutras 11,15) to the relation between right knowledge (prama) 
and its cause (prama$a) (See above, Chap. IV,p.lo<&).
The light of the sun may be obstructed by black clouds,
as well as by the darkness of night (see above, p.xv?-). As
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in the autumn, (after the rains), the sun, being at freed of 
clouds, shines brightly and with a strong light,., so also 
the light of sattva (clear knowledge), when freed from the 
alloys of rajas and tamas, becomes infinite, and but little 
remains to be illumined (Vacaspati on Yogasutras IV,31).
It is natural that the sun should be the subject of all
sorts of mystical speculations and symbolic applications, e..g. 
"The sun is the sacrificial post" or "the head of the sacrificial 
horse is the dawn, its eye the sun".. (Byh. Up. 1,1,1). With 
most of these we cannot here concern ouiselves, but we may just 
remark that "there can be no day and night for one who has 
identified himself with the sun" (Byh. Up. Comm. 3,1,5); and 
as the element of fire includes the sun, we may note the sym­
bolic connection between celestial sun and terrestrial fire, 
as Exhibited in two sample passages, Byh. Up. 1,5,12 (and Comm.) 
and 6,2,9* In the first passage, the vital force, or Vayu,
is said to have sprung from the union of fire and sun at the
junction of the two halves of the cosmic shell. Fire here re­
presents the mother, or the organ of speech; while the sun is 
the father, or the mind (i.e. performing the functions of mani­
festation and generation respectively). The appropriation of 
functions here is probably explained by the greater accessibility 
of fire to human beings. At 6,2,9, (in the course of an 
enumeration of different symbolic fires, it is said that the
(heavenly) world is fire, the sun its fuel, the rays its 
smoke, the day its flame, the four quarters its cinders, and 
the intermediate quarters its sparks. In that fire the gods 
offer Sraddha (faith),- and out of that offering the moon 
is produced (as an abode for the sacrificer).
From the sun we pass on to the atmospheric fire, lightning. 
Lightning is a fitting symbol for a flash of intuition, which 
comes apparently from nowhere, yet Illumines everything around 
it (e.g. Byh. Up. 2,3,6; in the commentary ad loc., it is said 
that a mental impression reaembllng a flash of lightning is 
the property of Hiranyagarbha. See also Maitri Up 7,11, where 
the utterance of the sacred syllable Om is said to light up 
the whole body, llfce lightning). The non-perception of a 
flash of lightning, owing to defects in the sense-organs, is an 
example of anupalabdhi (Sarv. V, p. 51).
From the metaphysical point of view, those (individual 
souls) who rise forth from their source "like the spray-drops" 
(see above, p.xx^) are also compared to "the lightning flashes 
of the light among the clouds" (Maitri Up. 6,35).
From the logical standpoint, lightning is taken as an 
example for something that is not produced by an effort, and 
yet (unlike ether) is not eternal, but evanescent. This fact
helps to upset a good many syllogisms, in which similar and 
contrary cases must be produced. For instance, jars and the
like are produced by an effort, and are admitted to be imper­
manent. But it is not possible to maintain the contrary, namely
that whatever is not produced by an effort is eternal, for 
the example of lightning refutes this view. (See Nyayabindu 
and TIka, p. 23, and in several other places). From another 
angle, the Jain asserts that a flash of lightning (ta<Jil-lata) 
is certainly material (paudgalika) , even though it does not 
admit of analysis into successive parts (Syadv. p. 90, St. XIV) 
And if it is material, should it not be regarded as produced 
by an effort?
We now come to the fire on earth, which is no less 
mysterious than its counterparts in the heavens and in the 
atmosphere,- although in this case man may play his part in 
producing and regulating it. The predominant characteristics 
of fire are its heat, its light and flames, and its association 
with smoke. Of these, light is the only quality which is also 
shared by all the other representatives of the element ignis; 
while smoke is peculiar to terrestrial fire. But as the main 
object 4e in lightning a fire is to obtain heat, we shall deal 
first with that quality.
In the Nyayabindutlka (II, p. 40) it is said that an 
"efficient" fire is distinguished from other fires by its 
capacity of removing cold. For there are fires which are not 
capable of doing so, as e.g. the fire of a lamp. The natural 
properties which are observed in a thing cannot be separated 
from it, as the heat (or light) of fire, a or the light of 
the sun (an illustration for the unchanging nature of the Atman
Byh. Up. Comm., passim). But in Vacaspati* s gloss on Yoga­
sutras IV, 10, it is said that what is natural to anything, does 
not stand in need of any other cause for its manifestation; 
and even fire stands in need of other causes for the manifest­
ation of its heat (and in the same way, the opening of a lotus 
bud is helped on by contact with the rays of the sun).
The Naiyayika contends that the conjunction of a sense-
organ with its object is the chief cause of perception (and 
not the attention of the mind). One example adduced in proof 
of this is the conjunction of the organ of touch with fire, 
which spontaneously produces a sensation of burning, even 
when the mind is not attending (Nyayasutras 11,26, vrtti. Cf. 
also ibid. 11,104-5, discussed above, p.\o(o-7).
In logic, an example of a “mistimed'* (kala-atyaya-apadi§£a) 
argument is e.g. when one argues that fire does not heat, 
because it is produced by an effort,- it having previously 
been ascertained by the evidence of the senses that fire does 
contain heat (Nyayasutras 1,49) (See "Reality of Fiction" for 
"cold fire"). The Jain says that the test d>f contradiction 
is "Do the two things exclude each other- as do cold and heat?" 
When he applies this test to existence and non-existence (sattva 
and asattva), he finds that they are not contradictory, for
they are two aspects of the same thing (Syadv. p. 149, St. XXIV).
For the Buddhist theory of moments of heat gradually 
replacing moments of cold when a fire Is lit, see Nyayabindu^Ika
Ill, pp. 72-5* The dextrine of momentariness, it should be 
noted, does not absolve one from responsibility for past 
actions. A man who carelessly leaves a fire burning cannot 
plead, when arrested for burning another man’s field, that it
was not the same fire as the one he left behind,- for the last
(moment) of fire could not have arisen if no fire k had been 
lighted at first (See Milindapanho, Tremckner p. 47)*
We may just touch upon the semi-magical power of heat
(tejas), which glows at the same time as it devours. In the 
Maitri Up., the soul, manifested as l£ana, Sambhu, and so forth, 
is said to give forth heat, and is imagined as k covered with 
a thousand-eyed golden ball (or egg- ap$a) (= the sun or the 
universe (brahma£<Ja)), like a fire covered with a fire (or: 
a small fire overpowered x by a large fire- Ramatlrtha) (6,8). 
Having passed through what is enveloped in darkness, one sees 
Him who sparkles like a wheel of fire., (see above, Chap. IV).
In the Upani§ads, the sparks that fly forth from a fire 
are a favourite analogy for creation (and k reabsorption): 1 As 
from a well-burning fire sparks in thousands, of like form, 
spring forth, so from the imperishable living beings of various 
sorts are produced, and thither also return (apiyanti- lit. 
“swell, increase14 (Mun£. Up. 2,1,1). As Sankara points out in
his commentary on a similar passage, Byh. Up., 2,1,20, this 
illustration is intended to show an original unity, and a single
cause (similar to the one ocean with its foam and waves showing
unity in diversity). (Cf. also Byh. Up. 2,4*10 and Comm.;
Maitri. Up. 6,26 and 31.) A variation occurs in the Kaugitaki 
Up. (3,3; 4,19): When a man awakens, the vital breaths (prana) 
disperse from the Self and resort to their respective stations 
(ayatana = senses?); from the vital breaths come the tutelary 
deities (devas); and from these, the worlds,- as from a blazing 
fire sparks would disperse in all directions. At Pra£na Up.
3,5* "seven flames" are referred to. These are the seven organs 
of sense in the head (eyes, ears, nostrils, mouth), and they 
are compared £b (by Sankara in Comm, ad loc.) to seven sacri­
ficial oblations,- the enlightenments produced by their activity 
being the flames of the sacrifice, and the sense-objects their 
fuel. All seven are coordinated by the mind (manas) (located 
in the heart), which presumably represents the fire. (Cf. Mun<J. 
Up. 1,2,4 : the seven "tongues" of fire). At Prafina Up. 4,3, 
it is said that "Life’s fires (prana) alone remain awake in 
this city (=the body)". In t h i / t h e  following verse a n d /  
Commentarv^a further asso/ition between t>ie vital breaths and 
the sacrifice is elaborated. The body is commonly regarded 
as the abode of fire: either the fire of life (e.g. Yogasutras 
111,40 and Comm.), or the digestive fire.
■ The kindling of fire,- one of the first accomplishments 
of primitive man, and of obvious importance to every sacrificial 
rite,- is a favourite analogy, particularly in the Upani§ads.
For example: "As the material form (murti) of fire, when latent'
in its source (i.e. the firewood), is not perceived; and yet 
there is no destruction of its subtile form (linga); and as 
the material form may be grasped again by kindling in the 
source (indhana-yoni-grhya); so, indeed, both (the universal 
and the individual Brahman) sire to be found in the body by 
means of the sacred syllable QjwM (Svet. Up. 1,13). And in 
the next verse: "By raAng one’s body the lower friction-stick,A
and the syllable Oni the upper one; by practising the friction 
of meditation (dhyana), one may see the G-od who is hidden, as 
it were." For if one seeks painstakingly, the Universal Boul 
may be apprehended in one’s own soul, where it lies hidden, 
like fire in the fire-sticks (see above, p.VM). (Cf. also 
Maitri Up. 7,7: HUe is the Self within the heart, very subtile, 
kindled like fire, assuming all forms"; and Kaugltaki 4*19: 
"Just as a razor might be hidden in a razor-case, or fire 
(vi£vaipbhara) in a fire-receptacle or source (=wood), even thus 
this intelligential Self has entered the body right up to the 
hair and the tips of the nails." (also Byh. Up. 1,4,7).
As the digestive fire in the body has to be nourished 
with food, so the burning fire is fed with fuel. The connection 
between food and energy is well illustrated at Chand. Up. 6,7, 
when a student of the Vedas, after fasting, is unable to re­
member his texts. His guru then tells him that as a single 
small coal may be left over from a great fire, and only burn 
feebly; but when covered with straw it blazes up again,- in
like manner when a person does not eat, only one of his "16 
parts" (kala) is left over, and he must eat to regain full 
strength. For the mind consists of food (i.e. is dependent 
upon food for clear thought), the breath consists of water, 
the voice consists of heat (tejas). (Cf. Maitri Up. 6,34:
"As fire without fuel becomes extinct (upasSamyate) in its own 
source (yoni), likewise the mind (citta) by the cessation of 
its functions (= when objects cease to impress themselves on 
the consciousness)". See also Maitri Up. 6,10; 6,12). The 
"karma which ripens into a span of life" (ayur-vipaka^i karma) 
is either sa-upakramam, developing speedily, like fire let 
loose on dry hay, and fanned by wind; or nir-upakramam, develop­
ing slowly, like fire applied to single pieces of straw out 
of a heap. (Vyasa on logasutras 111,22).
Although it is imperative to keep the fire in one’s body 
tended during life on earth, yet the ideal state to strive 
after is "£anti", when the fire is extinguished and all desires 
calmed. At Svet. Up. 6,19, for example, there is mention of 
"Him who is without parts, inactive, tranquil (£anta),.. the 
ghighest dam (setu) of immortality, like a fire with fuel 
burned (up)". (Cf. also Brh. Up. 5,14,8; and Comm, on ibid. 
4,4,22-3; Chand. Up. 5,24, 1-3). "Like fire, does a Brahman 
guest enter houses. (They call) this (the bringing of water) 
his appeasing (Cantina tasya: pun on appeasing of the Brahman, 
and extinguishing of fire)." (Ka^ha Up. 1,7). For by fire
*I
all evils and passions are burned up* and calm and peace re­
main in its ashes*
We come to the third of the major characteristics of 
fire, viz. its association with smoke. On this association 
is based the stock example of "dr^a-linga" inference, also 
known as "purvavat"; where, of two things previously observed 
togather, one is perceived, and the presence of the other in­
ferred therefrom,- as fire from smoke (both existing simult­
aneously in this case: see Nyayasutras 11,15; and above, Chap. 
IV, p.\o^). The resultant syllogism takes the form: "Where 
there is smoke, there is fire. As in the kitchen (mahanasa). 
The mountain has a smoke: therefore it has fire.” (For a full 
elaboration of this inference, see Nyayabindu^ika I, pp. 16-7; 
II, pp. 35-41; III, pp. 89-90; pp. 54-5; also (for wrong hetu 
(reasons) etc) Nyayasutras 1,40,47#50,55, etc., andVrtti).
The vipakfa or counter-instance in this case is the lake, 
which cannot contain fire (although it may have mist rising 
from it, having the appearance of smoke).
We have referred to the Vedanta theory of perception 
(above, Chap. Ill, p^. 5^ )• In the case of inference, there
can be no movement of the internal organ (antahkarapa) £ts 
modification Cvytti) towards the fire, for there is no contact 
between the eye and the fire, in this case the vjtti is in 
the form of recollection of the fire formerly perceived in the 
kitchen, etc., and it is only the knowledge of the mountain,
the substratum of the fire, that is direct (pratyakga). (See 
Vedantaparibhasa I).
The Carvakas, denying the validity of inference, assert 
that it is mere supposition to conclude, on the perception of 
smoke, that fire accompanies it.
In refuting the Buddhist theory of kurvadrupatva (for 
which see above, Chap. Ill, p#>^J, the Naiyayika says: "if 
you assume this "efficient form" (and at the same time do 
not abandon your theory of momentariness), there can be no 
valid inference, for fire can only then be the cause of smoke, 
when its nature as fire acts as the "efficient form" of the 
ffirst moment's) smoke. And you cannot infer therefrom that 
fire in general is the cause of smoke in general; so that no 
inference can be established. And without inference it is 
impossible to establish the theory of kganikatva." (Kusum.
Comm. 1,16).
It must be remembered that the vyapti or "invariable 
concomitance" of smoke and fire refers only to the invariable 
presence of fire where there is smoke,- for it is possible 
for fire to exist without smoke, though not vice versa. The 
condition- (upadii) for the presence of smoke is said to be 
"a at fire laid with damp fuel" (See e.g. Comm, on Sankhyak. 5). 
Cf. Maitri Up. 6,32: "As from a fire laid with damp fuel, 
clouds of smoke separately issue forth; so from this great 
Being has been breathed forth (nih£vasitam) that which is
Rgveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda, etc." (see also Byh. Up. 4,5#H)* 
The "Purusa" (soul) of the Ka£ha Up. is "of the measure of 
a thumb", and "like a flame (Jyotis) without smoke." (Katha 
Up. 4,13; and cf. Maitri Up. 1,2).
An example of fire devoid of smoke is the fire that is 
latent in a red-hot iron ball (for which see above, P.87-S).
We may 6ive t»wo further references here, both from the Maitri 
Up. As a lump of iron, when it is beaten by workmen, changes 
into a different shape when it has been pervaded (lit. : over­
come- abhibhuta) by fire, so the elemental soul (bhutatma), 
overcome by the inner person (purusa) and beaten by qualities 
(guna), takes on a different form. But as the fire in a lump 
of iron is not overcome when the iron is hammered, so that 
purusa is not overcome. (3,3)* But as fire, iron-workers, and 
the like can make no impression on a piece of iron which has 
passed into the condition of clay in the earth (i.e. been ab­
sorbed in the earth), so mind (citta) together with its support 
vanishes away (through intense concentration)" (6,27).
Above (Chap. Ill, pp.tt-7) we have pointed out the di­
vergent views of Mlmamsakas, Naiyayikas, etc., on the subject 
of genus and particular qualities, as applied to Jars and the 
species jar. There is a similar discussion revolving around 
fire (Kusura. Comm. 1,6). The Mlmamaakas maintain that we 
must assume as a cause (of the production of fire) the fact 
of there being present a "capacity" favourable to fire.
According to Srlkaracary a: "There is an eternal capacity 
favourable to fire, abiding in straw, the arapl wood, and 
the burning genu" But the Naiyayikas assert that the fire 
pesulting from straw is in a different class from the fire 
produced by the firesticks, and the fire which is manifested 
through the agency of the burning gem and the sun's rays is 
different again, 'Aiis, they say, may be seen by the evidence 
of the senses; for the fire of a lamp is evidently different 
from the fire on the hearth,- the varying fires being united 
by the common quality of heat. Hence "capacity" is not to be 
assumed afxa as a separate category.
Further arguments in support of "capacity" follow. For 
example, the powers of the "burning gem" and the "extinguishing 
gem" (pratibandhaka) are discussed. Saya the Bha£ta Mfmajjisaka: 
"If the fire burns of itself and not by reason of its capacity, 
we should have to ecpect the effect of burning to be produced, 
wherever there was contact between the fire and the hand,, even 
though the fire-extinguishing gem were worn. Instead of which, 
we say that this gem destroys the burning capacity.." The 
Srlkara Mlmamsakas, in their turn, assume an eternal (not, like 
the Bhatjas, a varying) capacity in fire, which is dulled when 
the pratibandhaka is present. But (says)tbe Naiyiyika) we 
cannot agree with this theory, as we should then have to assume 
an endless number of different capacities, as that of the 
extinguishing gem to cause the dulling of the burning capacity,
of the burning gem to destroy the dulling, etc. (Kusum. I#10, 
Comm.). (Cf. Upaskara on Vai£. Sutras I»2,2; 111,1,12).
The Vai£egika attributes the natural properties of fire, 
etc. to fate, the unseen power, adrg^a; for such phenomena 
cannot be explained by any known causes. The Jain thereupon 
asks, “Could not these properties be regarded as the very 
nature of fire, rather than have to be accounted for by an 
obscure cause of which we know Nothing?" (Syadv. p. 50> St. IX) 
In their view, the natural .upward tendency of the flame is 
an analogy for the rising of the liberated Soul (Sarv. Ill,
P# 33). The Carvaka, too, from his materialistic standpoint, 
believes that all qualities arise from a thing's own nature.
For the illusory perception of a circle of fire, see above
pp. and “Reality of Fiction".
The fire of the lamp has been mentioned incidentally
(e*6* Pi?.‘i-'SS )• It is supposed not to be an “efficient" fire,
but it burns Nevertheless, and there is a popular proverb 
regarding “the burning of a city through a child's playing 
with the wick of a lamp" (See Jacob III. p. 64). Cf. also 
the "burning lamp" which provides one of the similes for the 
transitory empirical universe (Byh. Up. Comm. 1,5,2); and 
the moth which singes its wings on the flame of a lamp (above, 
Chap. VI, p.tf>fc>).
The main function ofthe lamp, however, is to give light, 
in the absence of the heavenly light of sun and moon. For the
lamp-light is feeble in the day-time, when overpowered by the 
radiance of the sun (an example of anupalabdhi through being 
overpowered; Sarv. V., pp. 51-2). Analogously, consciousness 
(caitanya) reflected in the modification of the understanding 
(citta-vrtti) is unable to illumine the Supreme Brahman, self- 
luminous and\identical with the individual self; and k is over­
powered by it. (And on the destruction of the “state of oneness"
(akhap<Ja-vrttl), only the Supreme Brahman, identical with the 
individual self, remains, see above, Chap. IV, p.l^s). (Vedanta- 
sara 173)*
It will not be necessary to do more than glance quite 
cursorily at the relation of lamp and light, except as regards 
features such as self-illumination, of which the lamp is the 
stock example, symbolic applications, too, are fairly obvious 
(e.g. uanvlksik£ (philosophy)., the lamp of all sciences (vidya^1 
(Sarv. xl, p. 94); or "with the essence (tattva) of the self, 
as with a lamp, a practlser of ioga beholds the essence of 
Brahman^ (Svet. up. 2,15)# we have referred (above, Chap. Ill) 
to the expanlxding and contracting light of a lamp, according 
as it is confined to a jar aad or a mansion. The Jain philo­
sophers hold that a soul adapts Itself to the size of the body 
it inhabits, as the light of a lamp varies in range according 
to its container (see e.g. Yogasutras IV,10 (Bhasya)). This 
possibility is denied by the Ramanujas, on the ground that it 
would involve the non-eternity of the soul, were it subject
to such modifications (Sarv. IV, p. 37). And the Vedantic 
view is expressed at Brh. Up. (Comm.) 1,3*22: “The vital 
force cannot be merely of the size of these bodies (anty 
elephant, etc.), for it is formless and all-pervading. N0r 
does the equality mean just filling up those bodies by con­
traction or expansion, like lamp-light in a jar, a mansion, 
etc. ..For there is nothing inconsistent in an anil-pervading 
principle assuming, in different bodies, their particular 
size." The Vedantin admits, however, that this all-pervading 
principle may be temporarily limited in individual persons, 
by reason of attachment and other evils caused by ignorance. 
But (when the soul leaves the body) mind, vital, force, and 
organ of speech pervade everything in their cosmic form, like 
the light of a lamp when its enclosing jar is broken (Byh.
Up. Comm. 1,5*17*18; and cf. introduction to 4*4*3).
According to Raghunatha, the ghata-pradlpa-nyaya, simile 
of the lamp inside a jar, is applied to one whose knowledge of 
Brahman is of a low order; for a lamp within a jar illuminates 
only the interior of such a vessel. Writers on Alamkara, on 
the other hand, apply this maxim as follows: "as the lamp 
continues to burn after it has lighted up the interior of the 
vessel, and is indeed essential to the continuance of that 
illumination, so the expressed meaning of a sentence is ab­
solutely essential as a basis for the figurative meaning which 
it also conveys" (Jacobis summary of Dhvanyaloka 1,12; 111,33;
see Jacob II, p. 16• And for the “lamp in a vessel with many 
holes”, see Jacob II, p. 30). Speaking of alaqjkara and sen­
tence construction, we may refer to the "lamp on the threshold1', 
which illumines both the interior and the exterior of a house. 
This figure is applied to anything fulfilling a-double purpose, 
as e.g. a wprd referrijfrg to two separate pottions of a sentence 
(see e.g. Sankara's bha§ya on MunJ. Up. 3#1»5)*
From the metaphysical point of view, we infer the exist­
ence of an all-powerful agent (=Brahman, in the Vedantic view) 
from the sun and moon which give light to human beings;- just 
as we infer the existence of a maker when we see a lamp (See 
Byh. Up. Comm. 3#8,9). In this passage, the lamp is regarded 
as an instrument, controlled by a superior force; and this is 
evidently the case, from the material point of view (Cf. also 
Brh. Up. Comm. 4,3*7s "The intellect is the instrument that 
helps us in everything, like a lamp set in front amid darkness"). 
But when the actual light of the lamp is considered as part 
of light in general, it can be said to be self-revealing 
(svayam-praka£aka).
The various schools have many conflictting arguments on 
this score,- some asserting that a lamp is self-luminous, and 
some setting out to prove that it is not. In general, the 
Naiyayika school holds that it is sfelf-luminous. For instance, 
Nyayasutras V,10: uAs a lamp does not require another lamp to 
reveal it, so an example (d^tanfca) does not need a counter­
example to illustrate it"; and Nyayasutras and v^tti, 11,19, 
which says that light is the very nature of a lamp, which 
reveals e.g. a jar (as well as revealing itself). Similarly, 
the pramanas are the illuminators of things which are rightly 
known. Otherwise even the lamp would not be the illuminator 
of the jar, etc., for fear of a regressus in inf. (le. sight 
is the revealer of the lamp; consciousness the revealer of 
sight, etc.).
In one passage of the Brhad. Comm. (1*5*3) tot is said 
(ostensibly as the view of Sankara) that the organ of speech 
is self-luminous, like a lamp, which does not require another 
lamp to reveal it. But the normal Vedantic view is that a lamp 
does not requtre another lamp in eved order to be revealed. But 
it is revealed by an intelligence other than itself. A similar 
idea is expressed on p. 40 of Sarv. IV : The lamp is not able 
to illumine hitherto unillumined objects, for it fes knowledge 
alone that illumines. And even in the presence of a lamp it is 
knowledge that reveals objects; the light of a lamp is meeely 
an auxiliary to the cognition by dispelling the obstructing 
darkness and thus aiding the eye which is the real instrument 
of the cognition.
In reply to the contention of the Bha^Ja Mlmamsakas, namely 
that Jnana (which is compared to a lamp) is not self-revealed,
because revelation is an action (kriya), and no action can have 
Itself as an object, the Jain says that the light dpes not have 
itself as an object, but springs into existence as Illumination 
and in that sense is svayanwpraka£a.
At Slokavartika p. 508, a critic is pictured as asking : 
"What do I want with eyes when I can see by means of a lamp?"
But it then pointed out that the eye is an illuminator, greater 
than the lamp itse&f, for blind men cannot even see by using 
hundreds of lamps. In the course of the discussion (Syadv. p.
75» st. XII) between Jaina and Mlmamsaka, the Jain asserts that 
knowledge is eelf-revealed. This, he says, can be shown by an 
anumama : "Jnana illuminates objects while it Illuminates itself, 
because it is an illuminator, e.g. a pradlpa". The objection 
ra£ed to this is that the hetu of the syllogism 4» is incon­
clusive, for the eyes ate illuminators, but they do not illumine 
themselves. The Jain replies they are illuminators not as phys­
ical organs, but as sensuous consciousness (bhave&drlya), and 
such consciousness ij3 self-revealed. For the Nyaya theory of 
perception see N.S. Ill, 23 - 45 (and above, pramapa ).
A further argument against the Vai£epika view (brought for­
ward by the Jain in this case) is the following :"According to 
your system (the Vak£e§ika) an object and its quality (dharmin 
and dharma) are absolutely distinct. Now you must admit that the 
lamp (or fire as the case may be) is the dharmin, and illuminatio:
(praka^a) its dharma. So how can a lamp be self-illuminating ?
If you assert, in the teeth of your principles, that it can, 
i.e. that praka£a and pradlpa can be separated and yet pradlpa 
can illumine Itself and other objects, then there is no reason 
why a Jat or a cloth should not be equally able to illumine 
themselves” (Syadv. pp. 41-42, st. VIII.).
The following is an instructive quotation from Brahma- 
sutrabhagya 2,2,28, showing that there is a limit to the ability 
of a lamp to illuminate itself, - just as an idea cannot exist 
independently of the knower, so a lamp must needs manifest its 
light for the benefit of a person : "if jiou say that (discrim­
inative) knowledge (vljnana), like a lamp, does not need any­
thing else to reveal it, but shines forth of itself, it would 
be eqqal to saying that knowledge (exists) which cannot be 
reached by any of the pramapas, and is without a person to un­
derstand it (anavagantytvam) ♦ This is like the shining forth 
of a thousand lamps (hidden) in the midst of a mass of rock ". 
-(^For pther examples of absurdities, such as e.g. taking a lamp 
to assist in hearing sound (Nyayabindu ), and attempting to dis­
pel darkness with a lamp no bigger than onefs finger (Atmatattva 
viveka p. 52,) or trying to remove the dimness of one lamp^y 
lighting another, see "Reality of Fiction" chapter.)
A favourite expression of fche Vedantin is that ignorance 
and knowledge cannot co-exist; to expect to cognise ajnana by
means of a pramapa would be like going to look for darkness 
with a brilliant lamp (Vedantasiddhantamuktavail, ed. Venis, 
p. 125), cp. Bphad. Comm. 1,41 4,10. But surely one can realise, 
when a lamp is lit, the contrast between the present light and 
the past darkness ? In the case of a lamp appearing for the 
first time out of darkness, there is a double function to be 
perdormed : (a) the removing of the darkness, and (b) the cov­
ering of the object to be illuminated, with light. This process 
is referred to at Vedantasara 179-80, where it is likened to 
the action of buddhi and its underlying consciousness :"Both 
the intellect and the reflection of consciousness (cittabhasa) 
depending on it, come into contact (lit. "reach" vy-ap) with 
the jar. In this case the intellect would destroy the ignorance 
(regarding the jar) and the reflection (of consciousness) would 
bring the jar to light", (quoted from Pancada^I 7,91). It should 
be noted that, for the Vedantin, ignorance (avidya or ajnana) 
is a positive entity which tkkes the place of knowledge until 
such time as knowledge displaces it. We may remark here that 
the question of whether or no darkness can be regarded as a pos­
itive substance, and not merely as the negation^ of light, was 
often uhder discussion among the various schools. The Jain, 
true to his doctrine of the Syadvada, says that darkness (tamas) 
is quite as visible as light (aloka), and therefore is as much 
a material substance as the latter. The VaiiSegika may object
that darkness is nob really visible, for whatever is visible 
requires light to make it so. The retort to this is that 
d tamas is seen by owls without the help of light; therefore 
it is visible of itself (Syadv. p. 14, St. V). (The VaiiSegika 
holds that darkness must be a negative something, since it 
cannot be classed as a substance, a quality, x or an action 
(see tfai£. Sutras V,2,19-20). The Bhat£a Mlmamsakas and 
Vedantins hold that darkness is a substance, because it moves; 
some Prabhakara Mlmapsakas consider that it is the absence
of light the cognition of light; while the Naiyayikas think 
that it is the mere absence of light. Srldhara holds the 
curious view that darkness is a dark blue colour which is 
superimposed Iaropita) on those places where light is lacking: 
to which the VaiSegika retorts that one might as well believe 
that the <colourless) sky is blue. For these varying views, 
see e.g. Nyayakandali Book I, Chap. 2; Sarv. X, pp. 90-1; 
Nyayasutras, Bhasya 1,49)*
Another Jain contention! is that a lamp is at once im­
permanent and permanent (in opposition to the usual distinction 
between ether (permanent) and lamp (impermanent, transitory).) 
The difficulty in the way of regarding a lamp or light as 
permanent is our experience of darkness as its negation. But 
the Jain treats darkness as a positive substance, a kind of 
matter (pudgala) into which light is at times transformed.
Thus the particles of light persist as the original matter,
and it is only their form which changes (paryaya) (Syadv. 
p. 14, lines 18-26). The Buddhist, of course, regards the 
lamp as not merely impermanent, hut also momentary (k§anika) 
(ibid. p. 20, St. V). Just as the light-rays of a fcamp are 
new every moment, so a series of momentary cognitions (jnana) 
seem to be the same, but in reality form an unbroken succession, 
each one lasting but a moment, (ibid., p. 127, St. XIX)
(cf. also Nyayasutras III, 112). (As a contrast to this view, 
cf. Maitri Up. 6,3°: "Unending are the rays of him who like 
a lamp dwells in the heart..**).
A man whose mind is unaffected by attachment and other 
evils is likened to the flame of a lamp when sheltered from 
the wind; and in this state he may enter into nlrvikalpa- 
samadhi (Vedantasara 214; and cf. Vyasa on Y 0gasutras 111,51). 
The same figure from the opposite angle occurs in Maitri Up. 
(6,35): "Even as a lamp stirred by a gentle breeze, so flashes 
up he who goes among the gods". The obstructions which cloud 
the intuition may also be compared to a shade, covering the 
light of a lamp (Sarv. Ill, p. 31). And final liberation, 
according to the Sankara school of Vedantins,(and others) is 
like the going out of a lamp (see e.g. Brh. Up. Comm. 3,2,13; 
amd Kusum. 11,3, Comm.).
From the empirical point of view, a lamp is a combination 
of several things,- oil, fire, wick, support. In themselves, 
these constituent parts would be regarded as contradictory;
but in unison they effect the illumination of objects. 
Likewise, in the Sankhya philosophy, the three gupas, though 
naturally contradictory, serve their purpose in harmony, and 
bring about the illumination or revelation of the "puru§a- 
artha" (Sahkhyak. and SankhyatattvakaumudI, 13, and 36. See 
also Vacaspati*s gloss on Yogasutras IV,14). A similar 
illustration, but without the idea of incompatibility, is at 
Maitri Up. 6,36: "As the existence (sapsthiti) of a lamp 
is because of the combination of wick, support and oil, so 
these two, the (individual) self and the bright (sun), exist 
because of the combination of the Inner One and the worid-egg 
A Seeking to overthrow the Naiyayika*s classification 
of different genera, an opponent says: "But may we not say 
that as one and the same lamp gives light, causes the wick 
to alter, and illumines jars, etc., so we may have one single 
cause, either the one Brahman (Vedantic view), or Prakrti 
(Sankhya view), which is not to be distinguished from the 
different intellects (buddhi) which vary according to each 
particular soul (puru§a)?" (and therefore there would be no 
need of a separate Creator). The Naiyayika*s retort is, that 
if the same nature which existed when one effect was produced 
continued to exist at the time of the production of another,
then the nature of water might exist in fire. The instancejof 
the lamp, he says, can be explained by a difference in the 
materials necessary to produce the different effects. (Kusum.
Comm., 1,7)• (Cf. also Vacaspati's gloss on Yogasutras IV,4, 
where the possibility is discussed of there being only one 
mind, which pervades more created bodies than one, just as 
the light of a lamp is diffused on all sides and illuminates 
more bodies than one).
We may conclude our study of the lamp by a glance at logic. 
In Chapter II of the Nyayabindu^Ika (p. 22) we meet the foll­
owing statement: "We do not admit that the logical mark (linga) 
is comparable to the light of a lamp, which occasionally brings 
hitherto unperceived objects, like such as jars etc., to our 
notice (haphazardly). On the contrary, in the case of the 
linga, there is an invariable concomitance." That is to say, 
before the light is lit, one does not know which objects are 
about to be revealed; nor is there any logical connection be­
tween the lamp and the objects it illumines (Though the Naiya- 
yikas maintain such a connection). A logical reason, Cn the 
contrary, is based on a previously observed connection, as 
between smoke and fire, (see also NBT p. 29; p* 52; and Syadv. 
p. 107, St. XVI: "it may be said, further, that an illuminator 
(praka£aka), e.g. knowledge (jnana), acquires existence from 
the object it Illumines (=artha), and then becomes the illum­
inator of the object which ife to be illumined, (i.e. the effect 
reveals the cause). This is fallacious, for a lamp is the 
illuminator of a jar, yet the jar is not produced by it.").
So much, then, for the element of fire. "As fire, though
one, has entered the world, and has taken on different forms 
according to every form (rupa), so the Inner Soul (antaratman) 
of all beings, though one, takes on different forms corres­
ponding to every form, and yet is outside." (Ka^ha Up. 5,9; 
and cf. Maitri Up. 6,27)*
The element of air is all-pervading in a wider sense 
than fire; it is everywhere, and enters into everything. The 
all-pervasiveness of the Inner Soul is compared not only tb 
that of fire, but to that of wind (Ka^ha Up. 5,10). We have 
mentioned the wind as affecting the flame of a lamp (above, p.
• The Carvakas regard the coolness of a breeze as spring­
ing from its own nature, and not from any external causes 
(Sarv. I); while the Vai£esika cites the natural properties of 
air, etc., as a proof of adp§ta (see above, p.xLa), and the 
Mimapsaka attributes qualities of air such as sensibility to 
touch, to the special category "capacity" (Kusum. 1,12, Comm. 
Introduction). See above, p.X\*, for air and "spar£a"; any 
other references to wind, etc., have been dealt with incident­
ally .
Practically the only specific references to the sky are 
in connection with its (apparent) colour, etc., and will be 
dealt with in the Reality of Fiction chapter. See above, p. 
^V^o.andrvi, for the Vedantic simile of the skies reflected 
in water. Finally, tk as the sky is untouched by impurities 
such as clouds, so the "witness of vision" (i.e. the Universal 
Self) is untouched by such relative attributes as hunger and
thirst (Byh. Up. Comm. 3,5,1)*
The sky is sometimes identified with-the ether, or space 
(aka£a); e.g. in the Vedanta simile just referred to ("ether” 
which is Reflected in the water). According to the Vai£esikas, 
the ether constitutes a separate, indivisible entity, which 
is eternal, being absolutely changeless; while the Jain seeks 
to prove that it is both permanent and impermanent. Among the 
Buddhists, aka£a is a reality only in HlnSyana circles (being 
regarded as "asamskrta-dharma”). The Mahayana and Sautrantika 
schools did not admit the reality of eternal, unchanging 
elements. But although unreal according to them, aka£a could 
be used as a negative example in syllogisms. The Advaita 
Vedantin, for his part, cannot accept even ether as eternal, 
for according to him only Brahman is real and unchanging.
The Jain uses the following argument to prove that Eka£a 
is both permanent and impermanent: When a Jar is removed 
and a cloth takes its place, the ether formerly limited by 
the Jar is replaced by that limited by the cloth. Thus one 
aka£a is destroyed and another is produced. If it is objected 
that this is mere quibbling (upacara), the reply is that 
although ether is all-pervading (and therefore, in one sense, 
eternal), it is nevertheless modified through its association 
with various objects, jar, cloth, etc. Thus the production 
and destruction of jar, cloth, etc., and through these of 
ghaja-aka£a, pa£a-aka£a, etc., amount to the production and
destruction of aka£a itself. (Syadv. St. V, pp. 15-6). (See 
above, Chap. Ill, p*t>S, for the Vedanta view of a jar and 
a house as two upadhis or limiting conditions of ether).
Above (TZhap. Ill, p.^-) we have quoted an argument between 
a Nalyayika and his opponent, as to the meaning of the phrase 
"possessing parts", and its possible application to such eternal 
entities as ether. The Madhyamika Buddhist, asserting that 
the relation of cause and effect is an imaginary one* says 
that a things which is generally accepted as eternal has no 
need of a cause,- e.g. ether (while that which is non-existent 
cannot be brought into existence by any cause, e.g. "flowers 
in the sky"). (Sarv. II, p. 10). In logic, it is likewise 
argued that wherever there is production, there is change, as 
in a jar; if something is changeless, it is not a product, like 
aka£a. (Nyayabindu and TIka, p. 47, etc.). This argument is 
used to prove the non-eternality of the sounds of speech, which 
are products (see Nyayabindu III, passim, for examples of in­
conclusive syllogisms dealing with this subject of the eternity 
of sound.). In Nyayasutras 11,115 (vptti), it is argued that 
as, although such eternal things as thek ether are beyond the 
grasp of sense, yet the nature of a cow, etc., is eternal (and 
perceptible), so too, though other eternal things are unchange­
able, letters may be susceptible of change.
Though the Vedantin dee may not accept the etem ity of 
ether, he admits its all-pervading nature, and takes it as an
analogy for the infinite self (Brh* Up. Comm* 5*1*1) (The 
same analogy is used by the Vai£e§ika: “The soul is infinitely 
large, like the ether, being pervais&ve (vibhavat) (Vais.
Sutras 7,1,22). But at another passage of the Brh. Up. Comm. 
(4*3*30) we find this statement: "Although the ether is con­
ceived as all-pervading, etc., it has no attribute of its own 
called all-pervasiveness; it is through its association with 
all as limiting adjuncts that it is designated as all-pervading, 
when as a p matter of fact it is present everywhere in its 
natural form.. The same is xfc true of atoms (for which see below, 
p.avv\$#. Therefore there is no example to prove that a substance 
which has no parts can possess many attributes."
In logic, the ether is taken as an example to prove that 
anything which is simultaneously inherent in different objects, 
regardless of their situation, must be all-pervasive. Hence, it 
is argued, a "universal" must be all-pervasive (Nyayabindutlka 
III, p. 87-8). The Jain, in criticising the Vai3e§ika tenet of a 
"samavaya" relation between sin object and its qualities, says 
that as this relation is asserted to be "one, eternal, and 
all-pervasive", it must therefore be in touch with everything 
simultaneously, like aka£a; and this would make the qualities 
of a jar reside also, e.g. in a cloth (Syadv. p. 32, St. VII).
Some philosophers, e.g. the Jain, may say that the Self 
may have different parts, owing to various limiting adjuncts,- 
just as the ether enclosed in a jar is different f»rom the ether
in the pores of earth. The Vedantin retorts that any such 
apparent differences belong only to "name and form" (namarupa), 
and cannot be attributed to the Self. The ether is one and in­
divisible, in epite of apparent modifications. "When the logic­
ians find distinguishing characteristics in the ether, then 
only will they find such characteristics in the Self" (Brh. Up. 
Comm. 2,1,20). Further, "To those who say that sound etc., 
perceived through the ear and so on, contradicts the unity of 
Brahman, we ask, does the variety of sound and the rest contra- 
©At-dict the oneness of the ether?" (ibid.; and cf. also 2,3*6; 
4,4*20. the Vedanta view was that the organ of hearing consisted 
of the ether limited by the auditory passage,- see Vedanta- 
paribhaga I).
The intangibility of the ether lends it a mystical quality, 
which leads it to be associated with the seat of knowledge and 
emotions,- the heart. For instance, Brh. Up. 4,4*22: "That 
great unborn Self which is made up of intelligence (viJnanamaya) 
and is in the midst of the vital breaths, lies in the ether that 
is within the heart" (Cf. also ibid. Comm. 4,3*12; Maitri Up. 
6,22; and Maitri Up. 6,27: "The ether-storehouse of the heart 
is bliss, is the highest refuge (alaya).."). In the Commentary 
on Yogasutras 1*36, it is said that the "essence of buddhi"
(or the quality of sattva in relation to buddhi) is like the 
ikaSa; this probably means that it moulds itself easily to fit 
impressions.
It may be of interest to note that aka£a is regarded as 
inactive (e.g. Syadv. p. 24, St. VI% "Without a body a maker 
can do nothing; he would be as inactive as aka£a". But on 
the other hand it is pointed out by Gau^apada (Sankhyak. 38) 
that each element may be the cause of varying sensations (sukhaiji 
duhkha, moha), corresponding to the characteristics of the 
three gunas. The ether, for example, is a cause of contentment 
to a man going out into the open (out of a stuffy atmosphere), 
but it causes suffering and is ghora for one who is overcome 
by heat, cold, wind, rain, etc., and bewilderment for one who 
has wandered from the path in a wood, and lost his sense of 
direction. In the same way vayl (wind) is welcome to one over­
come by heat, terrible for one plagued by cold, and very bewild­
ering when it is laden with dust and pebbles. Other references 
to ether are e.g. Sankhyak. Comm. 29; Byh. Up. Comm. 3,7,2; and
6, 2, 1 6 .  ft ■To^ 'oC ow I u t ttiCdL .
We have already referred more than once to the Mlmaysaka 
doctrine of the eternity of sound; but as sound dwells in the 
ether, it may not be out of place to discuss it more fully here. 
There is a dea detailed argument on the subject set out in 
Nyayasutras II, 79-121 iand vytti). The Naiyayika says that 
sound (as expressed in speech) is not eternal, for it is not 
cognised before pronunciation, and yet we do not perceive any 
obstruction which might prevent its being cognised (if it were 
cognisable). A If sound were eternal, a lecture would be under-
stood by the disciple, even without his preceptor uttering a 
word. The Mlmamsaka replies: "if sound (or the words to be 
employed in the lecture) did not exist during the intermediate 
time, how could the lecKtute take place? The non-cognition of 
the sound is accounted for by the non-functioning of its mani- 
festers, i.e. tongue, palate, throat, etc. Further, soudd must 
be permanent, because it is dwelt upon (e.g. one can recite a 
passage of the Veda 100 times, without variation; just as one 
may look 10 times at a colour, which is admittedly a persistent 
(though not necessarily eternal!) thing.)" "No", says the
Naiyiyika, "dwelling upon" anything does not establish per­
sistency, for there may be a numerical difference.. Further, 
there are the changes in letters, owing to sandhi, etc. (e.g. 
i or I may become y)." "That", replies the Mlmaipsaka, "is no 
obstacle. For you cannot prove that an eternal entity is necess­
arily static."
This sums up the main arguments pro an^con, though there 
are several more quibbling ones. The logical expression of 
the grounds for belief or disbelief in the eternity of sound 
is dealt with in Nyayabindu and TIka at several places (e.g. Ill, 
p. 70, where four inconclusive arguments are adduced). It is 
shown to be difficult to produce a conclusive argument that will 
not be confounded by the non-pervasiveness of the reason. For 
instance, the Mlmamsaka may not assert that the sounds of speech 
are eternal, because they are not impenetrable bodies of limited
dimensions). for this would fail to convince his Vai^esika 
opponent, believing as he does that atoms, which would con­
stitute the negative example, are eternal. (See NBT III, p. 70, 
91,94, etc.). Another illustration of an erratic (sa-vyabhi- 
cara) reason is given at Nyayasutras 1,46 (vytti). If anyone 
were to argue that sound is eternal, because it is not the 
object of touch (like the ether), the reason alleged would 
lead to more conclusions than required, for the quality of 
conjunction or of disjunction, for example, is not the object 
of touch, yet no one argues for its eternity.
To sum up: the Mlmamsaka asserts that sound is eternal, 
any apparent break in its continuity being due to absence of 
manifestation of what is always present (in the ether). His 
opponents, on the other hand, base their objections to this 
theory #ainly on the ground that what is eternal can never be 
a product,- and sounds are quite evidently products, and have 
genus, like a jar, etc. (See Syadv. p. 89, St. XIV; Vai£. Sutras 
passim, but esp. 11,2,26-36; VII,2,9-10); and Sarv. XII). It 
is noteworthy that the Mlmamsa system, generally regarded as 
the dullest and most pedantic of all the Indian philosophies, 
should have been alone in anticipating the truth which we in 
our modern age have but just "manifested11 through the telephone 
and radio.
A particular branch of "sound" in the ether is that made 
by thunder,- produced, according to the Vai£egika, by conjunction
with and disjunction from waters* For the spontaneous pro­
duction of knowledge through the conjunction of sense and 
sense-object, (as e.g. the organ of hearing with the thundering 
of a c l o u d s e e  above, pj^ . .
Though the Vai^egika did not admit the eternity of sound, 
he himself evolved a complicated system of 1 categories" (vi£e§a), 
in which the atoms of the four gross elements were regarded 
as eternal (see above, p.*^'^); likewise ether, the substratum 
of sound. Though the atoms themselves, as constituting the ne 
plus ultra of minuteness, are indivisible and eternal, yet 
their aggregates are evanescent, consisting as they do of ever- 
changing permutations and combinations of the invisible atoms.
The Jains have an atom theory of their own, according to which 
"pudgala" (matter) is made up of endlessly small parts.
The Sankhya system did not officially admit any such theory, 
as conflicting with the function of the basic undifferentiated 
avyakta; but G-audapada in his commentary on Sankhyakarika 12 
says: "the gunas are dependent on one another, like a combination 
of two atoms (dvy-apukavat) " • The Yoga system enlarges or 
reinforces the idea of the paripama of prakpti, by admitting 
the possibility of the existence of atoms, corresponding/to 
moments in time (see above, p.oru).
Just as we ordinary beings are able to distinguish cows 
from horses, owing to their special characteristics (colour, 
hump, bell, swift gait, etc.), so yogins can perceive the
distinction of one atom from another, in spite of their looking 
alike. This, says the Vai^egika, must be in virtue of some 
special quality (vi£e§a) (Syadv. p. 36* St. VIII; see also 
Vyasa on Y0gasutras 2 3*44; 3*52; 4*14* etc.). He contends 
that each atom has various qualities (such as odour, colour, 
etc.), some more than others, according to the elements they 
represent. The Jain atom, on the other hand, has taste, colour, 
odour, two kinds of touch, and though itself soundless, is a 
cause of sound: all atoms being qualitatively alike.
In the Vai£e§ika view, the ultimate atoms, being imper­
ceptible, are inferable x only. The dvy-apuka, or combination 
of two atoms, is still invisible, but an aggregate of three 
multiplied by two forms the smallest perceptible object, as 
represented by the speck of dust seen in a sunbeam. It may be 
noted in parenthesis that it was necessary to assert the im­
possibility of infinite division, on the ground that this would 
involve the equality in size of Mount Meru and a mustard 
seed, since infinities are equal (Nyayavartikatatparyatlka 
IV,2,17; etc.).
The later Vedantin also accepted the atom theory, as we 
see from Sankara*s commentary on Bph. Up. 4 ,3,30: to the con­
tention that the possession of varying qualities involves the
possession of parts, and hence contradicts indivsibility (i.e. 
of the Self), the Vedantin retorts that "An atom, say of earth,
which consists only of odour, is the minutest particle of it, 
and it 44eie£ itself odouri; one cannot conceive that it again 
has a property called odour.. Therefore there is no example 
to prove that a substance which has no parts can possess many 
attributes.1 It will be observed that this view differs from 
that of the Jains and Vai^esikas.
The Vai£e§ika theory of atoms was of importance for the 
teaching of the eternal cycle of world-creation and world- 
dissolution. In the process of dissolution, all combinations 
of atoms are destroyed, and the atoms remain isolated. A 
detailed account of the twofold process of creation and dis­
solution will be found in Pra^astapada1s Bhasya, pp. 48 ff. 
(edition Benares, 1895). And cf. also Comm, on Kusumanjali 
V,l; where it is stated that only a Supreme Being could bring 
about the necessary conjunctions of atoms at the beginning of 
a creation.
We now seem to have reached a point which to European 
thinking marks something definitely abstract or theoretical. 
But we must never forget that to the Indian mind, which thinks 
in terms of life and feels in sentiments of a live universe, 
even that which we call abstract has a concrete nature and can 
only be grasped through a concrete representation (cf. the 
personification of the creative forces of Mature in a diversi- 
fied pantheon of gods in superhuman forms). Therefore it does
not surprise us that even pure$ly fictitious (often fantastic 
and miraculous)images of life, which should fall under the 
category of illusion, are considered by the Indian to be real 
and capable of conrete representation. In this sense we are 
entitled to speak of a "reality of fiction44, to the considera­
tion of which we shall now turn.
Chapter IX. The Reality of_Fi.ctionJL
In Chapter I we have enumerated the different divisions 
of "non-existence1 {abhava), and "non-apprehension" (anupa- 
labdhi). L$t us now consider in greater detail the application 
of both abhava and anupalabdhi, with reference to those con­
ditions which are partly due to natural (external.) non-existence, 
and partly to defects in the cognising faculties of the in­
dividual.
Previous non-existence (prag-abhava) is exemplified by 
two proverbs which are intended to show futility: 1) Proclaiming 
the name of one‘s son before he is born (e.g. Nyayamanjarl 
P» 345;- this may be taken as the equivalent of “counting your 
chickens before they are hatched"), and 2) The partition of 
an Iguana1s flesh while it is still in its hobe (This is an 
impossibility if taken literally, but if it is a mental "parti­
tion", it is another case of “counting oneAs chickens")
(e.g. Khan<Janakhan$akhadya p. 640).
Whereas prag-abhava implies an anticipation of
reality, itaretara-abhava (mutual non-existence) is eternal, 
for it illustrates the complete distinctness of objects with 
divergent natures. For example, one person cannot remember 
what another has seen or experienced (e.g. Kusum. 1,15; Vacas- 
pati on Yogasutras 1,32; 111,14); nor does the falseness of 
one person prove another to be false. A Brahman living in a 
village inhabited solely by Kiratas does not on that account 
become one of them (Vacaspati on Yogasutras 1,5); nor does an
Iguana become a snake simply because it creeps along ^Mahabhagya 
1,1,23*). From seeing smoke rising from one house, we do not 
infer that there is a fire in another house (e.g. Tantravartika 
(p. 180) on Jaimini's sutras, 1,3,15); 3yamaka grain cannot be 
made to germinate as rice, and if an axe operates on a Khadira
tree, it is not the Palana tree that is cut (see above, chap.
*
vll). Acow and a horse cannot be identified with one another 
(see above, Chap. vl); and a dog with an ear or tail cut loff, 
is still a dog, not a horse or a donkey ^bee Jacob III, p. 89)^ 
a Sankhya argument for the production of the existent from the 
existent is the fact that not even the cleverest person can 
make that yellow, which is by nature blue (SankhyatattvakaumudI 
9; Sarv. XIV, p. 121). (N.B. The process of changing blue to 
yellow is not an empirical impossibility, but it is logically 
impossible). A man who says "It is the ten pomegranates
which will become the six cakes", is not a trustworthy person, 
and his words cannot be taken as aptavacana (Vacaspati on Y0ga- 
sutras 1,7)* Finally, an example of an Impossible sequence is 
"munir manute, murkho mucyate"- a sage meditates, and a fool 
attains liberation (Vedantatattvaviveka, p. 37)* This is both 
a contradiction in terms, and a logical impossibility.
It will be observed that in nearly all of the above instances 
the statement is a negative one, and couched in terms which deny 
a manifestly impossible state of affairs. But the very denial 
implies that the positive statement either has been made, or is
capable of being made,- and accordingly even that positive 
statement is not entirely absurd* The Western philosopher 
would say that such a sentence as "a cow is not a horse" is 
correct, but absurd and unnecessary, as it leads us to no 
useful conclusion. The Indian, on the other hand, with his 
polaric outlook, holds that such a statement is. useful, as it 
leads us to an understanding of the sequence of essential 
qualities in cause and effect, and of the classification of 
species, which after all comprise the great universal category 
“Existence" (See above, Chap. VI).
Pradhvaipsa-abhava, non-existence by destruction, may be 
dealt with quite briefly. The Naiyayikas say that it has a 
beginning, but no end,- in contrast to previous non-existence, 
which has an end, but no beginning. The Advaita Vedantins argue, 
however, that the destruction of e.g. a jar, by breaking it 
into pieces, ends when those parts are further destroyed; for 
the further destruction of the fragments of the Jar cannot be 
said to be the further destruction o^the Jar itself. They are 
probably driven to some such conclusion in order to uphold their 
conviction that only Brahman is eternal,- nothing else, not even 
non-existence, can be allowed to compete with Brahman in this 
respect.
It follows that the Vedantins must deny the permanence even 
of atyantau-abhava, absolute non-existence. As everything except 
Brahman is non-eternal, therefore even the non-existence of
qualities in any particular object must, like the qualities 
themselves, be perishable. That is to say, existence and non­
existence follow the same law. (See Datta, The Six Ways of 
Knowing, pp. 176-7).
It is this last type of non-existence which will yield the 
greater part o ^ u r  illustrations; and it deserves special 
notice, for it is a notion that could not find a place in 
European logic. At first sight it would seem that such a con­
ception must be proof of a love of abstract thought; actually, 
though, it is more concrete than the concrete, for it means 
that even the unreal and uncognisable is conceived and grasped 
in the same process as the cognisable and existent. The wealth 
of terms for non-existent things is due no doubt to an ever­
present disbelief in the reality of the empircal world; but also 
paradoxically, to a very real apprehension of Nature* s abundance 
as manifested by India's tropical vegetation. Here, in the 
presence of quick-growing, yet quick-decaying plants and insects 
even the impossible might one day come to pass.
One of the stock examples of absolute non-existence is 
the "lotus in the sky", which is quoted in Sankhyak. 4 , Comm., 
together with an ass's horns, and the son of a barren woman.
The same illustration is used by the Buddhist Madhyamika in 
support of his contention that everything is void, and that the 
relation of cause and effect is an imaginary one: anything that 
has real existence as its nature does not require an efficient
cause to manifest it; while no cause can pr bring about the 
production of a non-existent effect, like flowers in the sky 
Sarv. II, p. 11).
The Sankhya-Yoga view is expressed in Vacaspati's gloss 
on Yogasutras 11,19: !lThe state of equipoise (samyata) of the 
three gupas is nowhere of use in fulfilling the objects of the 
Purusa. Therefore it does not exist as efficacious. On the other 
hand, it does not admit of being rejected as non-existent, like 
the lotus of the sky." That is to say, the effect is not directly 
efficacious while it resides in the cause in posse, but it cannot 
for that reason be said to be entirely non-existent (for when 
the samyavastha is resolved, the various gupas perform their 
own functions) (Cf. also Vacaspati on Y0gasutras III,13k: "That 
which is non-existent is never visible andAoes not perform any 
function, l-ike the lotus in the sky" (but the empirical world 
cannot be referred to such a category)). The opponents of the 
Saxikhya-Yoga satkarya-vadin may allege that, since we deduce 
the non-existence of the sky-lotus etc. through their non-appear­
ance to sight, similarly we should be at liberty to conclude that 
every product before its manifestation is equally unreal. And 
conversely, if we admit the reality of the product even before 
it becomes visible, we should also admit the potential reality
of the lotus in the sky, the hare's horn, and all other such 
produces of the imagination (SankhyatattvakaumudI 6). This is
a legitimate criticism, and one that cannot be absolutely refuted.
The most that can he said in reply is that nobody has so far 
seen a lotus in the sky, and therefore we can assume that it is 
entirely non-existent; but nobody can state with assurance that 
such an object will not come into existence at some future time, 
for both lotus and sky are real in themselves: it is the com­
bination of the two which has not yet materialised. And with 
regard to the first half of the criticism, the answer is that it 
is actually possible to see the effect being produced from the 
cause (e.g. curds from milk) (paripama).
As alternative, or supplement, to the "sky-lotus" we often 
find mention of the horns of a hare, or (less frequently) those 
of a horse, a donkey, a mouse, or a man. gere again two objects 
which are in themselves real are linked together to form an 
impossible combination. The "sky-lotus" and "hare's horn" are 
used interchangeably in many contexts to illustrate satkarya, 
asatkarya, and other theories of cause anc^4ffect (e.g. Sarv.
XIV, p. 121; Vacaspati on Yogasutras 111,13). In the last-men­
tioned passage (where nara-vigana, man's horn, takes the place 
of hare's horn) there is the further statement "The non-existence 
of perception does not disprove the existence of anything proved 
to exist by other means of knowledge" (but the horns of a man 
are not capable of being proved existent). There is a similar 
topic under discussion at Kusum. 3*1 et seq. The Naiyayika is 
seeking to establish the existence of a supreme Being. His 
opponent infers God's non-existence from his not being perceived,
and argues, "if you reply that the Supreme Being is not a suitable 
(yogya) object o^erception, and therefore, since we cannot here 
have a valid non-perception, we cannot assume His non-existenfce, 
we retort that in the same way we might prove that a hare's horn 
may exist since we have only to maintain that it is not a suitable 
object of perception."
The Naiyayika's reply is that if the absence of perception 
or perceptibility meant denial of existence, we should be for»ced 
to deny the existence of everything beyond the reach of the senses, 
e.g. ether, and such qualities as merit, demerit, etc. But a horn, 
if it existed, would certainly be a legitimate object of perceptior 
so we conclude that there is no such thing as a hare's horn, since 
we do not see it. If the opponent, however, insists that a hare's 
horn is not a legitimate object of perception (i.e. that it may 
exist although invisible), then its existence is not impossible, 
though there is an absence of proof to establish it. The same, 
however, does not apply to the existence of a Supreme Being, which 
is confirmed by inference anchoripture, if not by direct perceptior 
(Cf. the similar discussion on page 97 of Sarv. (Chap. XI), which 
supplements the above. Analogous passages are found at Sankhya- 
tattvakaumudl 8, with the substitution of the saptama-rasa (7th 
flavour,- there being only six flavours acknowledged) for the 
hare's horn; and Sankhyakarika Comm. 7* with the substitution 
of a "second head" or "third arm" (in reference to the non-per­
ception of puruga and prakrti).
The Nyayabindu^Ika provides us with a statement of the 
logical value of a "non-entity11: "The horn of a hare has not 
(ever) been an xx, object ofsight. But still it has been recognised 
as not being an object of practical purposive action (because 
it has not been present to sight,- i.e. through being imagined). 
..For in the case of a hare's horn et£., a non-existent object 
of action, which is simply a cause of non-pgesentatlon to sight 
(i.e. which must be imagined, in order to be rejected as non­
existent), has been established by proof (that is, by inference)", 
(NBT III, p. 49). This stress on the value of fiction and imag­
ination is evidence of the difference between Western and Eastern 
psychology.
For other mentions of "hare’s horns", etc., see Syadv. p.
162, St. X Z H f  XXVIII; p. 153, St. XXVI; p. 77, St. XIII; p. 70,
St, XI; p. ??t -S4 116, St. XVII (last three: "horse's horn";
P. 85, St, XIV ("donkey's horn") ;/Vacaspati on Yogasutras 111,52.
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In the last-mentioned passage, Vacaspfcti says that the succession 
of moments exemplifies a different sort of unreality from the 
unreality of the hare's horn. Their succession is a mental con­
cept, unreal because no two moments can exist simultaneously, and 
be ranged together for comparison. But previous and future moments 
are not of the nature of the horn of a hare,- though they are 
just as intangible- for they are part of the prxocess of evolution. 
And the Yogln can obtain direct knowledge, by Sa^yama, of the 
moments and their succession.
Other "wrong combinations" are "the hair on a tortoise's 
back" (SahkhyatattvakaumudI 6; Syadv. p. 136, St. XXI); and"a 
crest of matted hair on the head of a g frog" (Syadv. p. 86, St. 
XIV); and the "hairs of the sky (aka6a)" (Syadv. p. 106, St. XVI). 
A knowledge of the "hairs of the sky" is wrong knowledge, for it 
has no object (nirvisayaip). This is the prima facie view). but 
the Jain points out that one who has first seen real hair cannotA
even imagine hair in the sky; therefore it is not "nirvigayam 
jnanam"•
The "imaginary sweet" was also a subject for speculation.
The Bauddha, having stated that the object and the cognition 
thereof are identical, leaves himself a loophole by adding, "Nor 
must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the flavourk, energy 
and digestion derixvable from an imaginary and an actual sweet­
meat will be identical; for though the intellect (buddhi) is, 
strictly speaking, exempt from the modes of subject and object 
(vedya-vedaka), yet there is a certain practical distinction.." 
(Sarv. II, p. 13)* A parallel passage occurs in Vacaspati's gloss 
on Yogasutras IV,16: "Effects cannot arise spuriously from causes 
other than their appropriate causes.. For, is it proper that an 
object, being the cause of the knowledge of itself, should also 
be the cause of itself? If this were so, then the sweetmeats which 
one hopes to eat in the future (existing in the imagination), and 
the sweetmeats which one eats in the present, would not differ 
from one another in their taste, strength, and effect on the 
digestion." The “reality" of fiction, then, is on a different
plane from empirical reality; but the power or the imagination 
cannot be denied# (See also vacaspati on Yogasutras 1,32: “One 
cannot cook with imaginary fire").
Another "wrong combination" is the concept of "oil from sand;* 
used by the Sankhya to show that there can be no production or 
the non-existent (Sanichyak. 9)# We find a combination of absurdi­
ties in Bhartyhari’s Nlti^ataka verse 5 (quoted by Jacob, III, 
p« 96): HOne might obtain oil from sand by pressing hard; when 
thirsty one might drink water from a mirage; and while wandering 
about one might even come across a hare’s horn; but one could 
never please the heart (citta) of a fool#11 The 11 germinating 
stone11 is a further contradiction in sense (see e.g. Sarv. II,
PP# 8,9).
A fruitless enquiry is ridiculed by comparison with !,an 
examination of a crow’s teeth11 (for a crow has no teeth) (see e.g. 
Nyayabindu^Ika I, p. 1,3); and information leading to no useful 
result is like “instructions for obtaining Taksaka’s crest jewel 
as a febriguge” (See above, Chap. VI). In the same category may 
be placed the act of “looking for birds’ footprints in the sky, 
and fishes* footprints in the water” (a search for something 
unattainable) (e.g. Brh. Up. Comm. 4*4,22; Ait. Up. Coauji. 11,1 (p. 
67* Anand. edn.) (This is applied to fe) seeking for (external)
means to realise the Self with which one is identical; andj|))
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attempting to see distinctions in the one Reality). (Cf# also 
Byh. Up. Comm. 4*4*6). But we must note that such an action is
not as absurd as it might seem, for the sky is the path, the 
marga, of the birds (and the water of the fish),- so that such 
an attempt would be the translation of terrestrial reality to 
another sphere•
Before turning to a different^ branch of "unrealities", we 
may mention the "picture without a canvas", and the "shadow 
without a post"# In this case it is not a combination of two 
incompatible things, but a severance of two things which are 
inseparable: for the picture depends upon the canvas, and fche 
shadow upon the post or some other substratum# At SaAkhyakarika 
41, these two illustrations are applied to the inseparable 
connection between the subtle body (linga) and the characteristics 
(vi£esas) with which it is associated in each incarnation. But 
here again we must not lose sight of the polaric aspect: The 
Lord Vigyu, or a Yogin, by means of supernatural powers, can 
paint without a canvas (see e.g# Sarv. VIII, p. 78).
This leads us on from contradictions in sense to contra­
dictions in terms, which express an ideal incompatibility. The 
One of the stock examples of atyanta-abhava is the "garland 
without a string" (Sarv. XII; mentioned in connection with spho^a; 
see above, Chap. VII); while one of the most frequent of all 
illustrations of non-existence is the vaatndhya-suta, the son of 
a barren woman. The Bauddha, in ridiculing the Carvaka1 s claim 
that perception is the only pramana, says: "ifi, while you assert 
that inference is no form of evidence, you produce some headless
argument to prove, i.e. to infer, that it is none, you will he 
involved in an absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother 
to be barren.11 (Sarv. II, p. 6). Precisely the same argument is 
used with regard to internal and external perception, Sarv. II, 
p. 14 ("No man in his senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the 
son of a childless mother"); and in Sarg. XII, p. 104, with re­
ference to the authority of the Veda (which must be admitted to 
prove what is not provable by other evidence). The Jain, arguing 
against animal sacrifice, says that to say that hinasa is a cause 
of acquiring merit is to say that a woman can be a mother and yet
be barren (Syadv. p. 62, St. XI; cf. also ibid. p. 77, St. XII;
p. 128, St. XIX).
The counterpart of the vandhya-suta is furnished by the story 
of the impotent husband (Vyasa on Yogasutras 11,24). The Sankhya- 
Yoga theory of moksa has been explained. Someone ridicules this 
by the story of the impotent husband. A foolish wife says to her 
husband, "My sister has children; why have I none?" and he replies, 
"I shall give you children when I am dead." Similarly, the saving 
knowledge has no power, while it is in existence, to make the 
mind cease from action; what hope is there that it will cause 
cessation (i.e. liberation) when suppressed?
X resolving of a contradiction in terms is "The bride is not
married for the destruction of the bridegroom". This is applied 
to the non-emergence of an inference when there is no difference
between the example (and the probandum). (Sarv. V, p. 52).
Sankara*s school, with its nirguna and saguna Brahman, and 
its contention that the empirical world has no reality, provided 
a ready target for accusations of inconsistency and absurdity.
For instance, an opponent might say that to think of the trans­
cendent Brahman as the (identical with) the relative self, would 
be like thinking of fire as ga cold. But the Vedantin says that 
such sentences as "Knowledge, Bliss" do not contradict perception 
etc., as "fire is cold anc^vets things" would. (Cf. B$*h. Up. Comm. 
2,4,13: Maitreyi asks, "How can the Self be simply Pure Intelli­
gence, and yet after attaining oneness, have no more conscicusness? 
The same fire cannot be both hot and cold."). (For cold fire,
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dark sun, and the like, see Chap. XIII above).
A similar contradiction in terms is "floating stones". "If 
you allege Srult as the proof (i.e. of eternal happiness), we 
reply that Sruti has no place when the thing itself is precluded 
by a vklid non-perception; or if you allow its authority, then 
you will have to conceded the existence of such things as A float­
ing stones", (alluding to the Vedic phrase, "gravanah plavanti") 
(Sarv. XI, p. 96). ««• ^ ) .
Two well-known absurdities which frequently occur together 
are the "half-old woman", and the "half-cooked hen" (ardhavaiiSasa- 
nyaya, the simile of the slaying of one half of the body, while 
the other half is kept alive £©). These absurdities are employed 
by the Buddhist to illustrate his conviction that, when mother-
of-pearl is mistaken for silver, bdth substances are equally 
unreal: "Nor can the rule of the half-old woman be admissible 
(ucitam). For it is not imagined that one-half of a fowl may 
be set apart for cooking, and the other half for layihg eggs"
(i.e. neither mother-of-i>earl nor silver can be half real and 
half unreal) (Sarv. II, p. 11. Cf. also Sankara on Byh. Up. 2,3,3, 
with reference to gross and subtle cosmical forms).
A rather less ingenious "impossibility41 is the dead man come 
back to life. Allowing that knowledge and knowable are distinct 
and cannot be identified, the Vaina£ikas cannot m§ke knowledge 
itself a knowat3ee, as surely as they cannot revive a dead man 
(Pra^na Up. Comm. VI,3)* (According to the Vedantin, knowledge 
is one and indivisible, and therefore self-luminous).
The bikological "impossibilities" of the germination of 
seeds eaten by a mouse, destroyed by fire, or spoilt by oil, 
have been mentioned above (Chap. VII). A dimensional impossibility 
is expressed by the sentence "There are a hundred herds of 
elephants on the tip of my finger" Anyone making such a statement 
cannot claim credence (as an aptavacana) (See Jacob III, p. 3).
Let us now consider the cases in which there is R«t-»e§»ely 
a»^ percept ion, owii^g to various causes (anupalabdhi) • Owigg to 
too great distance, one sometiibes mistakes a post for a man, or 
a heap of straw for an elephant (for the former, see Nyayasutras 
11,1; Sarikhyakarika 30 and 46; and for the latter, Jacob III, p. 
55). At Nyayabhasya IV, 101, it is emphasized that there must
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be an initial likeness, otherwise one thing cannot be mistaken 
for another (see also Vail. Sutras II,$ 2,17) (See above, Chap. I). 
Faulty observation causes one to mistake an iron ball for gold 
(seen above, Chap. IV), while eye-disease or a blow on the eyes 
leads to the vision of a double moon , or "fenats and flies11, or 
a mass of hair (instead of a conglomeration of single hairs)
(see above, Vhap. VIII; also Comm, on Pralna Up. VI,4, and 
Myayasutras IV,77)* All these are real cognitions for the per­
cipient. though they do not cogform to actual fact; and the same 
applies to the vision of a flaming post (jvalita-stambha) which 
appears to one suffering from a disturbance of the humours 
(Nyayabindu^Ika I, p. 12). Only when the cause of the illusion 
is removed, can the object be seen in its true light. When the 
cause is internal, it may not be eliminated at all, but when 
it is external (e.g. in the case of the distant post or heap of 
straw), the apparent likeness is realised on close inspection 
not to exist.
Another complaint affecting the vision is jaundice, which 
leads a person to see a white conch-shell as yellow. This is 
clearly not a right cognition, but it is a cognition of the true 
shape and genus of the object, though not of its correct attributes. 
This erroneous knowledge, then, is a mixture of true and false; 
moreover even though the percipient may know that his cognition 
is incorrect, he cannot alter it, though he may make allowances 
for the organic defect, (see e.g. Kusum. Comm. 111,21; Syadv.
p« 135, St. XXI; Nyayabindutlka I,p.5. The latter passage says 
that this is not a tognition of the true form (akara), but this 
clearly refers not to the form but to the cobour).
A moving vehicle provides an external cause of illusion, 
leading to a wrong representation of the locus of an object, e.g. 
a tree. Though this is not stripy a right perception, it leads 
the percipient to b real object, i.e. a stationary, not a moving, 
tree. (See Nyayabindutlka I, pp. 5,9)# Another perception which 
though strictly erroneous, yet leads to reality, is the supposition 
that the light of a Jewel seen through the keyhole of a door, 
or a slit in a screen, is the jewel itself (See e.g. Sarv. II, p. 
18; NBT I, p. 5)# This is styled samvadibhrama, an error which 
has a corresponding reality behind it; to mistake the distant 
shining of a lamp through the keyhole of a door for a gem, is an 
illustration of visamvadibhrama, an error devoid of an underlying 
reality (though even here lipht is the real substratum). In a 
passage of Pancadall IX, treating of meditation (dhyana) as a 
means of arriving at right knowledge of Brahman, it is s-aid that 
dhyana directed towards Brahman with qualities (sagupa), though 
erroneous, leads to the underlying Brahman without qualities, 
as the light of a jewel leads to the jewel.
Two technical terms which occur frequently in the philo­
sophical texts are upadhi and adh.y aropa: the former being used 
in the sense of !,superimposition“, and more especially the super­
imposition of one substance upon another, leading to the erroneous
transference of attributes, the school example being the red flower 
which lends colour to the transparent crystal (cf. Kusum. IIJ,$ 
Comm.) Adhyaropa has a slightly different significance: it means 
the substitution of one object for another object which resembles 
it closely, through failure to perceive the distinction,- as when 
a rope is mistaken for a snake in the darkness (See Vedantasara 
32).
The Vedantin points out that though a crystal may appear 
coboured through association with various colours, yet in reality 
it is pure and unaffected by limiting attributes; similarly the 
sense-organs etc. appear to be associated with the Self, which 
is naturally Pure Intelligence (Brh. Up. Comm. 4,3,30; and cf. 
ibid. 2,4,12; 4,3,20). The same simile is applied to the nature of 
the Puru§a, which is unaffected by things affecting consciousness; 
or to the impressions made by objects on consciousness (Yggasutras 
1,3; 1,4; 1,41 (Vyasa and Vacaspati); see also V fs gloss on Yoga­
sutras 111,17), and Nyayasutras 111,77-8).
A similar erroneous cognition is the perception of Iblue) 
colour in the sky ("ether”); or the vision of the sky as concave, 
having parts, and h the like. The "blue1 or "concave" sky is 
quoted in several passages (esp. Brh. Up. Comm.) together with 
such obvious illusions as a mirage in the desert, the mistaking 
of a rope for a snake, or of mother-of-pearl for silver,- to all 
of which is likened the attribution of limiting characteristics 
to the indivisible s>elf (e.g. Byh. Upl Comm. 4,3,1; and other 
places; &a$ha Up. Comm. 111,14)* we note, however, that At in
this case it is only by inference that we know the absence of 
colour in the sky; and if a person did not see that colour, his 
senses would be mistaken.
The equivalent of our "castle in the air" (formed by cloud­
banks) is gandharva-nagara, "city of the heavenly minstrels"
(e.g. Ka£ha Up. Comm. VI,1; .Nyayasutras IV,95-6). In the latter 
passage, a (Sunyavadln)) opponent of the Naiyayika suggests that 
the notion of pramaga and prameya is as illusory as a dream, a 
magic show, a city in the clouds, or a mirage. The Naiyayika 
thereupon suggests that dreams at any rate have a basis in reality, 
for they arise mainly through previous (waking) experiences.
(See also NS IV, 98-9). At Nyayabindutlka p. 5, it is said that 
a dream is a wrong representation of time: e.g. we see at midnight 
an object which we really saw at noon. That is to say, a dream, 
like an inference, is a smara (remembrance) of pratyakga (perceptior
Optical delusions which are common to most include the mirage 
seen in the desert, the tricks of the conjuror (miyin), and the 
appearance of a fiery circle when a fire-tipped stick is swung 
rap&idly. The first (for which see e.g. Nyayabindutlka I,p. 4;
Brh. Up. Comm. 1,5,2; 2,3,6; 5,1,1; Syadv. p. 107, St. XVI; p.
132, St. XX) is an actual freak of nature, formed by light-waves, 
and as it is an experience shared by numerous persons, is not 
entirely unreal, though it ultimately vanishes. The Jain points 
out that the knowledge (jnana) which accounts for the setting out 
of a man in the direction of the supposed water, is not mrga-
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t^snika-jnana, knowledgea of the mirage, but jala-jnana, knowledge 
of water (which is subsequently corrected). In this case, there­
fore, jnana has come into being Without its corresponding artha 
(object). (Syadv. p. 107, St. XVI).(Cf. Bph. Up. Comm. 4*4,22: 
’’Because a man who sees water in a mirage proceeds to drink from 
it, another who sees no water there, but merely desert, is cer­
tainly not so inclined”).
The conjuror’s tricks, similarly, produce a semblance of 
reality, which actually exists (even if only in the minds of the 
onlookers) for the moment. We find several references to the 
magician (mayin) in the Upanisads (e.g. Maitri Up. 4,2; Ka. Up.
VI,1 (Comm.); 3vet. Up. 4,9-10). The world is produced by Brahman 
as a ”mayin”, but the tertium comparationis does not lie in the 
unreality of what is produced, but rather in the sovereign power 
of the conjuror, who is able to produce a multiformity of shapes.
A particularly noteworthy passage is found in the Comm, on Ait.
Up. 1,1 (p. 30, Inand. edn.): "Just as a wise (vijnanavan) magician 
(mayavin) can, by his own power, without a material cause, show 
himself (lit. measure out- nirmiralte,- cf. connection with maya) 
as walking on the sky,- even so the creator (the mahamaya) creates 
(measures out) the world out of himself by his own power.4 This 
bears out Dr. Heimann* s interpretation of maya as "that which is 
measured" (see "Indian and Western Philosophy", pp. 52-3, for the 
inferiority of "measured" empirical objects to the immeasurable 
Avyaktam; and see also Cakravarti, The Philosophy of the Upanigads,
p. 192). (For further references to conjuring, see Vedantasara 
119; Sankhyak. Comm. 23; Kusum. 11,4; Syadv. p. 102, St. XVI; 
p. 176, St. XXXII).
The third example, alatacakra, the fiery wheel, has been 
dealt with in Chap. IV. It is an illusion called forth through 
insufficient quickness of sight. A similar mistake is made when 
a firefiky in the darkness is regarded as a light, or as fire 
(Brh. Up. Comm. 3#3,1; see above, Chap. VI). In a slightly differ­
ent categoyy is the "confusion of directions", when a man who knows 
the points of the compass is suddenly perplexed about them (e.g. 
Byh. Up. Comm. 1,4,10; V's gloss on Yogasutras 1,7; 11,5)* This 
phenomenon may be explained by too quick movement (in turning), 
or by an incidental defect of the internal organ, (similar to 
anupalabdhl "mano1navasthanat").
A fault not in visual perception, but in taste, is the sensa­
tion of "bitter treacle1 (or molasses), when there has been a 
bilious disturbance (see e.g. Upaskara on Vai£. Sutras 111,2,3).
The two best-known school examples of adhyaropa,- an illusory 
object based on an inadequate substratum of reality,- are the "rope 
and the snake", and the "silver and mother-of-pearl" The Vedantin 
holds that the "snake" is the creation of ignoranr- - -
like the attribution of qualities and limitations to the absolute 
Brahman. "Just as the snake which is the vivarta (wrong transforma­
tion) of a rope is discovered to be nothing but the rope, so the
something positive, not merely negative like our
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world of unreal things, beginning with ignorance (ajnana), forming 
the vivarta of the Reality (vastu), is realised in the end to be 
Reality (Brahman) alone11. (Vedantasara 137; cf. ibid. 53-4; and 
B:jh. Up. Comm., passim).
The Jain, however, says that the sight of the (illusory) 
snake undoubtedly produces the effect of fear, just as a real 
snake would (Sarv. Ill, p. 21). The Mlmimsa view is similar,- 
to all intents and purposes it is a snake that is seen, and not 
a rope; it is not a substitution, but a non-realisation (a-khyati) 
of the normal reality. According to the Naiyayika, the perception 
of illusory objects can be explained by the theory of jnana-laksana, 
intuitive knowledge (see above, Chap. I), or the application of 
memory. We know that a long twisted object is (or can be) a snake, 
so that when we dim|>y see a similar object, our pre-existing know­
ledge functions, and we see a snake.
An illusion of the same class is the mistaking of mother-of-
pearl for silver. The different theories of illusion have been
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dealt with thMoroughly by Rnandle (Indian Logic in the &arly Schools) 
and Sinha (Indian Psychology: Perception- Chap. XV), with special
reference to this example, so it will not be necessary to do more
than touch upon it here. The five principal theories of error are: 
(1) Atmakhyati (Buddhist Vijnanavadin), according to which the ob9 
ject of erroneous Judgment is subjective or ideal, and has no 
existence apart from the mind. (2) asatkhyati (Buddhist Madhyamika), 
according to which the objectof error is non-existent. But, argues
a critic, something absolutely non-existent can never appear in 
consciousness at all# The most that can be said is that the mother- 
of-pearl does not exist as silver. (3) Anirvacanlyakhyati (Vedantin), 
according to which the object of error is not expressible as 
existent or as non-existent. (See Vedantaparibha§a I) An “indefin­
able*1 silver is produced by the action of avidya, and continues 
as long as the illusion lasts. The criticism of this theory is 
that at the time of the erroneous cognition, the object of error 
is definitely designable as existent, while when the error is 
realised it is as definitely designable as non-existent. (4) Anyatha- 
khyati (Nyaya-Vai^eslka), according to which one thing is simply
mistaken for another, both being real. It is the recollection of
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silver which produces the perception of it;/if we s merely regard
A
an Illusion as a reproduction of past experience, we neglect its 
psychological character. The later Naiyayika goes farther, and 
maintains that we actually perceive transcendental silver, in an 
extraordinary perception (alaukika- jnanam). The silver that we 
see actually exists in another place. The Vedantin thereupon points 
out that if this were admitted, then an immediate cognition of fire 
etc. could take place, and inference would be unnecessary (Vedanta- 
paribhasa I). (5) Akhyati (Prabhakara Mlmaipsa), the theory of 
"neglected difference/, according to which we see only the common 
qualities of mother-of-pearl and silver, and not their own distinct­
ive qualities. All knowledge is fact, sarvaiii jnanajp pramanam, and 
error simply does not exist, except as incomplete knowledge. Wljen
we see a glittering object, andijLeap to the conclusion that it 
is silver, we have simply neglected the difference between two 
similar things, and have not grasped the fact that it is mother- 
of-pearl and not silver that we see. But although not the whole 
truth, it is certainly a partial truth; and it is the inner eye, 
not the sense-organ, which is at fault. Finally, the idea of 
unreality in illusion is completely dispelled by the Ramanujas, 
who say that when a piece of mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver 
it is because the silver has an ontological existence in the mother 
of-pearl at the time of the perception (satkhyati). This theory 
is based on the cosmological doctrine of the triplication or quin- 
tuplication of the elements. With this cf. the idea that as a 
matter of fact a black bee (for example) possesses all the (give) 
colours, but only one of them is visible, while the rest are latent 
So that everything is potentially visible (cf. the three gupas 
in Sankhya,- one predominating at a time).
We have discussed the various forms of non-existence, and 
the different sofcts of faulty perception, due to internal disorders 
or external circumstances. It now remains to consider incompatibly.! 
ties, errors of judgment and the like, and physical impossibilities 
In most cases statements of manifest absurdities are used to ridi­
cule the opponent in a Samvada, and to demonstrate that his argu­
ments are unsuitable or afeeupdv ridiculous. For example, it is 
evident that a hyena or lion does not have a suitable opponent 
in a young fawn (see above, Chap. VI); while a blind man is not 
qualified for work involving the examination of butter, nor a
lame man undertake any task involving the strides of Visnu 
(Vaiyayikanyayamala 3»4#2 (sutras 18-20). Quoted by Jacob III,p.48). 
Not even by a thousand blind men can a house be adequately guarded 
from thieves (Vacaspatimi£ra in £lka on Nyayavartika 1,2,2), 
nor a thousand blind travellers find the right road (Bhamati 1,1,5)• 
Examples of wrong judgment are nume^us. For instance, there 
is the man who does not take the milk suitable to a sick person,
but enjoys the sour grufcl (sauviraruci). This is used of one who
abandons the view that liberation b is the manifestation of happi­
ness, and accepts the view that it is merely the cessation of 
misery (Sarv. XI, p. 96). A carter would be behedded rather than 
pay a hundred pieces of money, but was quite willing to give five 
score (refusing to admit one thing, but admitting it under a 
different guise, e.g. accepting the falsity of the universe, but 
not its unreality,- Sarv. V, p. 58). When an opponent is compelled 
to accept certain conclusions, or else adopt an absurd alternative, 
he is compared to a man who will not wear shoes on his feet, and 
has to hang them around his neck instead (CitsukhI 1,11, etc.).
A man who abandons the search for the knowledge of Brahman in order 
to enjoy worldly pleasures is likened to one who gives up the 
Cintamani, and prefers a piece of common glass (See Jacob II, p. 17)
The proverb of the tenth man is a v favourite: each man in a party
of ten fails to count himself, until the error is pointed out. 
Similarly the Self (i.e. an individual who forms part of the 
universal Self) may imagine itself to to be miserable, until it is
pointed out that it cannot be (see Brhl Up. Comm. 1,4,15)*
Other examples of wrong judgment are: enquiring as to a suitable 
date (according to the planets) for shaving one's head, after 
that ceremony has already been performed (Nyayamanjarl p. 171); 
speaking of Kovidara trees when questioned about mangoes (see e.g. 
Bhamati 1,1,22; Vedantakalpataru 1,4,1). Further, it is a topsy­
turvy state of affairs when a Nisadi woman gives birth to a son, 
and her husband drinks the medicianal potion prepared for her 
(Vedantatattvaviveka, p. 37)* One does not need a mirror in order 
to look at a bracelet on the wrist (see Jacob ill, p. 41), nor 
should one take a lamp to assist in hearing sound. See above, tthap. 
VII, for the absurd way of capturing a crane. Any faulty logic 
is compared to the logic of the “milk and cow-dung"; "All that is 
produced from the cow is milk. Cow-dung is produced from the cow; 
therefore cow-dung is milk." (Vacaspati on Yogasutras 32; and see 
Sarv. II, p. 15).
Examples of an unlooked-for result are for instance a snake 
biting its own body (= making a statement, e.g. "nothing is known", 
when this is itself not known. See above, Chap. VI); and "day-break 
near the toll-collector‘s hut", which indicates failure to accomplish 
a desired object (udde£ya-asiddhi),- in this case the passing of 
the hut in the darkness, to evade the toll (see Sarv. XIII, p. 116; 
Syadv. p. 29, St. VI). A man who is completely worsted in argument 
is compared to someone who goes to ask for some oilcake (pinyaka), 
and has instead to agree (to give) a kharika of oil (Sarv. V, p. 52).
On p. 52 of Sarv. (C^ap. V) it is said that "The statement 
of the Advaita-vadins, who thirst for reulnion with the Supreme 
Lord, that Visnu, the most excellent abode of virtues, is but a 
mirage, is like cutting off the tongue while desirous of x obtaining 
a fine plantain; for it happens that, through incurring Visnu(s 
anger, they sink into blind darkness" (and so are not liberated at 
all). Another proverb indicating the destruction of the instrument 
for obtaining an effect is "Wishing to grow, you have even destroyed 
your t root", which may also meanx "While seeking to obtain interest, 
you have lost that and the capital too" (Sarv. Ill, p. 22). The 
maxim "rain on a saline barren waste'* is an illustration of something 
not having any useful effect.
A useless effort undertaken through wrong judgment is "catching 
at straws", which signifies being driven to an untenable argument 
(e.g. Sarv. Ill, p. 21). Actions barren of result are e.g. whisper­
ing in a deaf man*s ear, or showing a looking-glass to a blind man 
(see Jacob II, p. 4,etc.); and sacrificing on ashes (see Chapter 
VIII above), or straightening a dog‘s tail (see Jacob III, p. 89)• 
Useless repetition is likened to the grinding of chaff (tugakharujana) 
ov the grinding of what is already ground, or seeking to put a 
shoe on a p foot that is already shod (the last two are impossible 
as well as useless). No satisfaction is obtained through attempting 
to dispel darkness with a lamp no bigger than one's finger (Atma- 
tattvaviveka p. 52). A man who is already in a village is not anxious 
to reach it, as a man in a forest might be (see above, Chap. V, p.13 )^
3 1 8
A thief’s offer ofhis body for examination whe after the gold has 
been found under his armpit is an example of pointless bluff 
(e.g. Sarv. XII, p. 109); and the vigilance of the watchmen after 
the house has been plundered is likewise misplaced in time (see 
Jacob I).
There is a series of proverbs setting out the limits of human 
capacity; these may be termed examples of physical impossibility.
For example: "No young actor, however skilled, is clever enough to 
mount on his own shoulder11 (Syadv. p. 73-4> St. XIL), and "The 
edge of a sword, even though very keen, is not employed to cut 
itself'* (similarly, argues the Mlmanisaka, no action can have itdelf 
as an object,- and knowledge is an action. See also above, Ch. VIII, 
on the self-revelation of knowledge). Or "(Knowledge cannot know 
itself), just as the tip of a finger cannot be touched by itself" 
(Nyayavartlkatatparya^ika p. 466). The maxim of "pulling the root 
of the ear with the tip of the nose" is applied in Sure^vara's 
Brhadaranxyakavartika 4#3*1184 to those who are deluded, and speak 
of impossibilities. (But cf. the alleged power of Buddha to touch 
his ear with his tongue).
When a questioner inquires, "Why should a man not be fceborn 
even after mukti has been attained?", the exponent of Sankhya-Yoga 
replies in terms of cessante causa cessat effectus. If the effect 
could arise even in the absence of the cause, we should have blind 
men finding jewels, and suchlike absurdities.. As the Srutl says,
"A blind man found a jewel; (or, pierced it: fcidh) one without
•1 / / •
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fingers seized it, one without a neck wore it, and a dumb man 
praised it." (Taitt. Ara£. 1,11,6).(If the effect could arise without 
a cause, such things would be possible, hot absurd) (Yogasutras,
Comm • IV, 31) •
The maxim of "treacle on the elbow" refers to anything that 
is almost (if not quite) inaccessible (e.g. Sarv. XI, p. 95).
The inaccessibility of the sky made it a at favourite ground 
for speculation. At Svet. Up. VI,20, it is said,"When men shall 
roll up the sky as a piece of leather, then shall there be an end 
of misery without knowing God". Those who attempt to see distinctions 
in the one reality are as it were wishing to encircle the sky with 
a shield, or to ascend the sky as if it were a ladder.. (Ait. Up.
Comm. 11,1 (p. 67, Anand. edn.). A favourite way of silencing an 
opponent is to say that his argument is a vain attempt to strike 
the sky with his fist (e.g. Sarv.XII, p. 108). An equivalent ex­
pression is “gagana-romantha", ruminating on ether (Sarv. IV, p. 39, 
and XIII, p. 116). But this occupation is supposed to be the special 
prerogative of the snake, whose epithet is vatabhakga, "feeding on 
air"; so that this expression, though intended to denote impossibility 
or futility, must be qualified. A man who ridicules another's 
attempt, and at the same time tries something much more impossible, 
is reprimanded in these terms: "You ridicule the man who ties his 
gold up in a corner of his garment, bi^ t you yourself take the gold 
and tie it up in the border of the sky." (Atmatattvaviveka p.
58).
In the same context as "looking for birds' footprints in the 
sky", we find "swimming on land under the impression that it is 
water" quoted as an impossibility (Byh. Up. Comm. 4»4#22,- see 
above, p.2>oi). But here again we must not lose sight of the polaric 
aspect. That which is not possible for the ordinary human being, 
is an everyday affair for the Yogin, who has supernatural powers 
second only to those of the gods. He can move from one place to 
another at will, in defiance of time and space. He can assume any 
form he pleases, either becoming lighter than cotton wool and 
walking over the rays of light or webs of spiders, or expanding 
to fill the universe. He can touch the moon with his fingertips, 
or plunge into the earth as if it were water. The saintly Yogin 
has prophetic vision, and past#and future time are present to 
his eyes. Moreover, he can create material things out of nothing, 
and make inanimate things animate. (See e.g. Sahkhyak. and STK 
23; Yogasutras 111,42 (Vyasa); IV,5 (Vacaspatl), IV,10 (Vyasa).
It may be argued that the power of the Yogin is beyond ?*>£&&&»? 
human knowledge, and does not affect the lives of ordinary mortals. 
But remember that in India there were schools of mysticism; it 
was believed that, with perseverance and application, anyone could 
conquer time, space and the elements. The Yogin collects and 
summarises that which is separate in other men; he combines divergen* 
things, and peselvee turns illusion into a "reality of fiction".
From the 'trfetaphysical points of view, too, we have seen howA
certain schools of thought regarded "illusions" as not entirely
false. On the one hand, the Vedantin holds that the whole world 
is an illusion, and that faulty perceptions (e.g. of silver in
mother-of-pearl) are no more unreal than the perception of any
empirical object, e.g. a Jar (though on a different plane). The
only difference is that in the case of the apparent silver, the
cognition can be contradicted in everyday life; while the jar etc.
is only unreal when contrasted with the ultimate Reality, Brahman.
On the other hand, the Prabhakara Mlmaipsakas say that
every cognition is true, and that there is no illusion; while
the later Naiyayika clings to his belief in abnormal perceptions
(alaukika), not only for Yogins, but also for the average person.
From yet another point of view, one has only to look at 
a collection of Indian paintings or sculptures to see the mani­
foldness and exuberance of Nature depicted and symbolised in 
seemingly fantastic ways. Gods and goddesses with multiple heads 
and limbs-e»-quii are quite de rigueur, while combinations of 
man and beast (e.g. man-lion, elephant-headed god, and the like) 
were not only accorded their place in art, but also in philosophi­
cal discussions (see above, Chap. VI).
It is therefore quite in order to give "illusion11 a recognised 
place in the world of reality, and to value it as a means of 
attaining truth.
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Afterword._
In a survey of the kind which we have now completed, there 
are two possible ways of approach: a) from the angle of the 
philosophical theories, grouping together the similes relevant 
to each theory; and b) from the point of view of giving a picture 
of Indian civilisation and culture, by assembling the similes 
in their appropriate sphere, and showing how each symbol may 
illustrate divergent philosophical theories* We have chosen the 
second method, at the risk of some repetition where the theories 
and dogmas are concerned; because in this way it can more clearly 
be shown how philosophy in India was never divorced from everyday 
life* For this purpose the whole classical period has been 
treated as one, without an attempt at following an exact historical 
sequence in the texts*
Some systems have come in for a larger share of notice than 
others, mainly because they specialise in striking similes. Certain 
metaphors and similes have been appropriated by one particular 
system,- e.g* the dancer, the lame and the blind, and the milk and 
the calf, which are regarded as the special property of the 
Sankhya shchool. But the vast majority of figures of speech are
%
common to all schools, and we have noted more than once how the 
arguments in a Saipvada tend to revolve around the example which 
symbolises the theory,—  the example which is common to layman 
and philosopher alike, and which makes it possible for (otherwise) 
abstruse doctrines to be expressed in a concrete way*
